Gulf War, a Kurdish perspective

[kurds at gn.apc.org]

        The following is the text of an article written
	by Sarbast just before war broke out in the Gulf.
	It provides a clear and excellent exposition of the
	significance of the unresolved Kurdish question in
	leading up to the present crisis.  A must for anyone
	who wants to understand the causes of the current
	crisis.


It is difficult to avoid comparison between Hitler's attempt to
wipe out the Jews and Saddam Hussein's desire to get rid of the
Kurds in Iraq.

It is also difficult not to note the general tendency in the
international community and even the press to underestimate the
importance of the Kurdish problem in the political equations and
inter-state relations of the Middle East.

While there are widespread talks about the necessity of resolving
all the Middle East's outstanding problems, we hardly hear any
mention of the Kurds.

Why?  Are the Kurds less important than the Palestinians?  While
the crimes committed against the people of Kuwait by the Iraqi
army of occupation since the August 2nd invasion must be
deplored, one should also ask oneself: is the fate of 25 million
Kurds of less concern to the world than a mere three quarters of
a million Kuwaitis?

Is the Kurdish question not one of the paramount elements of
instability in the Middle East?  I believe it is.  One live
example in hand to prove my claim is the present crisis in the
Gulf.

Let us for a while refresh our memory and try to find links
between Saddam's domestic and foreign adventures and manoeuvres
in the last 20 years or so, and see where the Kurds fit in.

Why was Saddam forced to make the concessions that he made to
Iran in 1975 - namely to give up half of the Shat-al-Arab
waterway? 

On March 11, 1970, an autonomy agreement was signed between the
Iraqi regime and the Kurdish movement, which was at the peak of
its strength at the time, under the leadership of the late
General Mustafa Barzani.  This agreement was supposed to be
implemented in four years.  But when the time came, in 1974, Iraq
refused to honour its promise.  And the war broke out once again.

Iran (then under the Shah), which has got its own Kurdish
problem, thought that this was a golden opportunity to establish
itself as the regional superpower while also making sure that the
Kurds never got anywhere in any part of Kurdistan.  The Shah
started arming and funding the Barzani movement with the full
backing of the CIA.

When Saddam (he was vice-president at the time, but still the
strongest man) found himself cornered under the increasing
pressure of the Kurdish guerilla movement to the extent that the
very existence of his regime was at stake, he conceded half of
Shat-al-Arab to the Shah (Algeria agreement), who in return
stopped supporting the Kurds.  And the movement came to an end.

However, less than a year passed before the Kurdish people
reorganised themselves and resumed their armed struggle against
the Iraqi government.  When the Shah was overthrown and Ayatollah
Khomeini came to power in 1979, Saddam sought to exploit the
turmoil of post revolutionary Iran and tried to regain what he
had given away himself.

Adopting the rhetoric of Arab nationalism and "defending the
eastern frontiers of the Arab world", on September 22nd 1980, he
led the Iraqi people to a war with Iran that would last eight
bloody years.  The result: a million dead to Saddam's credit.

Not long after beginning the war, Saddam had realised that he
would certainly be defeated by the much larger Iran.  But thanks
to all the military technology and economic assistance that he
received from West and East, (not forgetting Gulf money and his
large scale use of chemical weapons), and thanks to the
stubbornness of the Iranian mullahs, Saddam came out as a
survivor and even managed to claim "victory" when Khomeini
finally decided to drink the "poisoned chalice" and Iran accepted
Security Council resolution 598, demanding a ceasefire, in July
1988.

Since then, Saddam has been fully aware that, in order to satisfy
Iran, he had to go back to the 1975 Algeria accord: to surrender
all his war gains for nothing in return.  And this meant giving
up sovereignty over his only access to the Gulf.  He therefore
had to look for a soft target to make up for this loss and to
achieve his other ambitions (such as becoming leader of the Arab
world).  Kuwait proved too tempting to resist.

I also believe that there was another equally important reason
which contributed towards finalising his decision to invade
Kuwait: occupying Kuwait provided him with a perfect excuse by
which he would "fulfil" all the Iranians "wanted", without being
seen to be defeated or humiliated in the eyes of Arabs and
Iraqis.

Thus one can say that if it were not for the Kurds, Saddam would
not have been forced to give up sovereignty over Shat-al-Arab,
might not have started the war with Iran - although the West
might still have pushed him towards that war in order to stop the
spread of Islamic fundamentalism - and, last but absolutely by no
means the least, he might not have invaded Kuwait in the dramatic
style that he did.

Each of the countries occupying Kurdistan (Iraq, Iran, Turkey,
Syria) has always tried to exploit the Kurds of one or more of
its neighbouring countries for its own purposes.  But all of them
have always agreed to suppress the Kurdish people's demand for
their rights or any form of self-rule, no matter how limited. 
There have been reports in the past few days that possible aims
for Turkey's eagerness to be involved in the Gulf crisis include
ensuring that after a war no Kurdish state is formed in northern
Iraq; or even "retaking" Mosul and Kirkuk, oil rich provinces in
southern Kurdistan that most Turks believe were unjustly wrenched
from them in December 1925 by the British mandate in Iraq.

Considering these facts, one can only wonder why not try to find
a solution for this long standing and complicated problem of the
Middle East?  However, there are two reasons that have
contributed towards diluting the importance of the Kurds.  First,
one has got to be objective: the lack of a clear united vision
among the Kurdish political movement itself as to what kind of
solution it is seeking.  Presenting the case as a mere internal
problem of each of those countries surely does not attract
sufficient international sympathy.

Secondly, the obvious unwillingness among the West and the US -
the USSR does not have an influential role to play any more - to
upset their allies in the Middle East.  This is particularly true
in the case of Turkey, which is determined to fight Kurdish
nationalism and aspirations.

Whichever the case may be, unless this factor of instability
suits the West and the Americans - ie, they can use it in times
of need to play one state against another - then it is only
logical that they should practise their influence in order to
reach a just and lasting solution to the problem.

And now the clock is ticking away towards a catastrophic war in
the Gulf, the consequences of which go beyond our wildest
imagination.  In my opinion, the Kurdish element has been the
most decisive one in bringing the Middle East to this end.  It
would therefore be naive to try to establish what in Whitehall is
known as the PCRSS - post-crisis regional security structure -
without addressing the Kurdish question as well.

It is time to abandon the argument that the colonially imposed
borders on Kurdistan are inviolable.

It is time to get the records straight and to reconcile justice
with history.  Britain, as a nation that, after the First World
War, played a leading part in the arbitrary carving up of the
Middle East, has an historical and moral obligation to try to
include the Kurds in the eventual political equation of the
region.  Let us not forget that people's desire to determine
their own destiny and to live freely in their own land is
essentially at the root of international law.  In order to reach
a lasting peace and a "regional security structure" in the Middle
East, the West should not opt for the easy way out - maintaining
the status quo.


	Sarbast Aram
	Co-ordinator
	Kurdish Cultural Centre
	14 Stannary Street
	London SE11 4AA
	Tel: +44 71 735 0918
	Fax: +44 71 582 8894