Turkey Contra-Guerrila State (the planning of a war against the peop

[ozgurluk at xs4all.nl]

Subject: Turkey Contra-Guerrila State (the planning of a war against the people) PART I
From: Press Agency Ozgurluk <ozgurluk at xs4all.nl>

The following internal strategy paper was translated by the Kurdistan
Informationcentre Amsterdam


Internal discussionpaper from the National Security Council from
Turkey.

PROPOSALS FOR SOLUTIONS

PROBLEMS IN THE STRUGGLE AGAINST TERRORISM AND PROPOSALS FOR SOLUTIONS

1. GENERAL:

Terrorism and the fight against terrorism has occupied the country's
agenda for a substantial period and great resources are expended in
the struggle with terrorism. However, despite the widespread and
effective manner of the security forces continuation of the struggle
with terrorism, which needs to be waged all-out, it is observed that
they are faced with a number of problems in the political, social and
economic dimensions and that shortcomings and hitches have arisen in
the solution of these problems. Since terrorist activities in our
country are carried out on a broad platform it is considered that the
struggle to be conducted in this field should also be carried out with
multi-faceted organisation.

As well as the continuation of the struggle on a military dimension, a
number of problems arise due to the requirements of security resources
and the hitches in the activities of certain state institutions and
establishments.

2. DOMESTIC SECURITY REQUIREMENTS OF THE TURKISH ARMED FORCES AND
   RELATED PROBLEMS:

The importance must be stressed of prioritising meeting the needs of
the Turkish Armed Forces, in order that this struggle be waged in an
uninterrupted and effective manner.  The problems faced in the
Domestic Security Operation are listed below.

CONFIDENTIAL

a. There has been an interruption in activities for the arrangement of
   the borders with Iraq, started between 1983-1989, due to the Gulf
   crisis.

b. The Physical Border Security System is inadequate.

c. The means of identification and determination of targets in the
   Physical Border Security System on the Iranian and Armenian borders
   are inadequate.

d. There is a need for helicopter pads in the region*, and the
military units do not have any means of communication in the military
station and military bass areas.  
(* the region is a euphemism for the Kurdish region within Turkey in
particular, and the state of emergency region in particular
(translator))


e. The projects of modernisation of the Turkish Armed Forces must be continued.

3. DRYING UP FINANCIAL RESOURCES OF THE TERRORIST ORGANISATION(S):

The necessary precautions to be taken in the matter of measures to be
applied in order to deprive the PKK terrorist organisation of
financial resources have been determined by joint activities of the
relevant Ministries, Institutions and Establishments, co-ordinated by
the General Secretariat of the National Security Council.

The Inter-Ministry "PURSUANCE AND DIRECTION COMMITTEE" was formed with
a Prime Ministerial Directive dated 15 September 1994 with the aim of
determining the necessary procedures, putting them into practice and
continuously following up and co-ordinating their application in order
to apply these measures.

Appointment of Ministries, Institutions and Establishments relevant to
the matter was secured by the publication of two Prime Ministerial
Circulars dated 14 March 1995 containing the legislative and
administrative measures of terrorist organisations. 
The first meeting of the Pursuance and Direction Committee relating to
the procedures conducted was held on 3 July 1995, and the second and
last on 20 November 1996. There was a period of 18 months between the
two meetings. If the committee had met every month, it could have been
possible to secure more productive work and direction in the
activities carried out.
The conclusion was reached that although the procedures relating to
the precautions taken were generally fulfilled, there were
shortcomings and hitches in the matters of inter-institutional
co-ordination and intelligence.

4.  PROBLEMS FACED FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF SECURITY:

a. The co-ordination and Direction of Intelligence:
The military units intelligence branches face difficulties in
obtaining domestic security intelligence, the dimensions of which are
far greater. There is no arrangement of activities or hierarchy
between state intelligence organisations like MIT (National
Intelligence Establishment), SECURITY and JITEM (Gendarme Intelligence
Struggle with Terrorism). Intelligence obtained becomes delayed
intelligence by reason of bureaucratic and hierarchic
practices. Difficulties are experienced in the combination of
intelligence and the intelligence organisations work independently of
each other and without co-ordination.

b. The Temporary Village Guard System:
The Temporary Village Guard System, which has been highly beneficial
in the matter of achieving security and public order, is in the
position of being a target of the PKK terrorist organisation. Problems
with the activities and with rehabilitation in the Temporary Village
Guard System, which is made up of people of the region, continue.
There is a need for Temporary Village Guards in some areas. The
Temporary Village Guards and the Voluntary Village Guards, who do the
same job, do not benefit from the same rights. Law number 442, the
Village Law, has not yet been enacted (sic).

