More $1billion fines

Thu Jun 16 21:08:52 BST 2011

British Sugar plc in 2009 received  the record cheque in UK, £83million,  under the  Common Agricultural Policy
payments scheme.
This was the  same company , see below, fined euros 39.6million in 1998 for price fixing in UK .

Scores of individual Fines of multi million euros imposed by EC , are too numerous to list. and in one case of 1billion euros.    Many fines of £1million plus are imposed by OFT in UK.  Fines of  $1billion plus are imposed by Federal Securities Authority and by US criminal courts on well known multinationals trading in UK.
Two of the big four accountancy firms which prepare the books of the FT 100 companies were fined $50million (Deloitte) and $1.5million (Ernst and Young)
The latest fine, this week,  is £240 million on Lever Bros and Proctor and Gamble for operating a cartel to fix the price in UK of washing powders .

Many Banks including Credit Suisse, and Deutche Bank received $1million plus fines in 2003, 2004, etc.  
With this knowledge  and from the evidence given by Eddie George to the  Treasury Select Committee in 2005 I conclude that  the Treasury and B of E knew in 2005 that crooks were in charge of world finance and that the bubble was inevitable because of the total lack of integrity at the heart  of the City.
If you did not already know about these mammoth fines, and if you read the newspapers, ask yourself why you were unaware.
See the fines at www.endgame.org
(EC Press release)- 

														The Commission imposes fines for violation of the European competition rules on Great Britain's sugar market

IP/98/898
Brussels, 14 October 1998

The Commission imposes fines for violation of the European competition rules on Great Britain's sugar market
The European Commission has decided to fine sugar producers 
British Sugar and Tate & Lyle, as well as sugar merchants Napier 
Brown and James Budgett for violation of Article 85(1) of the EC Treaty.
 The Commission found that the companies have pursued the object of 
restricting competition through a co-ordination of their pricing policy 
on the white granulated sugar market in Great Britain. The Commission 
therefore imposed fines of 39.6 million ECU on British Sugar, 7 million 
ECU on Tate & Lyle, 1.8 million ECU on Napier Brown and 1.8 million 
ECU on James Budgett.
The Decision concerns the collaborative strategy of higher 
pricing by British Sugar, Tate & Lyle, Napier Brown and James 
Budgett on the industrial white granulated sugar market in Great 
Britain, as well as a similar kind of strategy pursued only by British 
Sugar and Tate & Lyle on the retail white granulated sugar market in
 Great Britain.
The relevant period during which these infringements took place 
was between 20 June 1986 and 2 July 1990 with respect to British Sugar 
and Tate & Lyle, and between late 1986 and 2 July 1990 with respect 
to Napier Brown and James Budgett. During this period the four companies
 represented around 90% of  the entire white granulated sugar market in 
Great Britain.
The Commission found evidence of numerous meetings between the 
parties, which took place in regular intervals throughout the relevant 
period. In an initial meeting between British Sugar and Tate & Lyle 
on 20 June 1986, the principles of the future anti-competitive conduct 
were set. The merchants Napier Brown and James Budgett joined this 
conduct before the end of 1986.
18 further meetings about industrial white granulated sugar took 
place between all four parties. During these meetings British Sugar 
informed Tate & Lyle, Napier Brown and James Budgett of target 
prices it intended to obtain with respect to industrial sugar. 
Concerning retail sugar, there were 8 further meetings between British 
Sugar and Tate & Lyle in which British Sugar revealed to Tate & 
Lyle its pricing policy and in which the two companies discussed their 
respective discount policies towards large retail customers.
While the Commission does not have sufficient evidence that 
prices to be charged to individual buyers of industrial or retail sugar 
were jointly fixed, the systematic participation of all four parties in 
regular meetings concerning industrial sugar, and of British Sugar and 
Tate & Lyle concerning retail sugar, lead to an atmosphere of mutual
 certainty as to the participants' intentions concerning their future 
pricing behaviour. Each of them could rely, if not on the precise price 
levels of the other participants, at least on their intentional pursuit 
of the collaborative strategy of higher pricing.
For all the participants this mutual assurance was of interest, 
particularly, - though not exclusively - in the price range above the 
break-even point, in which range price competition was possible while 
still profitable.
The fines have been calculated on the basis of the Commission's 
published Guidelines on the imposition of fines OJ C9, 14.1.1998. The 
Commission has taken into account that the infringements were serious 
and of medium duration. Considerable differentiations with regard to the
 individual contributions of the four parties to the infringement have 
been made:
  The participation of British Sugar, on account of its high
 share on the relevant markets for industrial and retail sugar, and due 
to its position as price leader on these markets, was an essential 
participant in the operation of the cartel.  
  Tate & Lyle, on account of its share on the relevant markets was the second most important member of the cartel.
  The merchants Napier Brown and James Budgett did not 
participate in the key meeting of 20 June 1986. They joined the cartel 
only several months later and from then onwards only participated in the
 infringements concerning industrial sugar. Moreover, due to the fact 
that they were dependent on the supplies from the two domestic sugar 
producers  British Sugar and Tate & Lyle  for a significant part of 
the sugar they sold in their function as merchants, their influence on 
the relevant market and their possibility of exercising power on that 
market, was limited. 
Moreover, with regard to British Sugar, several aggravating factors have been found:
  British Sugar was the instigator of the infringements and 
throughout the relevant period remained the driving force. In fact, 
after having waged a price war against its competitors, it took the 
initiative, by arranging the meeting of 20 June 1986, to replace this 
price war by a collaborative strategy of higher pricing with its 
competitors.
  British Sugar acted in a manner contrary to the clear wording
 contained in its full comprising compliance programme, which it 
presented to the Commission in October 1986 in the course of the Napier 
Brown-procedure, and which the Commission took into account as a 
mitigating factor when setting the fine in the Napier Brown-decision.
  Already in July 1988, in its so-called Napier Brown-decision,
 the Commission fined British Sugar for having attempted to squeeze a 
merchant out of the retail market on the white granulated sugar market 
in Great Britain. This means that British Sugar practiced the 
collaborative strategy of higher pricing, which is at issue in the 
present Decision, for two years in parallel with the 
Commission-procedure leading up to the Napier Brown-decision.
As to Tate & Lyle, the Commission has substantially 
reduced the fine under the Notice on the non-imposition or reduction of 
fines in cartel cases ("Leniency Notice") OJ C207, 18.7.1997, in order 
to take account of the fact that Tate & Lyle co-operated with the 
Commission, in particular by submitting two self-incriminating letters 
to it. Indeed, these two letters adduced decisive evidence of the 
cartel's existence and allowed the Commission to intervene in this case.

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