Turkey/DHKP-C: The history of our Party - Part 5

[english at ozgurlluk.xs4all.nl]

THE WAR IS REORGANISED 
THE YEARS OF DETERMINATION AND RESISTANCE

The operations and arrest increased day by day and the movement kept
loosing strength. The junta succeeded, already during the first six
months, to deliver serious blows to all the organisations, including
ours. Moral fell to a all time low and panic was caused. Our
resistance and armed struggle against the junta during the first six
months caused a lot of sympathy among the Turkish people and those who
were left behind by their organisations which left the country under
the pretext of a "withdrawal tactic". A lot of people from several
political groups joint our movement because they wanted to
fight. However, we lacked the possibilities and the organisation to
send them into the struggle, to organise them.

And at the beginning of November 1981, all of the 2nd. Central
Committee members, except for the political responsible person who was
abroad, were arrested. The political responsible person of the 2nd. CC
was comrade Niyazi. And when he was arrested as well, in November
1981, the movement entered a new crisis. The strength to fight had
fallen considerably. The leadership of the movement was in the hands
of comrades in lower positions. There was a gap within the movement,
even though it did not look that way from the outside. Several people,
who could no longer be held under direct control and who believed the
movement's authority was in their hands, hastily began to gather the
separated contacts and instead of continuing the struggle, they began
to agitate, based on their own personal fears. After the
demoralisation, present anyhow because of the junta, which befell our
potential and our cadres, they helped the junta in increasing its
psychological superiority and spreading fear because of their
indecisive and fearful conduct, not trusting the leaders of the
organisation. The continuous efforts by some comrades were not
sufficient to overcome this situation. Pasa Güven, on the other hand,
who was sent abroad to intervene in some difficulties, completely
forgot his original mission and he lost himself in the quagmire of the
existence of a refugee, drifting away in the direction of treason. 

Hundreds of our cadres and sympathisers were in prison. 

The possibility to intervene in events from within the prisons was
difficult, or even absent, seen the repression which was applied
inside the prisons. Despite the efforts of comrade Haydar Basbag and
another group of comrades to continue the existence as an organisation
and to confront the junta on the armed level as well by starting
actions on a lower level, we were far off reaching our goal. But the
determination was kept  to stay inside the country, to continue the
resistance, and the junta received an unexpected answer on 15 March,
1982, during the main trial. The campaign which was launched from the
outside, "The Junta can not condemn the revolutionaries", was heard
even inside the State of Emergency Courts. It was a time of a major
silence, no movement, and the junta claimed it had "intimidated the
revolutionaries and the masses". Its rule was stabilised in all
areas. In defending our organisation in the courts and condemning the
junta during a time in which our sympathisers and cadres were
surrounded by the junta, we showed the people in Turkey that the
revolutionary struggle would be continued, that this would not change
because we were imprisoned by the junta, that they could not make us
renounce our beliefs. Our slogans, presented once again to the
democratic public and the people and all of the left gave them a
tremendous moral support. The leaders and the cadres of almost all the
organisations, except for those who had fled the country, were in
prison. The junta had learned from events in the rest of the
world. They knew they could only temporarily stop the struggle by
means of arrests and death sentences. And because they knew that a
much more dangerous, a more revolutionary struggle, could emerge in
the end, they started a major propaganda war against the detained
revolutionaries by claiming that especially the leading cadres had
surrendered to the existing order, that they were repenting. Now they
wanted to intimidate the people, force them into submission,  by means
of psychological warfare because repression and terror had failed. We
had to cross this game. Even though we were imprisoned, we had to
resist, not only to save personal pride, we had to find forms of
resistance and ways to inform the people about our resistance. We had
to make public that we would keep our thoughts about the revolution
alive despite everything and that fascism would never defeat us. We
had to avoid ways and a conduct which would enable the junta to
present the revolutionaries in a wrong light, at the end of their
strength. The resistance had to become more as the resistance of just
a few revolutionaries. The prisons, filled with thousands and
thousands of revolutionaries and patriots had to become strongholds of
resistance, showing the junta that they could never be forced into
submission. By informing the people's masses about our resistance, we
had to create a new euphoria and a new morale, starting again with our
organisation. A movement which doesn't resist will drift to the right
because it looses all its moral views and ideals and it will return to
the existing order. That's predictable. But primarily, although we
were in prison, although we had witnessed many defeats, we had to keep
our faith, we had to take care of our wounds and get on our feet again
to lead the struggle which was waged by the people's masses. To
achieve this, we had to wage a determined and resolved resistance. To
neutralise the psychological superiority of the junta, to maintain our
existence as an organisation and in order to prevent that our people
would be influenced by right-wing, reformist and obscure imperialist
theories in these conditions of defeat, we had to erect high walls
around ourselves, we had to motivate our people for the struggle, we
had to train them but the obvious and impressive effects would only be
seen years later by them. In this way, our struggle was to build a
stable bridge between us and the people, carrying us into the
future. Those who were unable to see the future, who didn't believe in
it, refrained from building this bridge and they were unable to
prevent their own end. 

