The PKK where it is coming from and where it is going IV

[ozgurluk at xs4all.nl]

The PKK where it is coming from and where it is going

Part 4

War and Peace

"From the very first day up to the present our Party has made just one
appeal. Peace, peace, peace... This appeal has been answered by
expanding the scope of the war, and war was organised." (Ö. Yurtsever
Genclik, November 1997, page 9)

Peace, peace, peace... despite all statements about war, revolution,
guerrillas and victory, everything is today focused on peace and
negotiations. "The PKK wants peace, the Republic of Turkey does not
and carries on the war."

Again and again statements like this arise in different forms.

It is obvious that these are not the statements of people who "want to
fight throughout Turkey", who want to spread the war and who talk of
revolution in Turkey. Those who constantly talk of peace cannot at the
same time express such sentiments. 

The PKK makes statements like that on the one hand, and on the other
it claims to stand for revolution, even revolution in Turkey. But in
reality this claim is based on its past, its earlier theories and its
guerrilla warfare. But this has no bearing on the current practice of
the PKK. Currently the talk is chiefly of peace, dialogue and
consensus.     

HOW DID THEY GO FROM WAR TO "PEACE"?

"(...) The PKK is going through an impasse at the moment, despite its
considerable political and military strength and its roots in the
masses - as a result of its strategy and tactics which depend on a
nationalist viewpoint. Instead of taking a critical look at this
strategy and tactics and finding Marxist-Leninist solutions, it has
tried to escape from this impasse by resorting to a policy of seeking
a consensus with the oligarchy and imperialism. All its contemporary
political and military actions are aimed at furthering this
consensus. The PKK is trying to give this search for consensus a
theoretical underpinning. (Decisions of the Founding Congress of the
DHKP, "The Situation of the Kurdish National Movement and Our Attitude
Towards It")

The analysis given above expresses the position the PKK finds itself
in today.

The PKK certainly was more decisive from 1984, when it started
guerrilla warfare and in the years 1986-87 when it pursued guerrilla
warfare despite all the martyrs it suffered, than is the case at
present. Especially after the guerrillas had reached a certain
strength, the PKK set itself many tasks, ranging from setting up
liberated zones to the creation of an independent Kurdistan. 

The PKK's drawback from the beginning was its nationalist viewpoint
and the rejection of a class basis for its struggle, and its
organising on a national basis. Since the aims it set itself were
misguided, the alliances it entered into failed and it distanced
itself more and more from Marxism-Leninism, and its politics, which
did not meet the requirements of the war, have brought it into a
political and military cul de sac. Since 1990 it has regressed. 

In the phase of the oligarchy's strengthened attacks around 1992, the
PKK, instead of fulfilling the requirements of the war, began to look
for solutions from imperialism and the oligarchy. In accordance with
the policies of imperialism and the oligarchy it has taken onto its
agenda "a cease-fire", even if only with the aim of arriving at a
consensus. So as to be able to have a seat at the negotiating table it
has made not spreading the war into a plank of its own policy. 

Only during the Gulf War was an "exception" made, for a short time. "A
further disruption of the status quo, which in Kuwait was artificially
created by other countries and is already tottering, will create the
conditions for a great revolutionary development in this region. When
the developments accelerate, the discontent among the populace will
increase. This increase will tear at the present regime and put an end
to it. The avalanche which came about as a result of the October
Revolution, the Chinese Revolution and the revolution in Vietnam, can
now appear in the Middle East as well." (Fourth Political Report by
Abdullah Öcalan, p.28)

But even this "exception" was short-lived, as a result of the PKK's
increased search for consensus and its policy of seeking peace. When
this latest opportunity also slipped through its fingers, it no longer
talked of the "great October revolution", or of "revolutions",
"transitional governments" or "liberated zones", but instead nailed
its colours more firmly to the mast of the "peace policy". 

In reality, the period since 1988-89 has been a period in which its
prognoses have not been fulfilled. It is also clear how far-sighted
this movement is when since the end of the 1980s it has designated
"liberated zones" and "transitional governments" as short-term aims
and expected an "October, China and Vietnam" revolution to develop
from the Gulf Crisis.

Instead of the PKK discussing this point and looking into why and on
what basis its policies and tactics were not realised, it has almost
altered its strategic line and developed a theory that the armed
struggle has fulfilled its task and the stage is now set to engage in
diplomacy. But in the statements by the PKK leadership made on every
occasion and on a day-to-day basis, this is consciously concealed. So
it tried to appear more warlike while actually going down the road of
seeking peace, and it tries to appear revolutionary while in reality
becoming more and more reformist. 

