[Ir-l] "US gov can shut down the Internet in case of war"

Dave Bird dave at xemu.demon.co.uk
Wed Jan 22 19:54:59 GMT 2003


In article <3.0.5.32.20030117184233.008bf100 at mail.gaia.org>, Tony
Gosling <tony at gaia.org> writes
>
>Militaries and Cyber-War 
>http://www.counterpane.com/crypto-gram-0301.html#1
>Recently I was interviewed by an Iranian newspaper on the subject of
>computer security. One of the questions I was asked was whether or not the
>Pentagon had a secret weapon that could disable the Internet. 
>It's an interesting question. I have no idea what the real answer is, but I
>can certainly speculate. 

 The situation is similar to that with the phone system.  There is
 provision to shut the phone system down or, more exactly, make it
 either civil government and military or just military ('telephone
 preference system') as publicised in various Duncan Campbell books,
 and this provides a useful analogy.  On one level it was planned to
 just spring this were there a transition into a full-scale east/west 
 nuclear war when no-one gave a hang for civilian activity any more.  
 There are obvious disadvantages that doing it at any other time 
 disrupts many aspects of society and commerce, and would probably 
 cause a panic rather than prevent one.  On another level, it may have
 been tried for limited durations in limited areas, and the mainstream
 media ordered not to report it, in which case you are going to tell
 me that "of course" you know of such incidents because you read it
 in obscure alternative media, but very few of the public would.
 Also I have no doubt that phone cables or satellite transponders
 have had convenient technical failures at key times.  

 Much the same applies to the Internet.  I'm sure the government
 could make an arrangement to lean on most major ISPs to shut down
 in an emergency: "most large ones" is enough to cut off 98% of
 the population. Or it could block specific cables and satellite
 channels.  What holds them back from doing so is just how
 disruptive it would be.  It is always possible that communication
 can be taken from you in extreme emergency, or if it is a matter
 of all communications down a particular cable/channel.  Your chief
 guarantee of uninterrupted access is that it's so disruptive to
 shut down the whole system, and that you can hide among a lot of
 anonymous traffic without needing a specific link from A to B.
 
>
>There's no doubt that the smarter and better-funded militaries in the world
>are planning for cyberwar, both attack and defense. It's a multifaceted
>concept. A military might target the enemy's communications infrastructure
>through both physical attack -- bombings of selected communications
>facilities and transmission cables -- and virtual attack. It would be
>foolish for a military to ignore the threat and not invest in defensive
>capabilities, or to
>ignore the possibility of launching an offensive cyber-attack against an
>enemy during wartime. And while history has taught us that many militaries
>are indeed foolish, some are not. 
>
>This implies that at least some of our world's militaries have Internet
>attack tools that they're saving in case of wartime. They could be
>denial-of-service tools. They could be exploits that would allow military
>intelligence to penetrate military systems. They could be viruses and worms
>similar to what we're seeing now, but perhaps
>country- or network-specific. I can certainly imagine a military finding a
>new vulnerability in a common operating system or software package and
>keeping it secret, hoping to use that vulnerability to their advantage in
>wartime. 
>
>So my guess is that the U.S. military could disable large parts of the
>Internet, at least for a while, if they wanted.
>
>But I doubt that they would do so; it's far too useful an asset, and far
>too large a part of our economy. More interesting is whether they would try
>to disable pieces of it. If we went to war with country X, would we want to
>disable their portion of the Internet, or remove connections between their
>Internet and our Internet? Depending
>on the country, a low-tech solution might be the easiest: disable whatever
>undersea cables they're using as access. Could the U.S. military turn the
>Internet into a U.S.-only network if they wanted? That seems less likely,
>although again a low-tech solution involving the acquiescence of companies
>like Cable & Wireless might be the easiest. 
>
>One important thing to remember here is that you only want to shut an
>enemy's network down if you aren't getting useful information from it. The
>best thing to do is to infiltrate the enemy's computers and networks, spy
>on them, and surreptitiously disrupt select pieces of their communications
>when appropriate. The next best thing is to passively eavesdrop. After
>that, the next best is to perform traffic analysis. Only if you can't do
>any of that do you consider shutting the thing down. 
>
>When a military discovers a vulnerability in a common product, they can
>either alert the manufacturer and fix the vulnerability, or not tell
>anyone. In U.S. military circles, this is called the equities issue. It's
>not an easy decision.
>Fixing the vulnerability gives both the good guys and the bad guys a more
>secure system. Keeping the vulnerability secret means that the good guys
>can exploit the vulnerability to attack the bad guys, but it also means
>that the good guys are vulnerable. 
>
>Script kiddies are attackers who run exploit code written by others, but
>don't really understand the intricacies of what they're doing. Professional
>attackers spend an enormous amount of time developing exploits: finding
>vulnerabilities, writing code to exploit them, figuring out how to cover
>their tracks. The real professionals don't
>release their code to the script kiddies; the stuff is much more valuable
>if it remains secret. I believe that some militaries have collections of
>vulnerabilities, and code to exploit those vulnerabilities, that they are
>saving in case
>of wartime or other hostilities. It would be irresponsible for them not to. 
>
>My interview in the Iranian newspaper. (To be honest, I have no idea what
>it says.) 
><http://www.jamejamdaily.net/shownews2.asp?n=26454&t=com> 
>--
>All emails are 'cleartext' to the NSA
>http://www.nsa.gov
>"Capitalism is institutionalised bribery" [TG]
>
>Familiarise yourself with Jesus of Nazareth's exit strategy
>http://www.bilderberg.org/trib.htm
>
>Tony Gosling
>10-12 Picton Street
>Bristol
>BS6 5QA
>England
>+44 (0)117 944 6219
>fax +44 117 942 0164
>
>"Tony Gosling" <tony at gaia.org>
>http://www.tlio.org.uk
>http://www.bilderberg.org
>http://www.cultureshop.org
>http://www.videonetwork.org
>http://www.public-interest.co.uk/bbc/
>http://www.ecovillages.org/uk/network/
>
>
>
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