A party can have its leadership, all its fighters and cadres
imprisoned, it can witness major defeats.

These are the tests for the revolutionaries. Those who pass their test
successfully will have no difficulties to build a bond with their
people. We had to change the dock of fascism into a witness stand from
which we would exclaim our truth, the revolution, and from which we
would condemn fascism. We wrote the brightest pages of our
organisation's history with our resistance in jail, with the docks we
used as witness stands of the revolution, with the way were dealt with
the problems in the  police stations, the way we stood above them, the
way we organised a practice which supported people to stand on their
feet again, becoming an example for all the prisoners. The biggest
effort and work in writing those pages was done by Abdullah Meral,
Haydar Basbag and Hasan Telci who didn't hesitate to sacrifice their
lives for their organisation. I commemorate them with great
confidence, respect and love. 

And when comrade Haydar Basbag was arrested in the summer of 1982 as
well, we were completely in the dark about the general state of the
movement and who was taking care of the leadership. After a comrade
managed to escape from prison in that time and he took over the
responsibility, the contacts were restored again.

Now it was attempted to deal with the state of affairs of the movement
from inside the prisons, with help from the outside. The decision was
made that our movement still possessed a considerable potential and
that the line of resistance could be continued with a suitable way of
organising. During that period, the cadres discussed the state of the
movement and the made a general analyses of how to bridge this period
in the best way possible. The movement was not able in that time to
realise a stable tactic of retreat. Retreat is a tactic which can only
be realised by an organised force. We did not possess this kind of
organisation. By  December 1982, the Americanist fascist junta
succeeded to install its institutions through the entire country,
eliminating almost all revolutionary, patriotic organisations -
especially the armed ones - which constituted a kind of
opposition. Trade unions were banned, intellectuals and many others
were arrested or silenced. And the junta wanted to extend its power
base by making the people -forced to remain silent with violence -
vote for a constitution which would legalise overt fascism. Now there
was no opposition movement left which could pose a hindrance to this
junta program, this could be realised. The plebiscite for the
constitution was an important step in this direction. Among the left,
people generally favoured the view to say no to the constitution, to
boycott the elections, or to make the vote invalid. But the left
didn't have the strength to realise this. While our movement was in a
phase of rebuilding, we had to take a stand about the serious item of
making the people sensitive about the plebiscite. Therefore we started
a campaign, in the country and abroad, on the basis of "No to the
fascist constitution". We tried to politicise the masses by propaganda
and proclaimed that a vote against the constitution was a vote against
fascism. Although we were unable to carry out actions in the country
on a higher level, propaganda was made in several ways. The action
which put its mark on the campaign and which roused the most attention
among the people's masses and world public opinion was the occupation
of the general consulate in Cologne and the hostage taking of its
employees. We had to apply regular pressure on our people abroad,
force them, before something movement and this action could be
realised. Every reason, every hindrance to abort the action was
removed. Weapons, necessary for the action, were sent from
Turkey. Although this action was carried out abroad, it showed it was
possible to carry our movement's policy to our people under all
circumstances. It showed one can expose fascism, if the conditions
require it, abroad as well when the necessary measures are taken. In
this field it has the characteristic of showing a different
perspective of militancy and determination. How strong the attacks by
imperialism against us may have been, they didn't succeed in reducing
the effect and the importance of this action. 

