[Ir-l] How to hack an election computer
Tony Gosling
tony at gaia.org
Mon Dec 8 17:40:42 GMT 2003
1. this story below is from July - got very little publicity despite the
implications
http://www.scoop.co.nz/mason/stories/HL0307/S00065.htm
same story - http://www.guerrillanews.com/bunker/bunker_archive/doc2991.html
2. on the same subject - link only here - a whole book -
http://www.votescam.com/orderbook.html (to order the book)
http://www.votescam.com/chapters.html (for 9 chapters of the book)
It's very definitely a 'MUST read'
Inside A U.S. Election Vote Counting Program
Tuesday, 8 July 2003, 6:20 pm
http://www.scoop.co.nz/mason/stories/HL0307/S00065.htm
Article: Bev Harris
Inside A U.S. Election Vote Counting Program
By Bev Harris*
* Bev Harris is the Author
of the soon to be published book " Black Box
Voting:
Ballot Tampering In The 21st Century "
http://www.blackboxvoting.com
*** NEW *** FOLLOW UP STORY
Bald-Faced Lies About Black Box Voting Machines
and
The Truth About the Rob-Georgia File
IMPORTANT
NOTE: Publication of this story marks a watershed in
American
political history. It is offered freely for
publication in full or part on
any and all internet forums,
blogs and noticeboards. All other media are
also encouraged to utilise material. Readers are encouraged to forward
this
to friends and acquaintances in the United States and
elsewhere.
CONTENTS
Introduction
Part 1 - Can the votes be changed?
Part 2 - Can the password be bypassed?
Part 3 Can the audit log be altered?
************* Introduction
According to election industry officials, electronic voting systems are
absolutely secure, because they are protected by passwords and tamperproof
audit logs. But the passwords can easily be bypassed, and in fact the audit
logs can be altered. Worse, the votes can be changed without anyone
knowing, even the County Election Supervisor who runs the election system.
The computer programs that tell electronic voting machines how to record
and tally votes are allowed to be held as "trade secrets." Can citizen's
groups examine them? No. The companies that make these machines insist that
their mechanisms are a proprietary secret. Can citizen's groups, or even
election officials, audit their accuracy? Not at all, with touch screens,
and rarely, with optical scans, because most state laws mandate that
optical scan paper ballots be run through the machine and then sealed into
a box, never to be counted unless there is a court order. Even in recounts,
the ballots are just run through the machine again. Nowadays, all we look
at is the machine tally.
Therefore, when I found that Diebold Election Systems had been storing
40,000 of its files on an open web site, an obscure site, never revealed to
public interest groups, but generally known among election industry
insiders, and available to any hacker with a laptop, I looked at the files.
Having a so-called security-conscious voting machine manufacturer store
sensitive files on an unprotected public web site, allowing anonymous
access, was bad enough, but when I saw what was in the files my hair turned
gray. Really. It did.
The contents of these files amounted to a virtual handbook for
vote-tampering: They contained diagrams of remote communications setups,
passwords, encryption keys, source code, user manuals, testing protocols,
and simulators, as well as files loaded with votes and voting machine
software.
Diebold Elections Systems AccuVote systems use software called "GEMS," and
this system is used in 37 states. The voting system works like this:
Voters vote at the precinct, running their ballot through an optical scan,
or entering their vote on a touch screen.
After the polls close, poll workers transmit the votes that have been
accumulated to the county office. They do this by modem.
At the county office, there is a "host computer" with a program on it
called GEMS. GEMS receives the incoming votes and stores them in a vote
ledger. But in the files we examined, which were created by Diebold
employees and/or county officials, we learned that the Diebold program used
another set of books with a copy of what is in vote ledger 1. And at the
same time, it made yet a third vote ledger with another copy.
Apparently, the Elections Supervisor never sees these three sets of books.
All she sees is the reports she can run: Election summary (totals, county
wide) or a detail report (totals for each precinct). She has no way of
knowing that her GEMS program is using multiple sets of books, because the
GEMS interface draws its data from an Access database, which is hidden.
And here is what is quite odd: On the programs we tested, the Election
summary (totals, county wide) come from the vote ledger 2 instead of vote
ledger 1, and ledger 2 can be altered so it may or may not match ledger 1.
Now, think of it like this: You want the report to add up only the actual
votes. But, unbeknownst to the election supervisor, votes can be added and
subtracted from vote ledger 2. Official reports come from vote ledger 2,
which has been disengaged from vote ledger 1.
If one asks for a detailed
report for some precincts, though, the report comes from vote ledger 1.
Therefore, if you keep the correct votes in vote ledger 1, a spot check of
detailed precincts (even if you compare voter-verified paper ballots) will
always be correct.
And what is vote ledger 3 for? For now, we are calling it the "Lord Only
Knows" vote ledger.
*************
Detailed Examination Of Diebold GEMS Voting Machine Security ( Part 1) CAN
THE VOTES BE CHANGED?
