[Ir-l] Computer antivirus strategies in crisis
Tony Gosling
tony at gaia.org
Wed Sep 10 13:48:33 BST 2003
Computer antivirus strategies in crisis
http://www.newscientist.com/news/news.jsp?id=ns99994119
19:00 03 September 03
Special Report from New Scientist.
The speed with which US law enforcers last week tracked
down Jeffrey Lee Parson, one of the alleged culprits
behind the destructive computer virus MSBlaster, was
heralded as a great victory in the battle against computer
crime. But an investigation into antivirus software shows
that there is no cause for celebration. Antivirus
specialists are fighting a losing battle against malicious
code like viruses and worms, it concludes.
The research, undertaken at Hewlett-Packard's labs in
Bristol, UK, is the first to evaluate the effectiveness of
antiviral software. It shows that the way we fight viruses
is fundamentally flawed, because viruses spread faster
than antivirus patches can be distributed. By the time the
antivirus software catches up, the damage has already been
done, says Hewlett-Packard researcher Matthew Williamson.
Most antivirus software works by identifying unique
characteristics or patterns in the computer code that
makes up a virus. Once identified, this "signature" is
distributed to everyone who has bought antivirus software,
allowing the software to block or eradicate the malicious
code. But this strategy means you have to know what the
virus looks like before you can do anything about it,
Williamson points out.
Williamson's research, due to be presented at a conference
in Toronto later in September, is the first time anyone
has analysed how effective this antivirus software is. One
way of doing this would be to compare how a company
network protected by antivirus software fares, compared
with an unprotected network.
But there is an obvious problem with this approach. "Few
companies would be willing to turn off their antivirus
software to be part of a control group," Williamson
observes.
Biological spread
Instead, he designed a computer model to mimic the way in
which viruses spread, based on a model that tracks the
spread of biological viruses. He then introduced
parameters to represent the way the antivirus software
responds to this spread.
He found that even if a signature is available from the
moment a virus is released, it cannot stop the virus
spreading if it propagates fast enough. "These fast
viruses are what we are getting at the moment," Williamson
says, adding that they are getting better at being
quicker.
What emerged clearly from Williamson's model is that code
to combat these viruses cannot be distributed fast enough.
Antivirus software checks for updates no more than once an
hour, and this is too slow.
The problem is that too many checks may be perceived as an
attack. When the Slammer worm struck in January 2003,
78,000 machines were infected in half an hour. "That's
before anyone's pager went off," Williamson says.
Ultimately, the antiviral software gains the upper hand
and the virus stops spreading. "It will run out of
machines that it can infect," says Williamson. But by this
stage the damage has already been done.
Suspect code
An additional problem with using a signature-based
approach is that it clogs up the system. Every email has
to be scanned for every virus that has ever existed, and
with tens of thousands of viruses this has become more and
more cumbersome and less sustainable. Signatures cannot be
thrown away, in case that particular virus returns from a
non-inoculated source, so the list just keeps getting
longer.
Signature-based approaches should not be abandoned, says
Williamson, as they are useful for cleaning up infected
computers. But to stop the spread of a fast-propagating
virus, the antiviral mechanisms have to step in before
signatures become available.
Weblinks
MS Blaster, Symantec
HP Research Bristol
McAfee Avert
Computer Associates
McAfee Avert in Amsterdam, the Netherlands, is developing
a strategy designed to do this. It uses "heuristics" -
essentially a set of loose rules and probabilities - to
spot suspect code, and this approach does a good job of
catching new viruses. But there is a catch: it also tends
to sound the alarm over code that turns out to be
harmless.
"Customers don't want any false positives," says Marius
van Oers, an antivirus research engineer at McAfee Avert.
"It can cause panic."
As software becomes ever more complex the number of weak
points for viruses to exploit inevitably increases, says
Myles Jordan, an analyst with Computer Associates, an
antivirus company based in Australia.
And virus writers do not have to be particularly adept
programmers. It appears that Parson was caught because he
made the mistake of renaming the virus file after his
internet pseudonym. The next culprit may not give himself
away so easily.
Duncan Graham-Rowe
http://www.newscientist.com/news/news.jsp?id=ns99994119
--
Visit Things From Another World for the best
comics, movies, toys, collectibles and more.
http://www.tfaw.com/?qt=wmf
---
Incoming mail is certified Virus Free.
Checked by AVG anti-virus system (http://www.grisoft.com).
Version: 6.0.515 / Virus Database: 313 - Release Date: 01/09/03
--
Tony Gosling - +44 117 944 6219 - mobile +44 7786 952037
"Capitalism is institutionalised bribery" [TG]
All emails are 'cleartext' to the NSA.
http://www.nsa.gov
Familiarise yourself with Jesus of Nazareth's exit strategy.
http://www.bilderberg.org/trib.htm
All facts, no theory. Proofs of a conspiracy.
http://www.bilderberg.org/lucis.htm
My monthly e-bulletin
Check it http://www.bilderberg.org/pepis03.htm
Join it http://www.bilderberg.org/bilder.htm#pepis
"Tony Gosling" <tony at gaia.org> +44 117 944 6219
http://www.tlio.org.uk
http://www.bilderberg.org
http://www.cultureshop.org
http://www.videonetwork.org
http://www.public-interest.co.uk/bbc/
http://europe.ecovillage.org/uk/network/index.htm
-------------- next part --------------
---
Outgoing mail is certified Virus Free.
Unless you're using Norton Antivirus.
Checked by AVG anti-virus system (http://www.grisoft.com).
Version: 6.0.515 / Virus Database: 313 - Release Date: 01/09/03
More information about the Ir-l
mailing list