The protests against the fascist constitution and our efforts to call
the people's masses to say no to the constitution were continued also
in prison and in court. Our view about the constitution was expressed
in the docks of the oligarchy and proclaimed to the people, carried to
the outside.

At that time, the prisons had given themselves an important
mission. Opportunism, neglecting the facts that we were imprisoned and
the developments in the country and he special situation our movement
was in, and they  acted solely on the basis of there personal
worries. They tried to get such nonsense on the agenda like "the
prisons are not the central organ, it's impossible to make policy from
there which would influence people on the outside". These statements
were of no use to the struggle, they just were evidence of an attitude
which was caused by fascism, portraying the imprisonment of the
revolutionaries as an imprisonment of normal criminals. 

The prisoners of our movement showed an honourable attitude during the
developments in our country, according to their possibilities. They
tried to bring the policy of our organisation to the people and they
tried to influence and steer our organisation on the outside. This
attitude was internalised so much that positions were taken - even
about international affairs - under extreme difficult
circumstances. We can say that the first and only comprehensive
evaluation of the occupation of the Lebanon by Israel was ours, we
were the first in the world to determine a position, despite the
severe punishment. It were our prisoner's voices, in front of the
fascist judges, who condemned American imperialism and Israel, who
expressed their solidarity with the Palestinian people and who stated
that the fascist junta was a collaborator in these massacres and
attacks. These positions in world affairs, this resistance and the
idea to be able to maintain a living bond with the people, destroyed
the plans of the junta. Their aim was: "Take them in prison, silence
them, make them fear so much they won't dare to show themselves
anymore, force them to adjust to the system". A prisonership like that
of the members of Devrimci Sol doesn't occur much in the world, it's
not a normal prisonership, neither does it allow itself to be forced
in a status of prisoners of war. The prisoners of Devrimci Sol do not
bend, they do not remain silent, it's a new form of prisonership. We
could say the prisoners of Devrimci Sol are "Free Prisoners". The
attitude and the resistance of the Devrimci Sol prisoners influenced a
large spectrum of the left in a short time, reaching to the democratic
intellectuals. Although many tried to copy it, they did not
succeed. This is an aspect of our history which deserves much more
attention. 

Under the circumstances in prison we went through a phase in which we
did not have the possibilities yet to talk and discuss with our
comrades. That's why we thought of evaluating the conditions in our
country in a more suitable time, with the participation of more
cadres. But our comrades on the outside, confronted with many
questions, forced us to evaluate in order to prevent a wrong
position. It was presented as "Evaluation 1983" to the comrades,
discussed and finished. Of course it showed many shortcomings. 

The state the left and Kurdish nationalism was in, became shockingly
apparent, some written and oral drivel left aside, during the
constitution plebiscite in 1982. They didn't even have the slightest
form of organisation and strength. Dozens of organisations had gone to
Europe, taking a form which forced upon them. Misleading the people's
masses and their supporters with the propaganda slogan "Fighting
against fascism", they tried to collect money for ammunition and one
manifestation was organised after the other. Months and years passed
by. Looking at its appearance, the entire left, and even the
nationalistic PKK, seemed reasonable and matured. But when they were
hit by the sledge hammer of fascism, they suddenly changed. Arrogant,
displeased with everybody, looking at everybody as an hindrance for
the struggle and therefore as an enemy which had to be destroyed,
labelling all as "three to five morally inferior people", as servants
of the exploiter-Kemalists, even as contra-guerrilla, the PKK
theorised about the liquidation of the others, agreeing with DY. This
organisation, responsible for the death of dozens of revolutionaries,
started its front activities, without having gone once through any
kind of serious self-criticism, with the words "The people's masses in
Turkey and Kurdistan can not be organised by any left
structure". Separated from the reality in the country, fleeing the
country with the cadres in panic after total defeat, they were not
able to build a front against fascism in the country itself, nor
building a unity of strength and action with certain principles and
rules abroad. What did the situation look like? The left didn't see
the real meaning of fascism and the revolutionary struggle, they had
not overcome the positions of the petite-bourgeois opposition. Their
leadership did not posses a consciousness, no will to power. The left
was confused and shocked, their organisation only consisted of
political refugees, but still they acted like head teachers. 