IS IT UNMASKING, TACTICS OR A "FINAL AIM", AND WHAT IS MEANT BY IT?

The more vigorous the attacks by the oligarchy in this period, the
more the PKK has gone backwards, and all the behaviour it has
characterised as tactical has not allowed it to escape from its
impasse, and it has not been able to realise aims like "strengthening
and expanding the war", "increasing the number of guerrillas to
50,000", "achieving the October Revolution in the Middle East",
"creating a transitional government in the region, initially based on
Botan and Behtinan". In the end, it has gone from seeking these aims
to seeking "peace". This condition is the failure of the national
strategy, the theory of colonialism and the policy of seeking a
cease-fire. Even if the PKK says "We know that the TR (Republic of
Turkey) won't make peace, the Kemalists will not simply sit down at
the negotiating table for peace talks. The TR is not going to make
concessions just like that. But to push the TR into a corner we are
unmasking it by calling for peace," all that does not correspond to
reality. As in this quote, he policy of peace and seeking cease-fires
is justified as an attempt to unmask, or as a tactic. But even if we
remember Abdullah Öcalan's statement that "politics consist of tactics
anyway," it is clear that what we have here is not what we would
understand as tactics.

Moreover, there is no revolutionary logic to the statements cited
above. Since the oligarchy in Turkey is a fascist one and carries out
massacres, it does not have to be unmasked through a "peace
offensive". This objective could also be achieved by expanding the
war.

Where the PKK sees it as inadequate to publicly confess to having a
peace policy,  it uses explanations like "unmasking" and
"tactics". This is the other face of pragmatism. 

In reality all the indications are that the "peace policy" and the
"consensus policy" are neither about unmasking nor about tactics but
are a strategy and an absolute aim. This goes so far that the ruling
classes' conflicts and disputes are being characterised as those
between "hawks" and "doves". They have deviated from the path of
trying to smash a thoroughly rotten state which is a war machine
directed against the people. With the tactics they have suggested,
they have developed solutions aimed at contributing to "saving" the
decomposing state, and solving the oligarchy's problems. They have
torn themselves apart in the attempt to show how much they are for a
solution and for peace. 

WHOSE ARE THE PROBLEMS, AND WHICH SIDE'S PROBLEMS ARE TO BE RESOLVED
BY PEACE?

It is already the case that there is confusion as to whom the "peace"
is for and whose problems will be resolved through its proposals. The
Kurdish nationalists are seeking to convince the state how much
"damage this war is doing to the state". They write about how much the
"dirty war" is making a dent in the budget and correspondingly advise
the oligarchy in Turkey to put an end to the "dirty war" in order to
overcome its internal crisis. Whose side are we on? Whose problems are
we seeking to resolve? 

"It does not look so simple for these circles to free themselves from
the military's control, when they are so strongly dominated by the
military and are only a kind of fig leaf for it, concerning themselves
with fulfilling its economic and military demands. So the possibility
of reaching consensus is a small one. But in the final analysis the
military is also in difficulties. Revolutionary violence will be
stepped up a little more in Turkey itself and cause them even further
problems. Then a group can arise in the military which will support
consensus. The signs of this can start to appear now. (Selected works
of Abdullah Öcalan, volume 6, p. 177)

According to the PKK the "politicians" want to solve the problem
through consensus. But the military is preventing it. (Although at the
start of 1988 the PKK leader declared the contrary and said that the
military wanted a solution but it was the civilians who were not ready
for one. At that time he was saying the opposite from what he is
saying now.) But if the PKK fights on, the military gets into
difficulties and supporters of consensus appear on the scene. 

If the military is now in difficulties and can no longer pursue the
war against the PKK, why is the PKK waiting for groups to arise which
favour consensus? If the military is in trouble, why not spread the
war even further and bring about the revolution? It does not because
the PKK does not believe in achieving a result through armed
struggle. For this reason it cannot  - despite its declarations about
the military and its problems - make the statement that the war should
be expanded and the revolution brought about. On the contrary, it
keeps talking of the pro-war "hawks" and the consensus-seeking
"doves", it makes everything hinge on discovering them and expects the
state to come round to agreeing on a consensus. 

