Free Kani Yilmaz!
kurd-l at burn.UCSD.EDU
kurd-l at burn.UCSD.EDU
Fri Feb 24 06:24:07 GMT 1995
Reply-To: kurd-l at burn.UCSD.EDU
From: Arm The Spirit <ats at etext.org>
Subject: Free Kani Yilmaz!
Information On Kani Yilmaz, European Representative Of The PKK
Index:
1) PKK European Spokesperson Arrested
2) The Kani Yilmaz Case - By Ismet Imset
3) Free Kani Yilmaz - End The Criminalization Of The PKK And The
Kurdish People In Europe - Statement From The Kurdistan
Solidarity Committee, London
4) "Our Struggle Now Incorporates The Aspirations Of The Whole
Kurdish Nation" - Interview With Kani Yilmaz
1) PKK European Spokesperson Arrested
On October 26, 1994, British police arrested Kani Yilmaz,
the European spokesperson for the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK).
Yilmaz was arrested at Westminster subway station, as he was
travelling to address a Labour Party event entitled "The Future
Of The Kurdish People". Yilmaz was in London on the invitation of
a member of the British parliament. It is certain that Kani
Yilmaz was arrested on the order of officials at the Turkish
embassy.
After his arrest, Kani Yilmaz was placed in top-security
detention. Officials in Germany are trying to have him deported
back to Germany, where he has refugee status. Turkish officials
have stated that they would then like Germany to deport Yilmaz
back to Turkey.
Kurdish groups and their supporters have organized several
protests in London and in several German cities as well to demand
the immediate release of Kani Yilmaz. British parliamentarians as
well have expressed their extreme disgust at the fact that police
have arrested and detained a man invited by some members of the
British parliament to give a talk on the prospects for a
political solution to the war in Kurdistan.
On December 30, 1994, a judge was supposed to rule on
whether or not Kani Yilmaz would be deported to Germany. This
hearing was postponed. For more information on the case, contact:
Kurdistan Information Centre
10 Glasshouse Yard
London EC1A 4JN
tel. 0171 250 1315
fax. 0171 250 1317
e-mail: kic.london at kurd.aps.nl
2) The Kani Yilmaz Case
By Ismet Imset
I have a file of many pages in my hands.
On the first of these, somewhat squeezed into a pink dossier is
inscribed: "Separatist terrorist organization-PKK." The mentality
which aims to conceal everything has stamped both the cover and all
its pages "Secret". The author of this product is the security
(Police) General Directorate, the centre of those who manufacture lies
and market them to their superiors for promotions...
Almost every page of the dossier provides information on PKK
leaders. From the commander of Serhat region to Fingerless Zeki, from
Abdullah Ocalan to Riza Altun, here are many names. At the end of the
dossier is a detailed, graphic explanation of the PKK's "separatist
terror organization" and a section on "founders and directors of the
organization".
The most interesting part of this official file which I have in
my possession is its final part. There is a two-paragraph explanation
there on Faysal Dunlayici who is registered as "code named Kani
Yilmaz". Instantly I recall the telephone conversation I had with the
British police following Yilmaz's arrest. "I hear Kani Yilmaz is
arrested. Could you confirm this?" I had asked the police
spokesperson. "We have no one under that name", was the reply, before
adding, "but we have a suspect by the name of Faysal Dunlayici."
In the file of the Security General Directorate on Yilmaz and
Dunlayici, there is no mention of a "concrete crime". The only crime
which is evidenced is that he was "among the founders" of an
organization created "to divide and separate the Turkish Republic
through terrorist actions", and to "direct" this organization.
Dunlayici or Yilmaz is on a Turkish search warrant for being "a
founder and ringleader of a terrorist organization". The file of
Security General Directorate that I have openly displays this.
According to the laws of the Turkish Republic even membership
and/or acting on behalf of it, is a capital offence, let alone being a
founder or director of such an organization. In other words, had
Yilmaz been in Turkey and had he been arrested by the police, he would
have been put on trial for being "a founder and director of a
separatist organization", facing and most likely being sentenced to, a
penalty of death.
Turkish Foreign Ministry spokesman Ferhat Ataman who held a
press conference before the weekend has announced that Turkey had
formally applied to Britain for the extradition of Yilmaz, who is
under arrest here. He took care to add that the file prepared for
Yilmaz's extradition "does not contain any criminal offenses which
would require him facing capital punishment charges".