The left had lost its psychological supremacy because of the
Americanist fascist junta, its dynamics were dwindling. Separated more
and more from the home soil because of their refugee existence, they
increasingly lost the positive characteristics they possessed at least
in part previously. Step by step, they decayed, influenced by the
European ideology of the "civic society", of Trotzkists and anarchist
tendencies, they started to label themselves as democratic,
propagating this line. That's why they are responsible for the loss of
hundreds of cadres who still wanted to fight for the revolution, be it
on a wrong line or a just one, they bear responsibility for the
dissolution of the organisations. 

Those who didn't fulfil their mission of leaders in the struggle
against fascism, perfected the theory of the escape from war. They
caused thousands of revolutionaries and patriots to conform to the
system. The question of  "objectively or subjectively" has no meaning
anymore with such a result. The important fact is that entire
organisations dissolved and thousands of revolutionaries were
destroyed. These organisations bear the responsibility for this. Now
these people, after harming thousands of people, after giving false
hope to the people, act as if nothing ever happened and they only take
care of their own benefit, integrating in the system. Now we have to
call them by their real name, and that name is treason, treason
against the revolution and the people. Sooner or later the people in
Turkey will have to demand justice and accountability for this
treason. 

We have often said that this "sensational" front, built up from
abroad, would only be a foreign front, having almost no contact with
the country itself. As a result of 12 September, it as just an
artificial and temporary occasion. At the end, this front just
collapsed without achieving anything. Of course, we were aware this
left, convinced of themselves in their petite-bourgeois arrogance,
wouldn't listen to us. However, it was our task to tell the truth, to
warn the people in Turkey, the left and our supporters. That's why
we've written the brochure "About the Front" in which we made clear
our position. 

We emphasised that a left which truly intents to fight fascism
shouldn't waste its time with things which can't be realised and it
should stop to mislead the people with false claims and statements. We
stated that it was our task to leave the dividing points aside and
that we had to agree on a anti-fascist, anti-imperialist program,
aimed against the junta, based on the views we shared, and that we had
to realise this program in a unity of strength and action. Our calls
were condemned to remain unanswered because they did not have such
problems as fighting in the country itself.

After long discussions, a program was prepared in which they did not
believe themselves, not a single point was realised in practice and
then they started to accuse each other, especially DY and the PKK. Not
a single sign of the front was left. It was pointless to say: "We
proposed this". Everybody knew what game was being played. 

They were so irresponsible, they didn't even make the effort to
explain to the people why they dissolved, why they were unable to
realise a program they all agreed on. Life will show where this
irresponsibility, this lack of character, will lead these
organisations. Of course, we drew the animosity of this left, chained
in the bourgeois ideology, upon ourselves when we made their deceiving
and lying face public by telling the truth. 

We will now shortly address the situation of the PKK which took over
the leadership with their front, without a party, later putting a
radical left line of struggle into practice. Prior to 12 September,
the PKK was in conflict with all the nationalist Kurdish organisations
and with all the left groups. There were also conflicts with traitors
inside their own organisation. These conflicts had cost them a lot of
strength and the suffered a crushing defeat. Thereupon they left the
country in panic. 

Although the PKK leadership portrays this as an "orderly retreat", we
all know, as they do themselves, that the truth is different. The PKK
went through their defeat, witnessed by the left in Turkey in general
after 12 September, prior to the coup. 

The PKK had lost strength and they brought their leaders abroad. They
lost morale because after 12 September, the fascist terror in
Kurdistan imprisoned thousands of cadres, sympathisers and plain
Kurdish people in concentration camps. The events after the coup also
showed that the fleeing of the PKK was no orderly retreat at
all. During this phase, the PKK almost everywhere, in the prisons, in
Turkey and abroad, witnessed weakness and demoralisation. 

