[Ir-l] FW: [europe] [FYI] FITUG Statement on Crypto Policy

Caspar Bowden cb at fipr.org
Wed Sep 19 14:27:58 BST 2001


Forwaded from FITUG
--
Caspar Bowden                           www.fipr.org
Director, Foundation for Information Policy Research
Tel: +44(0)20 7354 2333 

-----Original Message-----
From: europe-l-admin at xs4all.nl [mailto:europe-l-admin at xs4all.nl] On
Behalf Of Axel H Horns
Sent: 18 September 2001 19:04
To: europe-l at xs4all.nl
Subject: [europe] [FYI] FITUG Statement on Crypto Policy


[Will soon be somewhere on http://www.fitug.de/              --AHH]

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FITUG Statement on crypto policy                         2001-09-18

FITUG expresses its deepest sympathy for the victims of the heinous 
attacks in the U.S.  

FITUG calls upon the governments around the world to ensure combating 
of terrorism and other forms of crime on the basis of proper law 
enforcement on the basis of law and justice in order to protect those 
basic values constituting a free and democratic world.    

The tragic events have sparked off an increasing debate on 
legislative measures suitable to help preventing future acts of 
terrorism, in particular with regard but not limited to potential 
future casualties including utilisation of weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD).    

One option recently proposed by various circles concerned comprises a 
re-strengthening of the signal intelligence (SIGINT) capabilities of 
the intelligence services and measures to facilitate the 
communication eavesdropping of law enforcement agencies in order to 
be able to uncover and monitor communication links of distributed 
groups of terrorists or other criminals. When following this 
argumentation, the availability of strong "unckrackable" encryption 
products to everybody can be identified as a major obstacle blocking 
further progress in anti-terrorism and anti-crime policy.       

Such view is, however, misleading, and any resulting legislative 
activity based thereon will inevitably fail to reach its goal but 
instead undermine the basic values of freedom and democracy which we 
all do need to protect against terrorism in these grievous times.    

In particular, FITUG issues a number of observations as set out 
below:    

- Over-reliance of intelligence services and law enforcement agencies 
on technology-based surveillance may well lead to a lack of awareness 
of relevant facts. It has come to be known that frequently in 
terrorist or other criminal groups some of the most important 
information is relayed non-technologically, often carried by human 
couriers. Oftenly, the communications methods employed by such 
organisations are designed to defy technological surveillance.   

- Hence, the proper way to enhance the capabilities of the 
intelligence services and law enforcement agencies is to effect a 
major reform of these institutions, abandoning contemporary visions 
of defeating terrorism and other crime by monitoring the outside 
world by masses of officials staring on countless computer screens 
installed within high-security fortresses and displaying data 
gathered by SIGINT techniques. The SIGINT hybris has to be stopped. 
What the services actually need isn't more and more electronic access 
to private raw information but more brain power in order to derive 
proper conclusions. Let them then get out to mess with real 
terrorists and other criminals in real life. This is where a solution 
of the current crisis can be found.        

- Cryptography is now well established as a basic technology for 
countless products of the emerging Information Society and, hence, a 
complete ban thereof is deemed to be completely infeasible. Moreover, 
in the late 90ies of the past centuries many recognised experts in 
the field of cryptography have demonstrated that mandatory GAK is not 
a real option on a technical level; countless technical problems of 
large-scale GAK systems are still completely unresolved.     

- Some have said that the tragic events in the U.S. are an example of 
high-tech terrorism. This is completely wrong. Although the captured 
planes surely are high-tech, the way of capturing them by rogue 
brutality exercised with knifes is absolutely low-tech. By no means 
society should forget that there is a real risk of a very severe high-
tech assault on the data networks of the wired world. However, 
widespread use of strong cryptography is a crucial brick in a 
framework to protect the sensitive technical network infrastructure 
of the Information Society against attacks. Obstruction of free usage 
of strong cryptography means irresponsibly weakening the 
infrastructual framework of the emerging Information Society.     

- Last but not least, the right to privacy of the ordinary citizen is 
one of the core values of a free democracy. Destroying the technical 
basis for preserving privacy in the Information Society means to 
deteriorate one of the essential characteristics of the free world.   
 
Whatever legislative steps are taken in response to the recent 
attacks, terrorists and other criminals will come up with effective 
techniques to conceal what and with whom they communicate from where 
to where, or even whether they store and communicate at all. Thus, if 
legal restrictions are placed on the privacy permitted by the IT 
infrastructure, only criminals will enjoy unrestricted privacy.   

In the current situation, law enforcement agencies should only be 
allowed and enabled to exploit security weaknesses of IT systems 
still present on the basis and within the limits of an explicit 
warrant issued by a competent court. No duty to implement additional 
weaknesses should be imposed by legislation whatsoever.    

Therefore, FITUG rejects all attempts to impose upon the citizens any 
restrictive regulations of cryptography, i.e. in particular, but not 
limited to, by demanding Governmental Access to Keys (GAK) schemes.   
Moreover, FITUG urges all policymakers as well as all relevant NGOs 
in this field     

- to support any suitable measures to stop the current SIGINT hybris, 
 
- to support development of alternative effective measures to 
strengthen societies against the threats of terrorism and other 
crime, and      

- to strongly oppose any proposals to impose restrictive regulations 
upon encryption.    




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