It is understood that, using the opportunity, Turkey has sent
London not the full dossier on Yilmaz who is being hunted as a
"founder of a separatist organization", but a dossier "prepared to
contain criminal charges not including capital punishment". In other
words, it is playing a new game to achieve its objective.
Despite this, every security unit throughout Europe is aware
that if Yilmaz is extradited, he will face what has now become
systematic torture in Turkey, that he will be tried not by an
impartial court but a controversial State Security Court which has a
special status and to which military prosecutors are assigned, and
that he will eventually be executed either legally or by extra-
judicial methods.
For Britain to extradite Yilmaz under these circumstances will
mean no less than sending someone to face a certain death sentence.
Thus, neither an extradition nor Ankara's request can be expected to
be taken seriously. But, there are other possibilities...
The Yilmaz case, from the viewpoint of both legal implications
and of international norms, is one of the most interesting cases
Britain has been party to. Yilmaz, who had come to Britain three times
in the past, was invited to this country as "the European Spokesperson
of the PKK" and on arrival he was not only assisted through
immigration control but was even given VIP treatment.
But exactly three days later, while on his way to a meeting with
British parliamentarians "to disclose the PKK's new proposals for
dialogue", he was detained by police under instructions of the same
immigration office. The first statement by the Home Minister claimed
his presence in Britain was against 'public interest'. Although the
Home Secretary who gave the order for his arrest later said it was a
mistake to have allowed Yilmaz entry in the first place, sources from
the same ministry now say the whole incident stemmed from orders
issued through the Foreign Office. In a way, this suggests "foreign
influences" have been at work.
Thus, the "Yilmaz case" is no longer an issue concerning only
Turkey and the Kurds but has turned into a debate concerning Britain's
own laws as well. This is one of the reasons why his period of arrest
has been extended. Day by day, with the legal advice of Winstanley-
Burgess, the case is building up into a resistance.
The British authorities, immediately after detaining Yilmaz,
informed him through translators and attorneys that they wanted him
deported. But the PKK spokesman was never asked which country he would
prefer to be deported to. Moreover, although he was arrested a day
before leaving for Holland, he has not been sent to that country
either.
At this stage, Kani Yilmaz's own decision was very important.
While at the beginning he wanted to get the issue over with and return
to his responsibilities as soon as possible, Yilmaz reviewed his
position and took an interesting decision that he would resist. He
argued that he had entered Britain quite legally, that his personal
rights were violated through his arrest and that he should either be
deported to a country of his choice or freed immediately.
The British authorities have rejected Yilmaz's demands and, as
required by the laws of the land, have asked for written guarantees
from any country who would accept him. But, as if those countries
applied to aimed to give a new dimension to the issue, none of them
agreed to provide the written approval.
It was at this very stage that Germany appeared on the scene
with a surprise request. This request turned the Yilmaz case, which
had started out as an issue of simple expulsion into a case of
"extradition". Britain was informed that Yilmaz was wanted for
violation of the German 129a Anti-Terror Law for provoking an arson
attack.
This request, coming as it does from a country where the Kurdish
community in Europe is most concentrated and where the PKK influence
is strongest, took even British officials by surprise. The British,
who had arrested Yilmaz simply to "expel" him suddenly found
themselves with "a suspect requiring extradition". The Yilmaz
operation, which supposedly would end in a matter of days, was thus
snatched out of their hands. Germany, one of the countries to which
Yilmaz was expected to wish to be sent to after his detention,
suddenly became a country which "wanted" him.
Such a development has naturally led to suspicion among Kurdish
circles that "a secret agreement may have been reached between Germany
and Turkey" on this issue. Extraditing Yilmaz to Germany so he could
be put on trial there would, according to international law, give
Turkey the right to ask Germany for his extradition for trial as well.
Now, what everyone asks is whether Germany has become a smoke screen
for Turkish interests. Ataman, answering a question relating to
Germany's extradition request, was observed to have abandoned the
customarily harsh line of Turkish officialdom and replied that he
would appreciate such an eventuality. "The British will decide on
this", was all he had to say.
Yilmaz's 'hearing' of last Friday lasted exactly four minutes
and it was adjourned to November 28. Meanwhile, a brief struggle
between demonstrators supporting Yilmaz and the police left behind
seven injured. Kurds marching in eight separate cities of Europe are
supporting Yilmaz with slogans against Turkey and Britain. These
actions clearly give "a careful warning" both to German and other
European governments. The only reason why there are no "larger
explosions" is seen as the murky nature of the Yilmaz affair but the
hidden message passed on with these demonstrations is being heard by
the capitals involved.