Before 12 September, the PKK had physically liquidated the other
leftist groups, making a theory out of it. Because of these attacks,
the entire left excluded the PKK but they increased their
irresponsible behaviour by labelling several organisations as
contra-revolutionary. 

They did not leave a fighting force behind in the country which would
have been able to deliver a blow against fascism. At that time it was
the paramount task to prevent the institutionalisation of the 12
September fascism, to defeat fascism. But the PKK did not participate
in this struggle. 

The PKK, eager to free itself from its subjective situation, gaining
new morale, pretended to admit that mistakes had been made in the past
to slightly open the door to the left again. 

The left was weak and didn't plan to act at all. They claimed they had
always been prepared. That's how this front emerged, existing in name
but not in reality. 

When this front emerged, we stated that the PKK, despite their wrong
tactics and a wrong line, was a radical movement which was destroying
the provocation theories of the revisionists and that they therefore
deserved support. We also stated that the real mission of the PKK was
radicalism but that this radicalism would be lost when they remained
in this pacifist front. After the pacifist front was dissolved, the
PKK returned to its course, considered its situation as being a good
one, and in August 1984, they made a large leap forward. The PKK likes
to portray itself as the only force, after this leap, which resisted
the 12 September fascism. This is a deliberate distortion of reality. 

By August 1984, the junta had paralysed all the forces of opposition,
the constitution of 1982 had been approved in a plebiscite and there
had been elections in 1983. The program of the junta to return to
democracy was going full steam ahead. Looked at from this perspective,
the emerging of the PKK was no tactic which crossed the program of 12
September fascism. 

Without doubt, there are more facts which influenced the people's
masses and the left from which lessons can be learnt on several levels
to gain a new dynamic. 

But all this can not change the truth that the PKK did not fight
against the !2 September fascism, that they left the country prior to
the coup, that they - like the rest of the left - looked from a
distance hoe overt fascism institutionalised itself. The truth is that
the PKK, by participating in the opportunistic front, distracted the
people. 

DIFFICULT YEARS, SACRIFICE, ALLEGIANCE AND TREASON

In January and February 1983, at a time when the movement had not been
rebuilt yet, we were against faced with a large operation. Almost
everywhere where we were partly organised, a lot of our comrades,
including many leading cadres, were arrested and a lot of our assets
and  resources fell in enemy hands. This operation made us loose us
morale, we lost almost all our fighting strength and we even worried
if we were able to continue the organisation with those who remained
outside. 

The Central Committee member P.G., who was abroad, only took care of
his personal worries. More and more he distanced himself from his
revolutionary identity and the reality in our country. The operations
in our country, the martyrs and the resistance of the prisoners did
not interest him anymore. There was no support for the struggle in our
country coming from abroad. In stead of contributing economically or
morally, the organisation abroad rather became a burden for the
organisation in the country. 

It was important to gather the remaining contacts and to continue our
organisation, although we had lost a lot of our strength. The
responsibility had to be handed over the remaining trustworthy
comrades, even though they had less experience. This was necessary to
gather strength once again and to make a new step forward. 

In this phase Sabo took over the responsibility for the movement outside. 

Her closest confidant was Gülcan who had shown a generally positive
attitude till then. These comrades took the responsibility upon
themselves in this time, the hardest for our movement. Almost all
contacts had been discovered or unreliable. Almost nothing was left
from the money, the weapons, support bases and hierarchy. We mainly
had unorganised people, mostly in Istanbul and other cities, who had
not been arrested, potential contacts which we did not know well, and
there was a rural guerrilla unit which was inactive at that time. 

It was a difficult task for our comrades to gather all these contacts,
to re-organise and create new possibilities for the movement. Our
comrades  enthusiastically accepted this task, despite their
inexperience and despite the heavy burden this task constituted. They
did not doubt they would fulfil this task. 

By taking over responsibility on the highest level, Sabo would quickly
learn the art of leadership in this process with her sense of
responsibility, her trust and awareness. 

She had to find out to do the right thing, based on her own knowledge,
her sense, intelligence and experience, without anybody showing her
the way. 

