Kurdish Family Clans: An Introducti

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From: Arm The Spirit <ats at etext.org>
Subject: Kurdish Family Clans: An Introduction

Kurdish Family Clans: An Introduction

     Recently, the governor of Yuksekove and the regional army
commander attempted to convince the leaders of the Oramar and
Doski families to abandon their neutral position with regards to
the PKK and to support the Ankara government and the army in
their fight against the ARGK (People's Liberation Army of
Kurdistan). After the Oramar and Doski families stated that they
would not change their position, Turkish army units carried out
acts of retaliation in several villages, especially those
inhabited by members of the Oramar clan.
     What makes Kurdish family clans so important that the
Turkish authorities and an entire NATO army are so dependent on
their support in Kurdistan? There are more than 120 family clans
in north-west Kurdistan, that is, in Turkish state territory. As
a result of the historical, social, and political changes of the
past 70 years, since the founding of the Turkish Republic in
1923, the family clans have lost a great deal of their power.
     In the 19th century, the power of the clan leader was
unlimited. In regions under his control, he was responsible for
almost all social functions: he was a land owner, judge,
religious leader, and controller of social life. Kurdish
rebellions against Ottoman domination in the 19th century were
less prompted by thoughts of forming a nation-state, as was
happening at that time in Europe, rather they were expressions of
self-determination in the face of increasing Ottoman control and
regulation.
     The Kemalist Republic, which the West viewed as
modernization, actually represented rigid Turkish assimilation
politics. After the Kurdish uprisings were suppressed, the family
clans lost a great deal of their power and significance. The more
remote a region was, the harder it was to control, and in these
areas the clan leaders were able to retain more of their power.
Poverty and labour migration to the major cities of western
Turkey and Europe lead to a further breakdown in family
associations. But still, the clans today - like the Doski and
Oramar families - can number as many as 25,000 adults.
     When the PKK launched its armed struggle in 1984, the
situation of the family clans was changed even more, due to the
fact that the party enjoyed support from increasingly broader
segments of the society, and because larger regions of the
country were coming under the control of the ARGK guerrillas.
     Some clans, like the Guyiler family from Uludere and the
Batuyanlar family from Cizre and the Mala Agaye Sabe family from
Sirnak, supported the PKK from the beginning. Today, many clans,
such as the Oramar, supply guerrillas for the ARGK, which now has
close to 35,000 fighters. The largest "family contingents" are
provided by the Kicalan family from Idil and the Pinyaniler
family from Cukurcu.
     Because of the PKK's socialist program and its clear
accentuation of womens' emancipation, many clan leaders have lost
their authority in regions controlled by the guerrillas. Reports
indicate that some clans have even disbanded themselves entirely.
Day to day life is now organized by the PKK. Other clan leaders,
under the influence of the egalitarian philosophy propagated and
practiced by the PKK, have given up their title as "Agha".
     Some Kurdish family clans have played a significant role in
the Turkish government's war against the PKK for about a decade
now. Certain families, which were previously both historically
and politically insignificant, like the Bucak family from
Siverck, for example, have become state-paid paramilitary village
guards. Tolerated by the Turkish authorities, these approximately
60,000 armed village guards wage maffia-style little wars to
control land and merchandise. Since they have increasingly come
into the sights of the guerrilla, many village guard families are
starting to distance themselves from their employer, the Turkish
government, and lay down their arms. On the other hand, reports
also indicate that hard-core village guard clans are now working
closely together with the Turkish nationalist party MHP.

(KURD-A - November 2, 1994)

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