From pnmideast at igc.apc.org  Mon Jan  6 03:58:39 1992
From: pnmideast at igc.apc.org (PeaceNet Middle East Team)
Date: Sun, 05 Jan 1992 19:58:39 -0800 (PST)
Subject: KURDISTAN: GUERRILLAS HAVE THE EDGE
Message-ID: <APC.1.0.54efc64c.ea7@igc.apc.org>

From: <pnmideast>
Subject: KURDISTAN: GUERRILLAS HAVE THE EDGE

/* Written 11:04 am  Jan  5, 1992 by newsdesk in cdp:ips.englibrary */
/* ---------- "KURDISTAN: GUERRILLAS HAVE THE EDGE" ---------- */
Copyright Inter Press Service 1991, all rights reserved.  Permission to re-
print within 7 days of original date only with permission from 'newsdesk'.

Area: Middle East
Title: KURDISTAN: GUERRILLAS HAVE THE EDGE IN SKIRMISHES WITH IRAQIS


an inter press service feature

by john roberts

attn editors:   repetition: the following is the first of a series
of four features on the situation in iraqi kurdistan. the other
three features will be run on jan 3, jan 6 and jan 7.

chamchamal, jan 2 (ips) -- the iraqi tanks are silhouetted against
the sky, their soldiers manning checkpoints which denote -- in
practice, if not in theory -- the birth of a new frontier.

this is chamchamal, the front line on the road from iraqi-held
kirkuk to the biggest city in iraqi kurdistan, suleimaniyah.

the pesh merga -- the kurdish guerrilla fighters -- have 4,000
men to cover the front lines, which have changed little in recent
months. despite this saddam hussein's forces have regularly tried
to isolate and seize kurdish held towns and villages.

in november, the iraqis sought to envelop chamchamal. kerim,
the local pesh merga commander, said that on the day before this
correspondent visited chamchamal, four iraqi helicopters had
bombarded the village of karawais, just south of here.

the iraqis then attacked a village a few kilometres to the north,
bina bingred. there were no reported casualties, as so often in
kurdistan, villagers fled at the first sign of attack.

the towns of chamchamal, karawais and bina bingred -- indeed most
of the territory of iraqi kurdistan -- lie south of the 36th
parallel, the line beyond which the western powers in the gulf war
coalition have said they will not permit iraqi aircraft to fly.

chamchamal, and its 100,000 population, lies in a bowl. to the
east, a low ridge is held by the iraqis. once, the pesh merga
could not have hoped to hold such a position. the burnt-out wrecks
of iraqi tanks in narrow highland defiles are testimony to their
true forte -- guerrilla war in kurdistan's rugged mountains.

but this is open plain. pesh merga control of chamchamal -- and
the most densely populated regions of their homeland -- depend on
two factors, both largely outside their control.

one is the collapse of morale in the iraqi army. this is
primarily the result of war weariness, eight years of fighting
iran (1980-1988); four years of suppressing the kurds (1985-1988);
defeat in the kuwait war (february 1991); and retaliation by the
allies for renewed efforts to suppress the kurds (april 1991), all
these have taken their toll. (more/ips)

kurdistan: guerrillas have the edge in skirmishes with iraqis(2)

kurdistan: guerrillas have the edge (2)

the pesh merga's tactics have helped too. when the iraqis
attack, they are usually repulsed quickly -- with many iraqi
soldiers quick to surrender.

the pesh merga say they keep any captured officers, but let the
men go -- unarmed but unharmed -- after a day or two. when the
released soldiers next face the kurds, they know there will be no
problem if they surrender. it simply becomes the safest option.

at chamchamal, kerim wants to show us a deserter. his identity
cards show him to be a 23-year-old baghdadi. ''i didn't want to go
back to the southern region'' the iraqi said, explaining that when
he joined up, he gave the authorities a false address, so his
family wouldn't suffer if he deserted. whether or not this is
true, it does indicate the poor state of the iraqi army morale.

the other factor keeping the iraqis at bay is, of course, the
possibility of a western military response to any major iraqi
assault on the kurds.

well to the north, over the mountain town of agrah, u.s. f-16
fighter-bombers from the nato base at incirlik in turkey, wheel
and dive in a demonstration of continued allied firepower in a
volatile theatre of operations. but all ask how long they will
continue to be in the area.

