An Analysis Of Grand Plans Over The

[kurd-l at burn.ucsd.edu]

From: Arm The Spirit <ats at locust.cic.net>
Subject: An Analysis Of Grand Plans Over The Heads Of Kurds

From: AKIN <akin at kurdish.org>

WHY (KDP)?

Robert Olson

The alliance of the KDP with Baghdad was at the center of international and
respective national media in September.  The entire period threatened a
wider escalation of attacks by the US in Iraq.  The crux of the origin of
the crisis has much to do with the KDP.  Why did it decide to align with
Baghdad?

Much has been written in the media that the KDP aligned with Saddam Hussein
for several reasons: 1) It felt threatened by the increasingly close ties
of PUK with Iran; 2)Barzani was upset that Talabani had facilitated an
Iranian incursion of some 3-4,000 troops some 50 miles through PUK held
territory in late July for the ostensible reason to attack an Iranian
Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) base in KDP held territory just North of
the 36th parallel and, 3) the KDP leader no doubt thought that the PUK
facilitated incursion heralded further assault by the PUK, backed by
Iranian support, on his territories.  Iranian supported PUK attacks on his
southern boundaries would have compelled the KDP to deploy more of its
peshmergas in the south.

Even prior to the Iranian incursion the KDP realized that Turkey was ready
to extend its international border with Iraq some three to six miles South
into KDP controlled territory.  This was anticipated to be an area in which
the Turks would try to eliminate any thing but a token KDP presence.  The
object of the Turks' move Southward was to better prevent PKK attacks on
targets within Turkey.

Thus prior to August 31, the KDP leader realized the possibility of the
reduction of both his Northerly and Southerly controlled areas.  Barzani
also, no doubt, thought that any opening of the Kirkuk - Yumurtalik
pipeline to Turkey and the diminished revenues resulting from it would
weaken his position vis-a-vis the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) led by
Jalal Talabani, his arch rival.  The KDP leader thought, correctly it
seems, that neither the US nor its European allies via Operation Provide
Comfort (OPC) and the host of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that
they directly or indirectly sponsor would seek to strengthen his position.
A reopening of the pipe lines and the increase of trade with Turkey would
mean that he no longer would be able to control exclusively the estimated
$250.000 per day lorry trade crossing the Turkish-Iraq international border
at Habur (Abu Khalil).  So Barzani had his reasons.

But why was the KDP so eminently successful? The international media would
have us believe that it was due exclusively to his alliance with Saddam
Hussein.  Maybe so.  But there are other reasons.  For sure Barzani got
arms and military aid from Baghdad.  But he also seems to have got
substantial arms from Operation Provide Comfort.  It could be that the US,
and at least some of its allies, were eager to counter the Iranian thrust
of late July and what that foreboded in terms of a broadening of Iran's
influence in Northern Iraq.  The KDP peshmergas also fought better.  Most
of the KDP pesmergas are tribally based and the core still consists of
Barzani tribesmen ready and willing to die for their leader. The PUK
fighters showed no such conviction.

The KDP also received the support of Shaykh 'Uthman Abdul Aziz, the leader
of the Islamic Movement of Kurdistan (IMK).  The territories controlled by
the IMK center in Ranya lying athwart the 36th parallel conveniently
between the territories controlled by the KDP and the PUK. Shaykh 'Uthman
threw his support and that of his peshmergas on the side of Barzani.

Now we must ask the question: Who wanted the KDP to win?  Baghdad did.
Turkey also favored a KDP victory.  A stronger KDP backed by Baghdad would
be better able to control the border area between the two countries by
eliminating, or at least restricting, the attacks of the PKK on targets
within Turkey.  A KDP victory would allow free flow of goods and trade
between Iraq and Turkey (Wherever the border may be placed).  Turkey, then,
a very close ally of the US, was happy with the KDP-Baghdad alliance and
facilitated its success.

Israel, the closest ally of the US, is also very happy with the KDP
victory.  Israel is a close ally of Turkey.  On February 24 and again
August 26, just five days before the KDP-Baghdad blitzkrieg, Ankara and Tel
Aviv signed another military - and apparently intelligence - cooperation
agreement.  In view of the close strategic cooperation between the two
countries, it seems likely that Israeli military and intelligence personnel
will participate with Turkey in setting up the new Turkish 'security zone'
along its international border with Iraq; after all, the Israelis have much
experience in this sort of thing.

Another reason for Israel's elation at the KDP victory is that it has the
potential for the expulsion of the PKK from Northern Iraq will limit the
ability of Syria to use the PKK as an instrument against Turkey in the two
countries' on-going differences regarding the Kurdish question and the
distribution of water flow from the Euphrates down to Syria.  And reduction
of the PKK's ability to maneuver in Northern Iraq and/or Syria reduces
Syria's regional geopolitics and geostrategic strength against Turkey.
This in turn necessitates more 'flexibility' on its part in its
negotiations with Israel and the US.  Perhaps it was not a coincidence that
Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu was in Washington while the KDP and
Baghdad were mopping up the PUK.

Maybe the US wanted both: more pressure on Syria to meet its dictates for
'peace' between Israel and the Arabs; and the missile attacks on Saddam
Hussein to ensure that President Clinton would appear as the legitimate
heir of the 'Hero of the Gulf War' against an authentic hero of World War
II.

Robert Olson is professor of Middle East and Islamic history at the
University of Kentucky.  This article appeared in Kurdistan Report, No 24,
December 1996.


----
American Kurdish Information Network (AKIN)
2623 Connecticut Avenue NW #1
Washington, DC 20008-1522

Tel: (202) 483-6444
Fax: (202) 483-6476
E-mail: akin at kurdish.org
Home Page: http://www.kurdistan.org
----

The American Kurdish Information Network (AKIN) provides a public service
to foster Kurdish-American understanding and friendship



-----------------------------------------------------------------
Arm The Spirit is an autonomist/anti-imperialist information
collective based in Toronto, Canada. Our focus includes a wide 
variety of material, including political prisoners, national 
liberation struggles, armed communist resistance, anti-fascism, 
the fight against patriarchy, and more. We regularly publish our 
writings, research, and translation materials in our magazine and
bulletins called Arm The Spirit. For more information, contact:

Arm The Spirit
P.O. Box 6326, Stn. A
Toronto, Ontario
M5W 1P7 Canada

E-mail: ats at etext.org
WWW: http://burn.ucsd.edu/~ats
MRTA Solidarity Page: http://burn.ucsd.edu/~ats/mrta.htm
FTP: ftp.etext.org --> /pub/Politics/Arm.The.Spirit
ATS-L Archives: http://burn.ucsd.edu/~archive/ats-l
-----------------------------------------------------------------

 ++++ stop the execution of Mumia Abu-Jamal ++++
   ++++ if you agree copy these lines to your sig ++++
     ++++ see http://www.xs4all.nl/~tank/spg-l/sigaction.htm ++++