[Ir-l] ALERT: The UK's new Export Control Bill and impacts on the Internet community
Paul Mobbs
mobbsey at gn.apc.org
Mon Feb 25 14:11:18 GMT 2002
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ALERT: Export Control Bill
**A very quick alert for something I've recently come across in Parliament**
Last year the Government introduced the Export Control Bill into Parliament
[http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200102/ldbills/020/2002020.htm].
This is a long overdue Bill, replacing many of the export controls over
military and paramilitary exports from the UK - the current controls date
back as far as 1939. Many lobby groups, such as Amnesty International
[http://www.amnesty.org.uk/action/camp/arms/index.shtml] are running
campaigns in support of the Bill.
There may be an unseen consequence of the Bill. Part of the military
technology controlled by the Bill is 'information security' and 'computer
software' - most notably encryption systems. But because the Bill controls
the "provision of assistance" to use information security or computer systems
it might affect the online community supplying help online to campaign or
protest groups.
New Scientist [no.2331, 23rd February 2002] has already flagged up the
problems the Bill may create for academics. The Bill does not discriminate -
it bans the movement of all products, information and assistance that has a
potentially damaging impact to the national interests of the UK. For example,
the developers of free software collaborating globally on developing new
programs might by affected if they work on any project involving encryption,
signals analysis, cryptanalysis, or even developing clustering software to
link computers together to form small supercomputers. The Bill affects all
media - you can potentially be prosecuted for providing support or
information by email, the web, telephone, fax or the postal system.
The important section is clause 3:
"3. Technical assistance"
"(1) The Secretary of State may by order make provision for or in connection
with the imposition of technical assistance controls in relation to technical
assistance of any description."
"(2) For this purpose -
"technical assistance controls", in relation to any technical assistance,
means the prohibition or regulation of participation in the provision outside
the United Kingdom of that technical assistance; and"
"technical assistance" means services which are provided or used, or which
are capable of being used, in connection with the development, production or
use of any goods or technology."
"(3) Technical assistance may be described in the order wholly or partly by
reference to the uses to which it (the goods or technology in question) may
be put."
<snip>
What determines whether an export or provision of technical assistance is
damaging are the conditions in the Schedule - the relevant part being
paragraph 5:
"Schedule:
(5) An order may be made for the purposes of imposing technical assistance
controls in relation to technical assistance of any description if it appears
to the Secretary of State when the order is made that there is a risk that
the provision outside the United Kingdom of such assistance might have a
relevant consequence."
The 'relevant consequences are also defined in the schedule:
!Relevant Consequences -
"A. An adverse effect on -
(a) the national security of; or
(b) the security of members of the armed forces,
of the United Kingdom (or any dependency), and Member state or any other
friendly state."
The problem comes down to how the definition of "friendly states" works. For
example. If there were a group set up in Afghanistan to lobby for human
rights, and I were to tech them online to secure their computers and to use
encryption systems, would I be breaching the provisions on 'technical
assistance'? If the Government were to decide that teaching anyone except the
'recognised' government of Afghanistan was tantamount to teaching Osama Bin
Laden himself, it could seriously impact the work of groups or individuals
providing assistance to lobby groups and activists. And what about the other
states where Britain has interests? Iraq, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia? This is not
an abstract consideration. Recently I have been involved in writing materials
that could conceivably fall foul of the terms of the Bill to assist
journalists and human rights workers in parts of the globe where the UK and
the US have significant political and military interests in propping up
repressive governments.
The draft regulations accompanying the Bill
[http://www.dti.gov.uk/export.control/legislation/exportcontrolbill.htm] set
out what items are covered by the Bill. These are *very* vague. This is
because the Bill seeks to apply to anything that the Government considers
problematic rather than describing specific examples.
For encryption, one of the deciding factors in the regulations is whether the
user is able to configure the system of encryption. If you're using the
standard PGP package it's borderline as to whether the user has the ability
to configure the system - for example choosing a longer key length. But what
about GPG for Linux. You have a choice of ciphers, key lengths, etc. It's
very user configurable.
In conclusion, the main problem with the Bill is that it is indiscriminate,
and it's application is beholding to the whim of a government minister. If
you have a benign minister, no problem. But the Bill could potentially be
used as a repressive measure to restrict co-operation between groups and
activists via the Internet to supply help and training. For this reason alone
the Bill represents a potential threat to civil rights.
The Bill is back in the House of Lords on March 4th. Those people who have
contact details for Lords might like to raise the issue of the application of
the Bill before then. After that it will have to go back to the Commons for
its final reading, and it will then receive Royal Assent.
If I have time I'll try and put something together and circulate it so that
everyone can lobby, In the mean time you could just contact the Lords or the
Commons (e.g., your local MP) to complain about the indiscriminate nature of
the Bill).
Paul Mobbs.
- - -------------------
"We are not for names, nor men, nor titles of Government, nor are we for
this party nor against the other but we are for justice and mercy and
truth and peace and true freedom, that these may be exalted in our nation,
and that goodness, righteousness, meekness, temperance, peace and unity
with God, and with one another, that these things may abound."
(Edward Burroughs, 1659 - from 'Quaker Faith and Practice')
Paul Mobbs, Mobbs' Environmental Investigations,
3 Grosvenor Road, Banbury OX16 5HN, England
tel./fax (+44/0)1295 261864
email - mobbsey at gn.apc.org
website - http://www.fraw.org.uk/mobbsey.html
public key - http://www.fraw.org.uk/keylist.html
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