It could be appreciated that the Yilmaz case has already started
to disturb England. The fact that a "simple" issue of expulsion has
now turned into a legal case which could last for months, is raising
some concern. According to those close to Yilmaz, the British actually
want to solve the issue "without wasting time".
As far as is known, there is no "concrete criminal charge"
against Yilmaz in Britain. But Britain is faced by a legal dilemma
both at home and on the international scene. Despite the possibility
that the case may take time, it is not possible to keep Yilmaz captive
"indefinitely". It is also difficult now to deport Yilmaz to another
country while the German request for extradition is on the agenda.
Furthermore both Yilmaz and Winstanley-Burgess appear determined "to
resist to the end". They will force British law as far as they can,
using their rights under these laws and appeal against an extradition
were such a decision made.
The situation surrounding Yilmaz is still murky and no one
really knows what will happen. Even if there is no "secret agreement"
between the Turkish Republic and Germany, extraditing Yilmaz to that
country so he could be put on trial, is regarded as a step which could
in the long term trouble both London and Bonn. The possibility of
having another era of "Dusseldorf trials" in Germany, which has
formally banned the activities of the PKK and ERNK, brings with it
significant risks related to that country's internal security. It is
certain that in such a period, Ankara will demand that Germany
extradite Yilmaz.
Under these circumstances, Britain is left with only two viable
alternatives: either to expel Yilmaz to the country of his choice or
"extradite" him to Germany. The possibility which does not exist is
for Yilmaz to be extradited directly to Turkey where he will certainly
be tortured, tried on capital charges and executed most probably by
extra-judicial methods. It is at this point that Germany plays a key
role...
(Source: Kurdistan Report #20 - January-February 1995. Originally
published in Turkish in Ozgur Ulke - November 22, 1994)
3) Free Kani Yilmaz - End The Criminalization Of The PKK And The
Kurdish People In Europe
The police seizure of Kani Yilmaz, the European Representative
of the PKK (Kurdistan Workers Party) and his subsequent imprisonment
by the Home Office is a serious blow to the democratic rights of all
people in Britain. It also reveals the sinister workings of a new and
unaccountable European police force which is coordinating its actions
across Europe in support of the Turkish state's war against the
Kurdish people.
Kani Yilmaz was invited to address a meeting at the House of
Parliament on October 26 by British MPs and Lords. As he left
Westminster tube station a carefully laid police trap seized him. He
was detained under the National Security provision of the 1971
Immigration Act. What threat Kani Yilmaz posed to Britain's security
was never stated. On November 11 his status was reclassified and under
the European Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism Act of 1978
he now faces extradition to Germany where he has refugee asylum
status. The German state has invented general, non-specific reasons
for issuing an extradition order - a procedure which effectively
overrides, ignores and prevents the exercise of the right to appeal.
In her June 1994 maiden public speech Stella Rimington, head of
MI5, identified the Kurds as a potential source of "terrorism" in
Britain. A programme to criminalise Kurdish and Turkish opposition in
Europe to the Turkish state is being coordinated by British and German
police and military intelligence, together with their Turkish
counterparts. The programme includes mobilisation of sections of the
media and establishment of special police units to survey and attack
the Kurdish communities. The PKK has been outlawed in Germany and
France. Alerted, if not encouraged, by the undemocratic actions of the
British and German governments, the Turkish state now demands the
extradition of Kani Yilmaz to Turkey where he would face certain
torture and death.
The Kurdish struggle for national rights is seen by the British
government as a threat to the Middle Eastern status quo. For the
British government ever since it devised the Treaty of Lausanne in
1923 which divided the Kurdish people up between Iran, Iraq, Syria and
Turkey, that status quo has meant oil and profits.
Over 1,500 Kurdish villages have been destroyed by the Turkish
army, Kurdish refugees from those burned out villages sheltering in
the mountains of south Kurdistan are regularly bombed by Turkish
aircraft, concentration camps have been set up in southeast Turkey by
Turkish state forces, torture is rife, death squads murder open and
legal Kurdish politicians, dozens of journalists and academics who try
to tell the truth about Kurdistan are imprisoned and murdered. Eight
Kurdish Democracy Party MPs are stripped of their constituencies and
now face the death penalty at the hands of the Turkish state. This is
what the British government condones by its seizure and
criminalisation of Kani Yilmaz.