c. Special Police Action Teams:
The expected result has not been achieved form the Special Police
Action Teams formed with the approval of the Ministry of the Interior
on 15 April 1994 within the Provincial Security Directorates for
employment in operations against armed terrorists in the hills, by
reason of erroneous employment and bad practice. A large  proportion
of the personnel, who were suitable in the beginning from the point of
view of physical condition, have lost their attributes with time die
to lack of training and employment outside their actual duties. It has
been determined in addition that they have been cause for breakdown of
discipline by behaviour such as talking and making noise and lighting
fires during night ambush duties, that they have been involved in
harsh attitudes and behaviour against citizens (Offices of the Chief
of General Staff, 22 November 1996).

d. Special Security Organisations in Public Institutions and Establishments:
Units engaged in the protection of buildings and roads are unable to
act according to the requirements of their actual duties. Law number
2495, the Law Regarding the Foundation of Special Security
Organisations in Public Institutions and Establishments, has not yet
proved functional.

e. Prisons and their Problems:
Legal and administrative problems relating to the prisons
continue. The prisons in their existing state virtually act as schools
and training, organisation and communication centres for the
organisations.

In addition, the Administration of the prisons has been divided into
internal and external administration, and there is no certainty of
collaboration between them. There are training and cultural weaknesses
among prison officers. The percentage of wardens from the people of
the region is over 80 %. There are insufficient female wardens for the
numbers of problems such as the lack of modern equipment and
apparatus, and errors in the design of prisons and the dormitory
system.

5. ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL PROBLEMS OF THE REGION:

It is inevitable that the waging of the struggle against terrorism by
the effective use of security forces will also be supported by
elements of a number of national forces. Just as the intervention of
these elements may meet, albeit to a limited degree, the reasons for
the rise of terrorism, they ill also secure new local structures.
Terrorist movements starting with the appearance of trying to obtain
political, social and cultural rights gain strength by the
exploitation of backwardness form the cultural, economic and social
point of view as well as of the geographical conditions of the region,
and the part of this strength relating to armed action groups is
broken by the effective struggle of the security forces. However,
along with this first dimension of the struggle with terrorism, that
of the removal of support secured for terrorism and the conditions for
this support, conducted by security forces, it is also possible to
realise the its second dimension:

a. In the field of politics:

Provision for the organisation of militants domestically is secured by
means of HADEP (People's Democracy Party). The voting potential for
HADEP in the last elections was noteworthy. This legal party is
virtually in a position of recruiting soldiers. The activities of this
party, particularly in Diyarbakir, have become clear from the
statements of terrorists seized wounded or uninjured in operations
conducted in the region, and complaints have been filed with the
necessary offices (Offices of the Chief of General Staff, 22 November
1996).
Certain human rights associations and other associations with a legal
appearance are also evaluated to have an attitude other than
impartial. People carrying out certain activities (within these) as
organisation sympathisers later join terrorist organisations through
these associations.
In addition, there are two types of countries which afford support to
terrorism. One type is made up of counties like Greece, which give
support to terrorism and the organisation and use it as politics
against Turkey, and the other, like Germany, France and the UK, are
those which do not evaluate the terrorist incidents in our country in
a political manner, but see them (sic) as unfortunate local people. It
is deemed important to explain the damage the terrorist organisations
in our country do to the European Community (drugs and arms smuggling
etc.).
Terrorist organisations also used against the state the reactions
against the existing regime of unemployed, troubled young people
unable from a social point of view to adjust to the environment in
large centres of population.
It is necessary to educate young people along the lines that they are
under the guarantee of the state, by aiming at education and
activities and the realisation of their potentials within the circles
in which they live.

b. In the field of administration: ..

c. It is not possible to transfer all the resources of the state to
   the backward regions. Otherwise the working of the machinery which
   secures the balance of development may falter. The state should
   direct its incitements and investments by planning along the lines
   of the geographical structure and natural sources of the
   region. And while taking investments and incitements to the region,
   it is necessary to take into account a number of shortcomings
   arising from the geographical and climatic conditions as well as
   balancing elements, and to consider as a whole the policies which
   will direct the people of the region towards production, meet their
   education, health and housing needs and tie the people to their
   land and their regions.

The principle must be understood that it is the people of the region
who have the capacity for production and that it is also the people of
the region who will be able to develop the region.
When payments relating to investment programmes planned for the region
are made, they must be properly designated and the fortification of
the local administrations must be taken into account on points such as
initiatives of metropolitan infrastructure, health, environment and
economics. In this manner the participation of the people of the
region in decisions relating to their own welfare and an increase of
political awareness may be secured.
The economic depression in the traditional economic activity of the
region, animal husbandry, has made itself obvious as a result of the
livestock sector being unable to keep up with competition in the
country and of its subsequent collapse. Terrorism and the struggle
with terrorism have dealt blows on this sector.
There have been migrations and a breakdown in the pastoral system as a
result of panic caused by terrorism.
A pilot region to be determined and state supported regions should be
dealt with as a whole. It is not possible to support the many
provinces in the region to the same degree.

(1) Population Planning:..