''we cannot depend forever on foreign protection,'' kurdish
leader jalal talabani told ips. but the kurds will need it for
some time to come. ''there is a need for long-term protection,''
added massoud barzani, the other principal leader of the umbrella
group known as the kurdistan front.

the comments are not really contradictory. both leaders know
the kurds must build up their own strength to counter that of
baghdad, so that if an agreement on autonomy or federal government
is ever reached with the central iraqi government, kurdish
strength will ensure that it is honoured.

despite several months of controversial negotiations, no such
accord is in sight. nor is there any sign of the kind of long-term
western protection required to maintain the current delicate
status quo in which the kurds of iraq indeed possess their
freedom, but wonder how and whether it can be made to stick.

nowhere is the balance between 'free kurdistan' and saddam-
controlled regions of iraq more clearly visible than at kifri.
normally home to about 100,000 people the town is half empty, the
closest iraqi checkpoint just 100 metres from the last house.

there the iraqis check to see baghdad's virtual embargo on
gasoline and heating oil is being observed. this is the point,
less than 200 kilometres from baghdad -- where the high tablelands
of kurdistan come down to the fertile plains of mesopotamia.
(more/ips)

kurdistan: guerrillas have the edge in skirmishes with iraqis(3-e)

kurdistan: guerrillas have the edge (3)

here are date-bearing palms, the very symbol of iraq. here, too,
are deserted and blasted houses, the prime symbols of devastated
kurdistan.

twenty or thirty kilometres to the southeast are the fertile
plains of khanigia -- a reminder that the kurds occupy significant
lowland areas. but, as in the plains around kirkuk and mosul,
these are areas controlled by saddam's troops.

for the moment, the front line between pesh merga and iraqi
soldiers is fairly well defined. but an iraqi thrust could quickly
isolate vast stretches of kurdistan, while an iraqi collapse could
yield the fall of major cities, oil fields and strategic areas.

in the mountains near dohuk -- the last advanced, albeit minor
outpost of western soldiery in kurdistan -- kurdish professionals
from the former iraqi army are trying to build up a regular
kurdish army to safeguard their people's future.

it's an ambitious project. the kurds have weapons enough --
including tanks, guns, and mortars captured from the iraqis -- but
they lack ammunition and training, and their own air cover.

given the conditions of modern warfare, that means u.s. warplanes
will have to continue patrolling the skies of kurdistan for quite
some time to come.

and if the kurds are really to be allowed to rebuild their
shattered society and infrastructure in peace, that aerial shield
will have to be extended southwards to reflect the realities of
the new frontier so closely guarded by both saddam's troops and
the kurdish pesh merga. (ends/ips/rp/jr/rj)


From pnmideast at igc.apc.org  Thu Jan  9 21:33:44 1992
From: pnmideast at igc.apc.org (PeaceNet Middle East Team)
Date: Thu, 09 Jan 1992 13:33:44 -0800 (PST)
Subject: KURDISTAN: A TURKISH PROBLEM FOR TH
Message-ID: <APC.1.0.54efc64d.86c@igc.apc.org>

From: <pnmideast>
Subject: KURDISTAN: A TURKISH PROBLEM FOR TH

/* Written  8:03 am  Jan  9, 1992 by newsdesk in cdp:ips.englibrary */
/* ---------- "KURDISTAN: A TURKISH PROBLEM FOR TH" ---------- */
Copyright Inter Press Service 1991, all rights reserved.  Permission to re-
print within 7 days of original date only with permission from 'newsdesk'.

Title: KURDISTAN: A TURKISH PROBLEM FOR THE KURDS


an inter press service feature

by john roberts

attn editors: the following is the third in a series of four
features on the situation in iraqi kurdistan. the first two ran on
jan 2 and 3. the last one will run on jan 7.

shaqlavah, jan 6 (ips) -- for years it has been a cliche that
turkey has had a kurdish problem. but in iraqi kurdistan the
situation is reversed: the kurds there have a turkish problem.

after decades of antipathy to kurdish asprations, the turkish
republic is now positioning itself to play a potentially decisive
role as a protecting power for the kurds of iraq. and, unlike the
support given to the kurds by the shah of iran before his 1975
peace pact with iraq, this time the protection would be overt.

such support from ankara is unprecedented - and has prompted very
different reactions amongst the kurdish leadership in iraq.

one kurdish leader, jalal talabani, said '' yes'' with great
emphasis when ips asked him whether he believed the pro-kurdish
stance of turkey's new prime minister, suleiman demirel, was
genuine.

but the other main iraq kurdish leader, masoud barzani, was far
more cautious. he acknowledged turkey's role in providing a base
for western planes to defend the kurds in the northernmost marches
of iraq from aerial assault by saddam's planes.

but his wariness at the thought of relying on ankara became all
too apparent when he spoke to ips. iraq's kurds, barzani said,
need some kind of international protection.