All democrats in Britain must support the Kurdish people who
have mounted a three week protest and hunger strike outside the Home
Office for Kani Yilmaz's release. We must demand to know what is the
relationship between Scotland Yard, MI5 and the Turkish police and
military intelligence. What policy decisions have been taken by the
Home Office towards the Kurdish community in Britain, for what
reasons, in conjunction with what European powers and under whose
authority?
British companies are queuing up to sell arms to Turkey to carry
on the slaughter of Kurds. They are queuing up to organise and benefit
from the forthcoming privatisation of Turkish industry.
Democrats in Britain must brand Turkey as an international
pariah (as with apartheid in South Africa) until it recognises Kurdish
people's basic human rights.
We must end British and German govemmental collaboration with
the Turkish state's war effort.
End arms sales to Turkey.
The rights of Kani Yilmaz to address people in Britain is a
democratic right of all the British people. It must not be taken away.
Kurdistan Solidarity Committee Statement - November 16, 1994
(Source: Kurdistan Report #20 - January-February 1995)
4) Our Struggle Now Incorporates The Aspirations Of The Whole Kurdish
Nation
Interview by Matthew Brady with PKK European representative Kani
Yilmaz a few hours before his arrest in London on October 26, 1994.
What stage have the endeavours to establish a national assembly
reached and how will it respond to the needs of the present time?
We had an earlier experience which we felt needed deepening.
Therefore contact groups have been set up by intellectuals and DEP
members which have met with varioUs sectors. The idea is to set up a
National Congress of 1,000 to 1,500 members representing north
Kurdistan, and for this Congress to establish an assembly. The make up
and framework of the assembly will be determined by the results
attained by the contact groups. I believe some Kurdish groups have
also been consulted but they said they were not in favour of such an
initiative. In fact these groups would not be able to make a con-
structive contribution had they wished to. They simply don't have the
resources. Therefore the projected assembly may not be a perfect,
classical one as it will not be all-inclusive. For this reason the
assembly is being projected as one that is oriented to external
relations, to the outside world, an assembly capable of including all
sections of society and with national symbols putting the emphasis on
legal activities internationally. These are continuing. I believe that
the founding of the assembly may be announced around Newroz (March
21).
Ocalan made an important statement recently calling on Kurdish people
to feel themselves to be Kurdish citizens and to live their Kurdish
identity?
There is no nation that is in need of the concept of citizenship
than the Kurds. Thus the General Secretary's call is of the utmost
significance. The Kurds have been dispersed to the four corners of the
world. Even Kurds living in their own homeland have been unable to
call it home. They are deprived of seeing their homeland as theirs and
of seeing themselves as citizens for many years. This call is in
essence an appeal to the people to involve themselves in the national
liberation struggle and to realise a transformation in their minds, to
realise a return to the motherland and to develop a national
consciousness that enables them to make the link with the homeland.
This is a call that incorporates broad layers of society: it means
those who can do so should join the struggle en masse, it means the
nation completing its self-mobilisation and the realisation of the
training of tens and hundreds of thousands.
We evaluate this call as one for national consciousness and a
great sensitivity to the developments in the motherland. We say that
it is high time to establish a Kurdish national reality, a reality
that feels responsible for the motherland and takes action on its
behalf. This is how we evaluate this call.
In the past, calls for national unity were made to other northern
Kurdistan organisations. However, it would appear that the desired
unity has not been achieved. If the vital importance of national unity
is taken into consideration, how then will the participation of
different opinions in the assembly be ensured? What stage have such
activities reached?
I think it is necessary to clarify what is meant by this phrase
"national unity", which has been used in a rhetorical way for years.
Is national unity the unity of the nation or the unity of
organisations? This is a crucial question. I believe the unity of the
nation has been achieved in Kurdistan, that is, a great majority of
the people support the national liberation struggle led by the PKK.
What is the proof of this? The ten-year war. If a nation fights for 10
years and the struggle continues to develop, this can only occur if
support is received from the nation. However, despite this, we felt it
would be beneficial for those circles that claim to be organisations,
that they be involved in a front of national unity. For about 18
months now, meetings have been held with various Kurdish groups.
However we have now reached an impasse, a dead end.
There are various reasons for this: Firstly seven or eight of
the 12 Kurdish organisations involved are almost nonexistent. They
have no people to contribute to a front organisation. Some of them
haven't even issued a leaflet for four or five years, or organised a
demonstration.