Here's what we're going to do: We'll go in and run a totals report, so you
can see what the Election Supervisor sees. Then we'll tamper with the
votes. I'll show you that our tampering appears in Table 2, but not Table
1. Then we'll go back and run another totals report, and you'll see that it
contains the tampered votes from Table 2. Remember that there are two
programs: The GEMS program, which the Election Supervisor sees, and the
Microsoft Access database that stores the votes, which she cannot see.
Let's run a report on the Max Cleland/Saxby Chambliss race. (This is an
example, and does not contain the real data.) Here is what the Totals
Report will look like in GEMS:
CLICK FOR BIG
VERSION
http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/images/gems/CLEL3.jpg
As it stands, Cleland is stomping Chambliss. Let's make it more exciting.
The GEMS election file contains more than one "set of books." They are
hidden from the person running the GEMS program, but you can see them if
you go into Microsoft Access.
You might look at it like this: Suppose you
have votes on paper ballots, and you pile all the paper ballots in room
one. Then, you make a copy of all the ballots and put the stack of copies
in room 2.
You then leave the door open to room 2, so that people can come in and out,
replacing some of the votes in the stack with their own.
You could have some sort of security device that would tell you if any of
the copies of votes in room 2 have been changed, but you opt not to.
Now, suppose you want to count the votes. Should you count them from room 1
(original votes)? Or should you count them from room 2, where they may or
may not be the same as room 1? What Diebold chose to do in the files we
examined was to count the votes from "room2."
Illustration:
If an intruder opens the GEMS program in Microsoft Access, they will find
that each candidate has an assigned number:
http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/images/gems/CANDNUM.jpg
One can then go see how many votes a candidate has by visiting "room 1"
which is called the CandidateCounter:
http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/images/gems/ROOM1.jpg
In the above example, "454" represents Max Cleland and "455" represents
Saxby Chambliss.
Now let's visit Room2, which has copies of Room1. You can
find it in an Access table called SumCandidateCounter:
http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/images/gems/ROOM2.jpg
Now let's put our own votes in Room2. We'll put Chambliss ahead by a nose,
by subtracting 100 from Cleland and adding 100 to Chambliss. Always add and
delete the same number of votes, so the number of voters won't change.
Notice that we have only tampered with the votes in "Room 2." In Room 1,
they remain the same. Room 1, after tampering with Room 2:
http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/images/gems/ROOM1.jpg
Now let's run a report again. Go into GEMS and run the totals report.
Here's what it looks like now:
CLICK FOR BIG VERSION
http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/images/gems/CLEL4.jpg
Now, the above example is for a simple race using just one precinct. If you
run a detail report, you'll see that the precinct report pulls the
untampered data, while the totals report pulls the tampered data. This
would allow a precinct to pass a spot check.
************* Detailed Examination Of Diebold GEMS Voting Machine Security
( Part 2)
CAN THE PASSWORD BE BYPASSED?
At least a dozen full installation versions of the GEMS program were
available on the Diebold ftp site. The manual, also available on the ftp
site, tells that the default password in a new installation is "GEMSUSER."
Anyone who downloaded and installed GEMS can bypass the passwords in
elections. In this examination, we installed GEMS, clicked "new" and made a
test election, then closed it and opened the same file in Microsoft Access.
One finds where they store the passwords by clicking the "Operator" table.
http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/images/gems/PW-1.jpg
Anyone can copy an encrypted password from there, go to an election
database, and paste it into that.
Example: Cobb County Election file
One can overwrite the "admin" password with another, copied from another
GEMS installation. It will appear encrypted; no worries, just cut and
paste. In this example, we saved the old "admin" password so we could
replace it later and delete the evidence that we'd been there. An intruder
can grant himself administrative privileges by putting zeros in the other
boxes, following the example in "admin."
continued at http://www.scoop.co.nz/mason/stories/HL0307/S00065.htm
--
Tony Gosling - +44 117 944 6219 - mobile +44 7786 952037
"Capitalism is institutionalised bribery" [TG]
All emails are 'cleartext' to the NSA.
http://www.nsa.gov
Familiarise yourself with Jesus of Nazareth's exit strategy.
http://www.bilderberg.org/trib.htm
All facts, no theory. Proofs of a conspiracy.
http://www.bilderberg.org/lucis.htm
My monthly e-bulletin
Check it http://www.bilderberg.org/pepis03.htm
Join it http://www.bilderberg.org/bilder.htm#pepis
"Tony Gosling" <tony at gaia.org> +44 117 944 6219
http://www.tlio.org.uk
http://www.bilderberg.org
http://www.cultureshop.org
http://www.videonetwork.org
http://www.public-interest.co.uk/bbc/
http://europe.ecovillage.org/uk/network/index.htm
-------------- next part --------------
---
Outgoing mail is certified Virus Free.
Unless you're using Norton Antivirus.
Checked by AVG anti-virus system (http://www.grisoft.com).
Version: 6.0.548 / Virus Database: 341 - Release Date: 05/12/03
More information about the Ir-l
mailing list