[Ir-l] FW: [europe] [FYI] FITUG Statement on Crypto Policy
Caspar Bowden
cb at fipr.org
Wed Sep 19 14:27:58 BST 2001
Forwaded from FITUG
--
Caspar Bowden www.fipr.org
Director, Foundation for Information Policy Research
Tel: +44(0)20 7354 2333
-----Original Message-----
From: europe-l-admin at xs4all.nl [mailto:europe-l-admin at xs4all.nl] On
Behalf Of Axel H Horns
Sent: 18 September 2001 19:04
To: europe-l at xs4all.nl
Subject: [europe] [FYI] FITUG Statement on Crypto Policy
[Will soon be somewhere on http://www.fitug.de/ --AHH]
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FITUG Statement on crypto policy 2001-09-18
FITUG expresses its deepest sympathy for the victims of the heinous
attacks in the U.S.
FITUG calls upon the governments around the world to ensure combating
of terrorism and other forms of crime on the basis of proper law
enforcement on the basis of law and justice in order to protect those
basic values constituting a free and democratic world.
The tragic events have sparked off an increasing debate on
legislative measures suitable to help preventing future acts of
terrorism, in particular with regard but not limited to potential
future casualties including utilisation of weapons of mass
destruction (WMD).
One option recently proposed by various circles concerned comprises a
re-strengthening of the signal intelligence (SIGINT) capabilities of
the intelligence services and measures to facilitate the
communication eavesdropping of law enforcement agencies in order to
be able to uncover and monitor communication links of distributed
groups of terrorists or other criminals. When following this
argumentation, the availability of strong "unckrackable" encryption
products to everybody can be identified as a major obstacle blocking
further progress in anti-terrorism and anti-crime policy.
Such view is, however, misleading, and any resulting legislative
activity based thereon will inevitably fail to reach its goal but
instead undermine the basic values of freedom and democracy which we
all do need to protect against terrorism in these grievous times.
In particular, FITUG issues a number of observations as set out
below:
- Over-reliance of intelligence services and law enforcement agencies
on technology-based surveillance may well lead to a lack of awareness
of relevant facts. It has come to be known that frequently in
terrorist or other criminal groups some of the most important
information is relayed non-technologically, often carried by human
couriers. Oftenly, the communications methods employed by such
organisations are designed to defy technological surveillance.
- Hence, the proper way to enhance the capabilities of the
intelligence services and law enforcement agencies is to effect a
major reform of these institutions, abandoning contemporary visions
of defeating terrorism and other crime by monitoring the outside
world by masses of officials staring on countless computer screens
installed within high-security fortresses and displaying data
gathered by SIGINT techniques. The SIGINT hybris has to be stopped.
What the services actually need isn't more and more electronic access
to private raw information but more brain power in order to derive
proper conclusions. Let them then get out to mess with real
terrorists and other criminals in real life. This is where a solution
of the current crisis can be found.
- Cryptography is now well established as a basic technology for
countless products of the emerging Information Society and, hence, a
complete ban thereof is deemed to be completely infeasible. Moreover,
in the late 90ies of the past centuries many recognised experts in
the field of cryptography have demonstrated that mandatory GAK is not
a real option on a technical level; countless technical problems of
large-scale GAK systems are still completely unresolved.
- Some have said that the tragic events in the U.S. are an example of
high-tech terrorism. This is completely wrong. Although the captured
planes surely are high-tech, the way of capturing them by rogue
brutality exercised with knifes is absolutely low-tech. By no means
society should forget that there is a real risk of a very severe high-
tech assault on the data networks of the wired world. However,
widespread use of strong cryptography is a crucial brick in a
framework to protect the sensitive technical network infrastructure
of the Information Society against attacks. Obstruction of free usage
of strong cryptography means irresponsibly weakening the
infrastructual framework of the emerging Information Society.
- Last but not least, the right to privacy of the ordinary citizen is
one of the core values of a free democracy. Destroying the technical
basis for preserving privacy in the Information Society means to
deteriorate one of the essential characteristics of the free world.
Whatever legislative steps are taken in response to the recent
attacks, terrorists and other criminals will come up with effective
techniques to conceal what and with whom they communicate from where
to where, or even whether they store and communicate at all. Thus, if
legal restrictions are placed on the privacy permitted by the IT
infrastructure, only criminals will enjoy unrestricted privacy.
In the current situation, law enforcement agencies should only be
allowed and enabled to exploit security weaknesses of IT systems
still present on the basis and within the limits of an explicit
warrant issued by a competent court. No duty to implement additional
weaknesses should be imposed by legislation whatsoever.
Therefore, FITUG rejects all attempts to impose upon the citizens any
restrictive regulations of cryptography, i.e. in particular, but not
limited to, by demanding Governmental Access to Keys (GAK) schemes.
Moreover, FITUG urges all policymakers as well as all relevant NGOs
in this field
- to support any suitable measures to stop the current SIGINT hybris,
- to support development of alternative effective measures to
strengthen societies against the threats of terrorism and other
crime, and
- to strongly oppose any proposals to impose restrictive regulations
upon encryption.
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