Although she was supported from inside the prisons, this support was
only limited and not on a regular basis. When she took over
responsibility, only few people Sabo had contact with knew her real
identity. In this phase of our movement, women in our ranks were not
yet able, like they are now, to proof themselves in the struggle. The
tendency to look down at women, only using them in secondary tasks,
was the view of a male dominated society. When she made contacts and
took over leadership, she had to fight this reality and fight for
recognition. 

It was a time in which there was no money for paying the rent, nor for
the bus. By limiting our collective spending in prison, we were able
to support her and help her to manage for a while. We asked all the
prisoners we could reach in the prisons in Istanbul for addresses of
relatives and acquaintances whose apartments could be used, at least
for a while, and we passed those on to the outside. This, at least
partly and temporarily, prevented our comrades standing on the
street. We could give many more examples and report of heroic acts,
sacrifice and dramatic events, but that's not necessary. We mentioned
these examples to enable a better understanding of that time. 

The difficulties of the revolution, not mentioned in theory and not
becoming apparent, were so numerous that it is impossible to explain
them with the classic and known theories and schemes. Sometimes it's
even impossible to explain them in simple text. When these
particularities of a revolutionary movement are not put into words,
are not grasped into notions, but when it is tried to press them into
theoretical schemes, this will inevitably lead to a deviation from the
revolutionary line. 

Sabo proposed a suicide action,  in which she was to participate
herself, to continue the struggle against the junta on the highest
level. But it's impossible to achieve important results with suicide
actions. Most important was to re-group the organisation. That's why a
suicide action was rejected. We will always remember Sabo because of
her unselfishness and her loyalty to the movement.

The responsible person abroad, P.G., ignored the order to return to
Turkey by denying his task abroad  had been finished. While our
friends had no money for a place to sleep or the bus, he took money
from them, without warning them, and sent it to his wife and family in
Turkey. He took his wife, needed in the organisation in Turkey, abroad
without asking the comrades. This breach and treason was continued,
disregarding all ethical values. This traitor, leading the cadres
abroad, took money from our sympathisers by misleading them with
stories of a coming fight which never to come. He used the
organisation's money for his own purposes. He was up to his neck in
honourless activities of organised crime, using the name of the
organisation. P.G. was going to account for his treason and he would
have to pay the price. He did not fulfil the tasks which were given to
him. In these difficult times for our movement, he did not want to
co-operate with our younger and more inexperienced comrades. He made
use of the fact that our leading comrades were in prison and he
exploited his charisma towards our comrades. He thought he didn't have
to anything, that he could use our movement's property as he
liked. Nobody could stop him. We as prisoners couldn't act. First we
had to create the conditions to learn what was going on abroad. We
didn't know what was going on exactly. Once in a while, the friends
got hold of our magazine which was published abroad. Although it
appeared under the conditions abroad, its contents were miles apart
from the reality in Turkey, it was a primitive piece of paper,
published pro forma. We had to gather in Turkey at first. Our friends
outside the prison could not solve the problems abroad at short
notice. Our young and inexperienced people developed a ripeness in a
short time, a ripeness which normally took years. By living and
learning in this phase, they started to evade police control. 

The junta continued its program of transition to democracy. Nothing
was hindering this program. After the junta, albeit with some
difficulty, had the constitution of 1982 approved in a plebiscite, it
saw no danger in, so to speak in the honeymoon of victory, holding
elections in 1983. The atmosphere in which these elections were going
to be held, the quality of the existing bourgeois parties, the bans,
the impatience of the bourgeois parties which already existed for
decades, this all clearly showed the results these elections were
going to have. The regime, which could not last in the form of a junta
for a long time because of several fundamental internal and external
factors, tried to find ways and means for its political and economical
aims by cheating the public with elections. Although the elections
increased the political sensibility of the masses, it was an action
which required a standpoint of the revolutionary organisations. It was
attempted to reach the people by making our standpoint clear in court
and from inside the prisons, by distributing leaflets, brochures and
handbills outside and by applying classic methods. There was no party
for the people to vote for, to support. To convince the masses and to
expose the fake elections of the junta, we clarified our view: "Do not
go to the polling boxes, boycott the elections, there are no parties
or persons worth your votes and support". Of course, this was not an
active boycott. But it was a boycott, even if it was a passive
one. Our organisation still existed, despite the difficult times. In
this phase, we took some people from the guerrilla units in the
mountains of Dersim to the city to carry out armed actions there. Some
of them committed betrayal and fled. The inertia in the land, the
standstill, not fulfilling the tasks against fascism, this all
increased the fear. When this fear was added to the increased
oppression in the cities, betrayal was inevitable. 