Then there are organisations like Hevgirtin, that have contacts
with village guards, that want any front that is set up to have the
authority to impose a ceasefire decision on the ARGK (People's
Liberation Army of Kurdistan). "If the war is not ended we will not
participate in the front" they declare. They have a liquidationist
approach.
So there are problems, but talks are continuing. Even if we are
unable to establish a front we at least believe we will be able to
have an understanding for cooperation and be able to act together in
some practical ways. We will take this proposal for an agreement on
cooperation to the next meeting planned for the first week of
November.
Of course it would be ideal if a front of national unity could
be set up but the groups working towards the national assembly have
contacted broad circles to ensure a variety of views are represented.
Also the national liberation struggle is continuing amidst blood and
fire. Kurdistan is being burnt as the Turkish state tries to create a
Kurdistan without forests or villages. Therefore, those people who
feel they have an obligation will not wait for a front to be formed.
It could take another five years. There are some people who, if you
even kill them, they would still not go to Kurdistan. They have no
sense of their responsibilities. But Kurdistan is not the country it
was ten years ago. The struggle has grown massively. Soon in 1995, the
PKK will have 50,000 guerrillas. A decision has been taken in this
regard. So whether we have a front or not, at this time when Turkish
colonialism is carrying out ferocious attacks, we will give the neces-
sary response on the basis of the national unity that we have created.
There is a campaign in Europe for the recognition of the Kurdish
identity. It would seem to be an effective demand at this time. If
this is recognised by the Western states how would you evaluate the
consequences?
KON-KURD is the largest confederation working for the rights of
Kurds in Europe. On November 4, 1994, it is organising a conference in
Brussels, in a hall at the European Parliament. This is a conference
to force the acceptance of Kurdish identity in Europe. In my opinion
it is a very important step. Of course the Kurdish identity is already
recognised in various ways in some places in Europe but this must be
made official in the whole of Europe. For instance, if 20 Kurdish
students warrant the opening of a Kurdish school then they should also
recognize the Kurdish identity. I believe this would also make a
contribution to the political process in that it would serve to assist
those circles in the west that want the West to play a role in the
Kurdish question. It would change, the opinions of various circles. It
would also deepen the expression of Kurdishness, the concept of
citizenship amongst the Kurds in Europe. This would also put Turkey on
the spot because if the Kurdish identity is recognised in Europe it
would make it somewhat difficult for Turkey to explain the lack of
such recognition in Turkey.
In March the North-West Kurdistan Conference was held in Brussels.
Following this conference has there been an intensification in
diplomatic activities?
The most important aspect of the Brussels conference was the
package of proposals presented by our General Secretary Abdullah
Ocalan. Did this have the effect it merited? I don't think it did.
There should have been more interest. But some opinions were changed
or, at least, some circles which had a superficial "anti-terrorist"
approach, have become more circumspect and cautioUs. There were also a
considerable number of messages of support from international and
human rights organisations. Some countries also began to take this
issue serioUsly and realised that steps should be taken. On November
18-19 the Olaf Palme Trust is organising an International Kurdish
Conference in Barcelona. This is something that has come about partly
as a result of the Brussels Conference. Of course the reason the
conference did not find the necessary response is political. Although
Turkey is losing its strategic importance, it is becoming an
attractive market and countries like France and Germany have interests
at stake.
However it is still possible to state that the Brussels
Conference did offer a perspective on the Kurdish question and gave
Western countries and organisations the chance to learn what the PKK
is, and this was particularly the case with Abdullah Ocalan's package
of proposals.
You say that France and Germany have adopted a negative attitude to
the PKK on account of their economic interests. Europe's negative,
even hostile, view of the national liberation struggle in Kurdistan is
well known. Could you comment on Western support or at least silent
approval for Turkey's genocidal policies?
To remain silent, or approve, or support what Turkey is doing in
Kurdistan implies support for a Kurdish genocide. But I can say that
those who follow this policy in Germany, have begun to debate the PKK
ban which will be one year old in November. They banned the PKK and
what happened? I will tell you. The PKK increased its strength
threefold in Germany. Now Germany wishes to play a role in the Middle
East, a sensitive region from which it has been excluded since it was
defeated in the 2nd World War. However it is now, particularly after
its unification with the East, a world economic power. It desires
political power to match. Thus, it is now targeting the parts of the
Middle East which used to be under U.S. domination, such as Iran and
Iraq. Iran now does more trade with Germany than it does with all the
rest of the world put together. And since autumn 1993 there has been a
stream of delegations from Germany visiting Saddam Hussein. Germany
also uses Turkey as a bridgehead to reach Iraq. Therefore the reason
for Germany's hostility towards us is its interests in the Middle
East. An intriguing situation has emerged. We have relations with many
countries. The world has not labelled us as terrorists but Germany
has. However, Germany is developing friendship with Saddam, who the
whole world regards as a terrorist. This illustrates the hypocrisy of
Germany's approach to us.
