IPS:IRAQ: Turkish Kurds the main lo

[PeaceNet Middle East Team]

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Subject: IPS:IRAQ: Turkish Kurds the main losers

/* Written 12:03 am  Oct 29, 1992 by newsdesk in cdp:ips.englibrary */
/* ---------- "IRAQ: Turkish Kurds the main losers" ---------- */
Copyright Inter Press Service 1992, all rights reserved.  Permission to re-
print within 7 days of original date only with permission from 'newsdesk'.

Area: Europe, western
Title: IRAQ: Turkish Kurds the main losers in a five-sided clash of wills


an inter press service feature

by john roberts

zakho, iraq, oct 26 (ips) -- there are now five main players in
the battle for the soul of some 20 million kurds in the
mountainous borderlands of iraq, turkey and iran.

and, within a few miles of this suburban city of kurdistan, all
of them are either warring or flexing their military muscle to
support or suppress the kurds' traditional dream of an independent
kurdish state.

the five players are the governments of turkey and iraq; the
peshmerga guerrillas who control the liberated kurdish areas of
northern iraq; the uncompromising, marxist forces of turkey's own
kurdish nationalist movement, the pkk; and the coalition forces
dispatched by the united states, britain and france to turkey to
help defend the iraqi kurds from the wrath of iraqi dictator
saddam hussein.

for nearly three weeks two of the actors, the peshmergas (iraqi
kurdish fighters) and the armed forces of turkey, have been
engaged in a bitter war against the pkk.

on oct 5, the peshmergas began a campaign to oust the pkk from a
strip of border territory -- embracing some 300 largely destroyed
or abandoned villages -- controlled by pkk fighters in northern
iraq.

this was done following a secret agreement concluded between
iraq's two main kurdish leaders, masoud barzani and jalal
talabani, and the turkish government and armed forces high
command. ten days later, the turkish army itself crossed the
border, to complete a pincer movement against the pkk.

according to turkish reports, more than 600 pkk fighters were
killed in the first week of the turkish operation. but diplomatic
sources told ips that the pkk had begun the war with at least
active -- both in northern iraq and in the kurdish areas of south-
eastern turkey.

for the peshmergas, the decision to turn on their fellow kurds
from turkey was not an easy one. describing the pkk's fighters as
''brothers'', barzani's top man in zakho told ips, this meant that
there was in effect, a civil war between kurds.

there would, declared fazel mirzani of barzani's kurdistan
democratic party, be no half-measures. ''if you fight your
brother, you really fight him. there is no fighting without
killing.''(more/ips)

iraq: turkish kurds the main losers in a five-sided clash of will(2)

iraq: turkish (2)

mirzani had no doubt that the forces of the kurdistan front, the
umbrella political grouping controlling the peshmergas, would
defeat the pkk in northern iraq. but, he added, ''you can't call
it victory''.

both parties are kurds, he said, adding that the peshmerga
leaders and specialists on kurdistan are well aware of what the
pkk is capable.

this was the closest he came to accusing the pkk of the kind of
behaviour that has won it a reputation in turkey as a terrorist
movement, accused of killing kurdish civilians on grounds of non-
cooperation, as well as turkish soldiers fighting to crush the pkk
insurgency.

for the peshmergas, the pkk's presence -- its hardline
authoritarianism and its rejection of any form of compromise --
prompted the decision to launch the october campaign.

''we gave them too many chances,'' mirzani said. ''they could
stay in iraq as a political group, making propaganda. they could
go to syria -- we told them 'the road's open -- go ahead,' or they
could continue the struggle in turkey.''

instead, he said, the pkk chose to continue to wage war against
turkey from bases in iraqi kurdistan and, he charged, did so with
weapons supplied by saddam hussein.

iraq's leader has his forces poised much closer to zakho than
most outsiders realise. just 15 kms east of this border town is
the tri-border point between iraq, syria and turkey. and just
seven or eight kilometres to the south-west of that position is
the most northerly outpost of saddam's army.

the relative emptiness of the land in the tri-border region,
where the tigris river cuts through low mountains to flow from
turkey into iraq, has not prevented arms from moving in recent
years from syria into iraq, or from syria into turkey, or from
iraq into turkey.

now, according to mirzani, the flow is from areas of iraq
controlled by saddam to areas of iraq or turkey controlled by the
pkk. by day, such movements are unlikely. by night, according to
both peshmerga and western diplomatic sources, the pkk have long
enjoyed considerable freedom of action.

but it is not the supply of arms that will ultimately prove
crucial. it is whether saddam intends to try to regain control of
iraq's kurdish regions by force.

throughout the summer there were reports of a build-up of iraqi
troops close to kurdish lines, whilst probing attacks on outlying
peshmerga positions are commonplace. but there has been no sign of
an actual impending offensive. (more/ips)

iraq: turkish kurds the main losers in a five-sided clash of will(3-e)

iraq: turkish (3)

this is because of the u.s., british and french military presence
in turkey. three squadrons of coalition aircraft routinely mount
extensive patrols over northern iraq, even flashing their lights
at night to inform both friendly kurd and antagonistic iraqi of
their presence.

officially their mission is to safeguard the kurdish-controlled
areas north of the 36th parallel by preventing iraqi warplanes
from flying above that line; in practice, they are helping to
safeguard the extensive kurdish-controlled areas lying further
south as well.

the coalition, one western diplomat told ips in ankara, has
contingency plans for extending the iraqi no-flying-zone south to
the 35th or even the 34th parallel.

these could be activated within 24 hours if the need arose, the
source said, thus ensuring an attack by saddam's planes on, for
example, the kurdish-held city of suleymaniyah could be countered
promptly by western military intervention.

but how much intervention will be possible remains a question
largely in the hands of what appears to be the most important
actor of all: turkey.

for the turkish government, and particularly the turkish army,
holds some of the highest cards in this five-sided game. it
controls the only guaranteed access route to the iraqi kurds, the
road to the border checkpoint near zakho, and thus it can
determine the extent of outside assistance that iraq's kurds
receive.

turkey also has the right to oust the coalition forces from its
territory and, indeed, their presence is a subject of fierce
political debate in ankara.

there is no doubt that barzani and talabani fully understand that
the freedom they have won from saddam's tyranny remains largely
dependent on turkey's goodwill. for the moment, at least, ankara
has ousted lesser players such as iran and syria, which both have
kurdish minorities, from their accustomed place in the kurdish
game.

if the present fighting goes turkey's way, then it may be able to
forge an uneasy but politically effective alliance with the
leaders of iraqi kurdistan that diminishes not only the role of
the pkk within both turkey and iraq but also saddam hussein's
prospects for regaining control of northern iraq.

but to sustain such a change in the regional geopolitics of this
volatile border region, turkey would need to bolster its own
forces. for, say western diplomats, the one army in the region
that turkey cannot yet expect to defeat in open warfare,
essentially because of a relative lack of advanced weaponry, is
that of saddam's iraq. (end/ips/rp/jmr/cpg/92)