''we don't underestimate turkey's role in providing such
protection, but it's a question of reliability. we've more faith
in provision of such protection by western powers, rather than by
regional powers,'' he said.

barzani's comments are rooted in kurdish experience. his fater,
mustapha barzani, waged a fierce campaign against baghdad in 1974-
5, with the active support of another regional power, imperial
iran.

but at algiers, in 1975, the shah of iran and saddam hussain
concluded an agreement whereby a bitter and long-lasting border
dispute over the shatt al-arab waterway was settled in iran's
favour in return for the shah's agreement to end its support for
the kurdish revolt.

as for turkey, the kurds remember the consequences of the 1979
ankara-baghdad agreement under which the two countries granted
each other the right of hot pursuit into each other's territory in
their campaigns against kurdish nationalists. (more/ips)

kurdistan: a turkish problem for the kurds(2)

kurdistan: a turkish (2)

between 1983 and 1987, when iraqi control of its northern
borders was weak, turkey launched a series of incursions into
iraqi kurdistan officially aimed a crushing support bases for the
pkk, the outlawed kurdish nationalist party in turkey, but widely
seen as the precursor of a revived turkish claim to political
authority over much of the kurdish-populated area of iraq.

with the return of suleyman demirel as prime minister, there has
been a sea-change in official turkish policy towards both the
kurds of iraq and turkey's own kurdish population.

ankara traditionally denied not only that it had a specifically
kurdish problem, but even that turkey had a kurdish population.
kurds were known instead by the euphemism ''mountain turks''.

now demirel has not only acknowledged that there are kurds in
turkey, but has said they constitute some 10 million of turkey's
60 million population and moreover, that matters of concern to the
to turkey's kurds must be matters of concern to the turkish
governmet.

and foremost amongst such matters is the plight of the iraqi
kurds.

demirel is certainly hoping that by agreeing to act as defender
of iraq's kurds, he will weaken the extreme nationalism of
turkey's own kurdish population. moreover, defending the kurds
will improve turkey's human rights image in the west.

by confronting iraq over the kurds, turkey may well be hoping
to secure a major nato role for itself in the post-soviet, post-
cold war era.

talabani told ips that demirel's turkey could take several
specific steps to aid iraq's kurds. it should, he said,
''facilitate international assistance to iraqi kurdistan through
turkey.''

also, talabani said, turkey could maintain political contacts
with the iraqi kurdistan front, the overall kurdish leadership
which has talabani and barzani as its two co-chairman. finally,
turkey could, and should, maintain sanctions against iraq.

significantly, even talabani, who has extensive contacts with
turkish politicians, did not call for any kind of turkish military
protection for the iraqi kurds. for such protection, the kurds
want the west. but the west is reluctant to become too embroiled
in kurdish affairs, and may well pass that role on to the turks.

turkish sources said that demirel's own strained circumstances
under the military regime (1980-84), made him take a fresh look at
turkey's internal problems, while the collapse of the soviet union
has made him conduct a fresh appraisal of turkkey's role in the
world. (more/ips)

kurdistan: a turkish problem for the kurds(3-e)

kurdistan: a turkish (3)

thus demirel now finds he can accept the idea that turkey's
kurds are kurdish and have justifiable aspirations to defend their
own language whilst yet denouncing, and opposing with military
force, what he terms the terrorism of the pkk.

demirel is also emphatic in his opposition to domestic kurdish
separatism: he simply does not want to see turkey divided. and,
since kurdish separatism in iraq could help create the nucleus of
a state which would seek to embrace the kurdish regions of turkey,
iran and syria, demirel favours the continued unity of iraq.

there are other factors favouring a cautious approach by turkey's
new prime minister. one is that turkey built up in the 1970s and
1980s extensive commercial links with iraq, which was often its
biggest import source and export market.

the other is its potential to earn significant sums from
transit facilities for iraqi exports. the flow of iraqi oil
through the pipeline from northern iraq to turkey's mediterranean
terminal at dortyol traditonally earned ankara up to 300 million
dollars a year.

should saddam despair of exporting via turkey (which is also
entails exports passing through kurdish-controlled regions of
northern iraq) he might prefer to concentrate on rebuilding his
shattered oil terminals in the gulf, thus depriving turkey of
transit-fee income.

domestic considerations, however, favour continued support for
iraqi kurds. the demirel government comprises the two main
political parties in turkey which consider themselves to be the
heirs of the major parties which alternated in government before
the 1980 military coup.

whilst demirel himself leads a conservative party, true path,
his ally, erdal inonu, leads the left-of-centre social democratic
party -- which in turn incorporates a large kurdish element as a
result of its pact in october elections with the kurdish people's
labour party.

with the kurdish issues, and kurdish parliamentarians, now moving
to centre stage in ankara, demirel has the opportunity to fashion
a new policy based on the defence of kurdish minority and cultural
rights in both turkey and iraq.

championing the plight of iraq's kurds in the face of saddam's
repression could, and should, help him cope with the political
problem in turkey itself posed by the fact that turkey's kurds
appear to favour much more autonomy than ankara would favour.

but the constraints on demirel are the reasons why many iraqi
kurds are likely to remain sceptical of ankara's intentions in the
short-term, whilst iraq's kurds have welcomed the news that turkey
will continue to host western warplanes, they still want to know
just who, if anybody, will offer them physical protection from mid-
1992 onwards. it could yet turn out to be demirel's turkey.
(end/ips/ip/jr/pr)