Let's get on to the war. From the world's press, or at least the
British press, one gets the impression that the guerrilla movement has
suffered serious setbacks as a result of the huge military operations
of the Turkish state. Can you comment on this please?
The war news emanating from Turkey and finding its way into the
world press is onesided and has been taken under the control of those
directing the dirty war. However, in the last 2 or 3 months the
Turkish state has not mentioned "finishing us off" or "breaking our
backs". They are silent. In Kurdistan we are now establishing a
regional military command structure and we are preparing in 1995 to
take complete control of areas which are already to a great extent
under our control. Ciller claimed in Autumn 1993 that she was going to
finish us off by Spring 1994. But we said then, that we would have
30,000 guerrillas by that time.
Now we aim to field 50,000 guerrillas by the Spring of 1995. It
is the Turkish army, which lost thousands of men in its last operation
around Herekol mountain and in South Kurdistan, that has suffered
severe blows. If the Turkish army has really broken our backs then why
are they talking about extending military service and why are they
sending marines to Kurdistan? It is Turkey that has its back to the
wall, both militarily and economically.
The guerrillas are in every part of Kurdistan. If the Turkish
army had achieved success with its military operations it would not
have to burn down so many villages or murder so many civilians. These
are the methods to which a defeated army resorts.
I would like to ask you about the situation in South Kurdistan. The
clashes between the KDP and PUK seem to have ended. There are also
reports of a KDP buildup in Behdinan, which has led to fears of a
repeat of the southern war of 1992. Could you comment?
South Kurdistan is a region where many circles are active and
various forces are pursuing their interests. Turkey and Germany are
striving to reconcile Massoud Barzani with Saddam and South Kurdistan
with Iraq, and also to get Saddam a reprieve so that he can return to
the international community. Recent Turkish operations into South
Kurdistan have all ended in fiasco. At the beginning of October 30,000
troops crossed into the South with a fanfare from the Turkish press,
but they suffered heavy blows and withdrew in great silence. The sole
reason for the instability in South Kurdistan is the absolute
domination the Turkish state exerts over the KDP, and Massoud
Barzani's collaboration with Turkey. If only the KDP were able to act
according to its own will, the situation in the South would have been
well on the way to freedom, but the leadership of the KDP does not
permit this. The reason for the KDP's attacks on the PUK and other
forces, is Turkey's policy. Turkey wants to remove all forces except
the KDP. Otherwise there is no ideological conflict between the
parties there. The only possible clash would be of interests. All this
stems from the fact that Massoud Barzani formulates all his policies
at the Turkish brigade headquarters in Silopi.
The situation at the moment may seem calm but this does not mean
that the situation is stable. Massoud Barzani has sold himself to the
Turkish state. Therefore there will always be the potential for
provocations and attacks on opposition groups. Turkish intelligence
operatives are in control of things there and move more freely than
the Kurds. The KDP has taken part in all the recent military
operations against the PKK and we think they will continue to do so.
Turkey and Germany's policy in South Kurdistan and their plan to
rehabilitate Saddam is seriously disturbing the USA. To keep the
equilibrium intact the U.S. is supporting Talabani, but not actively.
Now things seem to have subsided following Mitterand's intervention
but this is misleading because nothing has been resolved there.
Britain's policy is similar to that of the U.S.
November 27, 1994 will be the 16th anniversary of the founding of the
PKK. Could you comment on this please?
The national liberation struggle led by the PKK has now reached
the stage where it can not be defeated. The struggle now incorporates
the aspirations of the whole Kurdish nation. The 16th anniversary of
the founding of the PKK will be followed by the Party's 5th Congress
which will be held in Kurdistan. Chairman APO has named this congress
the Freedom and Liberation Congress, and as preparations for the
anniversary and party congress continue, the PKK is evaluating the
next period as one of liberation and freedom. Our people began to live
again with the emergence of the PKK. As Chairman Apo has said, a
revival was set in motion. Our 16-year-long struggle has brought about
a revival and from now on we are heading for liberation.
(Source: Kurdistan Report #20 - January/February 1995)
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