[Ir-l] Microsoft Security Bulletins Fail PGP Verification and no one noticed
Paul Mobbs
mobbsey at gn.apc.org
Sun Jul 29 23:49:47 BST 2001
http://www.newsbytes.com/news/01/168397.html
Microsoft Bulletins Fail PGP Verification
By Brian McWilliams, Newsbytes
REDMOND, WASHINGTON, U.S.A.,
26 Jul 2001, 2:12 PM CST
Microsoft security bulletins often fail a popular e-mail authentication
system. But the company insisted today that its method for distributing
security information is sound. To protect against forgery, Microsoft's
security response center digitally signs its bulletins with PGP before
e-mailing them to the more than 100,000 subscribers to its security
notification service. But if recipients attempt to verify the messages'
authenticity, PGP often issues a warning that the signer of the bulletin is
invalid.
PGP, a public key encryption and authentication technology developed by Phil
Zimmerman, has been widely adopted by security-conscious Internet users.
Network Associates Inc. acquired PGP in 1997.
"The problem is that Microsoft's bulletins effectively look as if they're
forged. And telling a Microsoft forgery from someone else's is virtually
impossible," said Paul Murphy, head of information technology at Gemini
Genomics, a genetic research firm in Cambridge, England.
Murphy encountered the problem when he attempted to verify the PGP signature
on security bulletin MS01-040, which was distributed by Microsoft Wednesday
night.
Newsbytes confirmed that on the last 22 bulletins distributed by Microsoft
since March 27, PGP reports that the signer of the key is invalid. One
bulletin, MS01-018, included both a bad signature and an invalid signer.
When PGP is used to digitally sign a message, the contents of the e-mail are
encrypted and placed in a signature block at the bottom of the message. Upon
reading the message, recipients can use PGP to decrypt and verify the
contents of the e-mail.
Scott Culp, head of Microsoft's security response center acknowledged that
the company's bulletins may cause PGP to generate invalid key warnings
because of an "implementation issue" in the PGP program.
According to Culp, Microsoft has chosen not to rely on an authentication
concept in PGP known as "the Web of trust," in which a key deployed by a PGP
user to encrypt documents gains validity if it is "signed" by other PGP users.
"The Web of trust works well if you're exchanging e-mail among friends. But
we don't ask anybody to sign our key. We have always relied (on) other,
better ways of validating our key," said Culp. Those techniques include
providing a secure download of the key from the Microsoft site and publishing
the key's fingerprint, he said.
Earlier this month, a malicious user distributed a bogus Microsoft security
bulletin from a forged Microsoft return address. The message advised
recipients to download a security patch, which security experts later
identified as containing an Internet worm.
In a message at its site about the bogus bulletin, Microsoft said "This is
not the first time malicious users have issued counterfeit security
bulletins, and it will likely not be the last. Microsoft urges customers to
always verify any mail that claims to be a Microsoft security bulletin."
The bogus Microsoft bulletin distributed July 10 contained text near the
bottom that resembled a PGP signature block. But Newsbytes has confirmed that
the e-mail was not digitally signed.
Besides sometimes not being able to verify the signer of a Microsoft
bulletin, some users may also encounter problems with the PGP signature.
Usually "bad" signatures result from bits of data being altered during the
bulletin's transit across the Internet, according to Culp.
Despite these problems and the confusion that may result, Microsoft will
stick to signing its bulletins with PGP.
"If you can't verify the signature or the key appears to be invalid, all it
means is that you don't know for sure whether the bulletin came from us and
hasn't been modified. In those cases, you should check the Web site, which
has the authoritative version," said Culp.
According to Murphy, most people don't verify the PGP signature in incoming
messages.
"If they see there's a signature, most people assume it's okay and trust it
without actually verifying whether it checks out," said Murphy.
Microsoft Security Response Team's PGP key is at
http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/MSRC.asc .
The Microsoft notice about bogus bulletins is at
http://www.microsoft.com/technet/itsolutions/security/news/bogus.asp .
Reported by Newsbytes.com, http://www.newsbytes.com .
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