In all the phases of difficulty and loosing strength of our movement,
provocateurs and traitors emerged who wanted to destroy the movement
from within. One of these traitors, emerging at that time and later
punished, was Ali Akgün. Before the putsch of 12 September, Ali Akgün
was responsible for the Mediterranean area. He was criticised for not
implementing the program and the decisions of the movement, for his
egoistic notions, for mixing up affairs in his former region, and for
abusing movement property. The Mediterranean area was important to us
because progress could be expected there. But because of Ali Akgün's
anarchism, his stubbornness and egoistic behaviour, many parts of our
program could not be realised there. Prior to 12 September, he was
asked to seriously account for his acts. It became obvious that he was
not sincere. He was supposed to go directly to his region to report to
the committee there. But on the second day of his stay in the region,
he attempted - without warning the organisation and after lying to the
region committee - to break into a jeweller's shop. They were all
arrested. Because of their guilt, all were demoted to normal
sympathisers and their tasks were taken away from them. In 1982, he
used the opportunity of a joint escape action of several organisations
to escape from the prison in Elazig with two of our comrades. The
decision to let Ali Akgün participate in the escape was taken by the
concerned organisation because of his severe prison sentence. Although
there are other stories, Ali Akgün split from our two friends after
the escape because of personal problems and other reasons. He behaved
individualistic. The other comrade took over responsibility in the
movement. Ali Akgün sent a message to prison, expressing his
opposition towards this comrade and asking for the responsibility to
be handed over to himself. Remembering of his misbehaviour in the past
and his position, we stated that we had made him a normal sympathiser
who can't take on responsibility and that he had to proof himself
first. But he, valueing himself very much like some petite-bourgeois
do, did not listen to the decision of the movement. He found three or
four petty criminals who had no contact with the movement and who
needed money. Together they committed theft, robberies and all kind of
dirty Mafia crimes. He continued his life as a gangster, not
fulfilling a revolutionary task anymore. Comrades on the outside and
comrades who were arrested during operations in 1983 stated that Ali
Akgün was not arrested during the operations in January 1983 although
the police did have the opportunity. While our people were in conflict
with the police everywhere at that time, Ali Akgün walked among the
policemen freely. With a loose lip, he spread around that he was the
real Devrimci Sol and he exposed all the cadres he knew, or suspected
of being cadres. He explains the fact that he is not touched by the
police by stating that they are afraid of him. Now the hopes of the
oligarchy to split our movement are on this traitor. While Ali Akgün
walked around, claiming that "we are the real Devrimci Sol", our
comrades on the outside had almost no contact to the traitor P.G. He
tries to legitimise his own treason and he starts to co-operate with
Ali Akgün. The two agree to split the movement. To realise this plan,
Ali Akgün prepares to go abroad. He stays at the house of a
sympathiser of the DHB. One day the police shows up and summons the
DHB sympathiser to come to the police station. Ali Akgün panics when
he sees them and he tries to escape by jumping out of the window, but
he is arrested. The gang he has gathered around himself splits from
him and they dissolve. The traitor P.G. has played his last card and
decides to return to the system. In fact it weren't just P.G. and Ali
Akgün who planned this conspiracy. The real people behind it were the
oligarchy and the opportunists. Opportunism can not accept that al its
efforts to split the movement have failed once again and it uses all
the opportunities to show its animosity. The theatre they play when
the traitor Pasa Güven and Ali "the Barbarian" are punished is the
result.

-- 
Devrimci Halk Kurtulus Cephesi (Revolutionary Peoples Liberation Front)
DHKC Informationbureau Amsterdam
http://www.ozgurluk.org/dhkc                          
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