(2) Investment in Education:

There are important weaknesses in the number of schools which are
closed and the amount of teachers working in the region. Of around
14.000 schools, 5.000, 1s 36%, are closed. Out of 53.000 teachers,
there is a shortage of 17.000, is 40% of teachers. In addition, 43% of
the numbers of teachers are people of the region. With the aim of
removing this shortage, 63 reserve officers and 76 NCOs, a total of
139 military personnel, have been assigned by the 2nd and 3rd army
commands as teachers in schools without teachers.
It is a known fact that a large majority of participation in terrorist
organisations comes from sections of society with a low level of
education.

(3) Investment in Health:

Health services are not at an adequate or desirable level. There are
things which effect citizens negatively, such as the lack of doctors,
midwives and health personnel in general, the shortage of killed
personnel, the price of drugs and the shortcomings in the application
of the green card system*.
(*The green card system was a system whereby people living below the
poverty line were issued with green cards which were supposed to
facilitate their entry into health facilities.)

(4) Investment in Employment:

There are important investments, starting in recent years and still
continuing, which will create broad work opportunities in the fields
of agriculture, livestock and industry in the region. It is necessary
to complete these investments and bring them to a state of being
establishments which will create employment. Initiatives to secure
that as well as protection and observation from state forces of the
investments and establishments, the people of the region protect and
observe and take these establishments, which will create fields of
employment, in hand. People should not be expected to stand up for
something to which they make no contribution. If the state prepares
everything and places it before these people, this serves no purpose
other than to waste resources and to encourage the people of the
region to sloth. It is possible to get the people to stand up for and
protect these establishments by encouraging them to work and creating
the necessary positive atmosphere, educating them and giving them the
opportunity to expend labour in the establishments in their own
region.

(5) Investment in Infrastructure:

The existing roads in the region are inadequate. Transport is
restricted to the main roads. Travel opportunities are thoroughly
reduced, especially in bad weather conditions, and the means of
transport of large numbers of villages and hamlets are completely cut
off. This situation hinders and delays the timely intervention of
security forces in the face of probable terrorist actions.
In addition, Yuksekova runway, from which 32 sorties were effected in
1995, is no longer in its current condition, suitable for planes to
land and take off. 


d. In the Psycho-Social Field:

The biggest influence deemed important form the point of view of
psycho-social power is "national unity". The achievement of national
unity requires that people think and act together. The state should
take urgent measures to secure this togetherness and create an
atmosphere of trust.

External forces desirous of weakening the Republic of Turkey,
rendering it dependent on themselves or causing its collapse and their
collaborationists inside of internal of external forces desirous of
drawing the state to systems and ideologies outside the raison-d etne
of the state are primarily working to direct the public onto their
side and influence the psycho-social and cultural force. Activities
which display their influence in the East and Southeast turn into
psychological pressure with the influence of armed terrorism, and the
lack of knowledge and awareness of the people of the region of the
genuine community values belonging to the essence of the state broaden
the exploitable fields for the terrorist organisations and facilitate
them.

This force, which is at least as important in the struggle with
terrorism as armed force, and possibly more so, has so far been
conducted though the limited means of the Turkish Armed Forces with
great sacrifice. But in order to achieve the desired results,
psychological operations and propaganda should be run by all state
institutions and establishments in an organised, co-ordinated and
planned manner. The state has not conducted adequate activities or
contributed enough to this since 1984.


(1) Media Activities:

The most important aim of the terrorist organisation is to remain on
the agenda. The tactics and strategies of the media generally support
this aim of the organisation, which does not even hesitate to use its
people in suicide-type actions in order to achieve this. By these
practices it is knowingly or unknowingly being used as a tool by the
organisation, and even making a contribution to it.

(2) NGO (International Aid Organisations) Activities:

Large numbers of delegations come to the region with human rights as
an excuse, these delegations meet previously specified people and draw
up reports. These reports are later used internally and externally as
means of propaganda against the state. Another aspect of this business
is that these reports are evaluated as if they were the reports of
parliamentary delegations and/or various international organisations.
The damaging activities of non-governmental aid organisations (NGO),
which carry out activities to our detriment in N. Iraq almost like
missionaries are another aspect of this matter.

(3) Activities in the creation of public opinion:..

6. CONCLUSION AND PROPOSALS FOR SOLUTIONS:

a. Conclusion:

Terrorist organisations, and in particular the PKK terrorist
organisation, carry out destructive activities targeting the basic
qualities of our country for the sake of their aims and cherishing the
objective of wearing down the Republic of Turkey.  It is not deemed
possible to run the struggle against these organisations with state
security forces alone. The struggle with terrorism will only be able
to achieve success as the result of the joint struggle of all state
institutions and establishments and the Turkish nation as a whole. For
this reason the struggle with terrorism must be dealt with as a state
problem.  
Governments may change in Turkey, but the strategy for the struggle
with terrorism should not change from one government to another. To
this end, the state should formulate a "struggle with terrorism
policy" and it should be applied without leave for the slightest
deviation.  A state minister and headquarters to be assigned with this
in mind should be based on the region, and their activities directed
from here.

-- 
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Turkey Contra-Guerrilla-State: http://www.xs4all.nl/~ozgurluk/contrind/
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