[Ir-l] Microsoft Security Bulletins Fail PGP Verification and no one noticed

Paul Mobbs mobbsey at gn.apc.org
Sun Jul 29 23:49:47 BST 2001


http://www.newsbytes.com/news/01/168397.html

Microsoft Bulletins Fail PGP Verification

By Brian McWilliams, Newsbytes
REDMOND, WASHINGTON, U.S.A.,
26 Jul 2001, 2:12 PM CST

Microsoft security bulletins often fail a popular e-mail authentication 
system. But the company insisted today that its method for distributing 
security information is sound. To protect against forgery, Microsoft's 
security response center digitally signs its bulletins with PGP before 
e-mailing them to the more than 100,000 subscribers to its security 
notification service. But if recipients attempt to verify the messages' 
authenticity, PGP often issues a warning that the signer of the bulletin is 
invalid.

PGP, a public key encryption and authentication technology developed by Phil 
Zimmerman, has been widely adopted by security-conscious Internet users. 
Network Associates Inc. acquired PGP in 1997.

"The problem is that Microsoft's bulletins effectively look as if they're 
forged. And telling a Microsoft forgery from someone else's is virtually 
impossible," said Paul Murphy, head of information technology at Gemini 
Genomics, a genetic research firm in Cambridge, England.

Murphy encountered the problem when he attempted to verify the PGP signature 
on security bulletin MS01-040, which was distributed by Microsoft Wednesday 
night.

Newsbytes confirmed that on the last 22 bulletins distributed by Microsoft 
since March 27, PGP reports that the signer of the key is invalid. One 
bulletin, MS01-018, included both a bad signature and an invalid signer.

When PGP is used to digitally sign a message, the contents of the e-mail are 
encrypted and placed in a signature block at the bottom of the message. Upon 
reading the message, recipients can use PGP to decrypt and verify the 
contents of the e-mail.

Scott Culp, head of Microsoft's security response center acknowledged that 
the company's bulletins may cause PGP to generate invalid key warnings 
because of an "implementation issue" in the PGP program.

According to Culp, Microsoft has chosen not to rely on an authentication 
concept in PGP known as "the Web of trust," in which a key deployed by a PGP 
user to encrypt documents gains validity if it is "signed" by other PGP users.

"The Web of trust works well if you're exchanging e-mail among friends. But 
we don't ask anybody to sign our key. We have always relied (on) other, 
better ways of validating our key," said Culp. Those techniques include 
providing a secure download of the key from the Microsoft site and publishing 
the key's fingerprint, he said.

Earlier this month, a malicious user distributed a bogus Microsoft security 
bulletin from a forged Microsoft return address. The message advised 
recipients to download a security patch, which security experts later 
identified as containing an Internet worm.

In a message at its site about the bogus bulletin, Microsoft said "This is 
not the first time malicious users have issued counterfeit security 
bulletins, and it will likely not be the last. Microsoft urges customers to 
always verify any mail that claims to be a Microsoft security bulletin."

The bogus Microsoft bulletin distributed July 10 contained text near the 
bottom that resembled a PGP signature block. But Newsbytes has confirmed that 
the e-mail was not digitally signed.

Besides sometimes not being able to verify the signer of a Microsoft 
bulletin, some users may also encounter problems with the PGP signature. 
Usually "bad" signatures result from bits of data being altered during the 
bulletin's transit across the Internet, according to Culp.

Despite these problems and the confusion that may result, Microsoft will 
stick to signing its bulletins with PGP.

"If you can't verify the signature or the key appears to be invalid, all it 
means is that you don't know for sure whether the bulletin came from us and 
hasn't been modified. In those cases, you should check the Web site, which 
has the authoritative version," said Culp.

According to Murphy, most people don't verify the PGP signature in incoming 
messages.

"If they see there's a signature, most people assume it's okay and trust it 
without actually verifying whether it checks out," said Murphy.

Microsoft Security Response Team's PGP key is at 
http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/MSRC.asc .

The Microsoft notice about bogus bulletins is at 
http://www.microsoft.com/technet/itsolutions/security/news/bogus.asp .

Reported by Newsbytes.com, http://www.newsbytes.com .




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