"...The military must practice self-criticism. If it does not practice
self-criticism in the coming period, then Turkey will have even more
problems. ...What does all this mean. It means that the military is
forced to prepare to reach a consensus. Chauvinism is very evident but
it is of use to nobody. All it causes is the effusion of blood,
bankrupts the state and throttles the exercise of politics. How long
will the military carry on with that?" (Selected Works, volume 6,
Abdullah Öcalan, p. 178) 

The PKK has decided that the bankrupting of the state is a problem for
itself, as is the throttling of the political system, and it is
indicating to the oligarchy how it must resolve these problems. But
those who fight for the revolution, for the liberation of the peoples,
for people's power would in such a situation think of nothing other
than aggravating the state's bankruptcy. For all these existing facts
are proof of the existence of a revolutionary situation and the aim of
the revolutionaries in such a situation is to bring about the
revolution. 

These facts show clearly that PKK strategy is no longer based on the
revolution but on peace and consensus with the oligarchy. So if they
talk of peace and consensus and so on, they should stop seeking to
deceive others by saying "it is only a tactic" or "we are unmasking
them". 

WHAT IS THE STATE'S POINT OF VIEW? WHICH ATTITUDE IS BEING TAKEN
TOWARDS THE STATE?

The attitude a political movement takes towards the state shows us the
clear criteria which define its characteristics. Even the man in the
street has grasped the true face of the state and says quite clearly
that the mask of the Susurluk state has long since fallen and that the
state is alien, it tyrannises people, it belongs to people like
Sabanci and Koc. When all left forces on today's political scene
define the present state, they talk of the "oppressing classes'
instrument for keeping down the oppressed classes..."

Such a theoretical definition on its own is not sufficient. What is
decisive is the attitude to the state and the steps taken in practice.

Many left-wing forces fall for the state's declarations of wanting
"more democracy" and they have expectations as a result which stop
them from manoeuvring and they no longer take an attitude to the
state. So we should take the opportunity to reiterate a general truth:
the liberation of the oppressed is only possible when they organise,
struggle and end this war with a revolution. The revolution means the
smashing of the state apparatus by the masses and founding a new and
more progressive order, that is, the revolution has the task of
destroying the fascist state and in place of the destroyed state
erecting a new state. Without this, it will not happen. If we struggle
and want a revolution, this sequence of events must be gone
through. On the other hand if you want only reforms and seek an
existence inside the system, then you do not have the problem of
bringing about the state's destruction. All that is needed is to be
content with some reforms, to become a part of the system and accept
the existence of this state and reach a consensus with it. This means
politics is only conducted within the framework of the
system. Institutions like elections, parliament and so on are the
aim. 

When we come forward for war, guerrillas, Marxism-Leninism, revolution
and communism, the decisive criterion is the attitude to the
state. Either we destroy this state, or we reach a consensus with
it. If our aim is to destroy the state we display a revolutionary
attitude, but if we reach consensus and accept the continuation of the
fascist state structure, we are displaying a reformist attitude the
state can tolerate. 

Despite the war the PKK has conducted for years, it now talks of peace
and negotiations. Thoughts of peace and negotiating cannot arise from
a viewpoint which seeks to destroy the state and put an end to the
mastery of the ruling class. The PKK, which from the beginning took
heart from its hostility to the state and expanded its war, now wants
to sit down at the same table as the state it was fighting and work
together with it in a common structure.

In the final analysis, this means to accept the oligarchy's system of
exploitation and to say "you can exploit our peoples even further, I
accept the state power of the ruling classes." 

But that also means that the "peace" the PKK speaks of is an actual
problem for the attitude it accepts towards the state.

If attempts to reach consensus with the state start, there is no
telling where it will end. The entire policy is determined by the
attempts, who is a friend and who an enemy, even the definitions and
the terminology. This has had its effect on the PKK. They criticise
socialism. They are saying, "look, we are not dangerous socialists."
They admittedly claim to be socialists but on the pretext of
criticising "actually existing socialism" they shed all the values and
symbols associated with socialism. They pay no heed to the positive
achievements of the socialist countries and do not defend socialism
but prefer to attack it.       

The same thing comes up with regard to the state. The PKK leader says:
"I will accept no democracy that means dictatorship to the
bourgeoisie." But the bourgeoisie will naturally consider people's
democracy to be a dictatorship. How is it possible for the people and
the bourgeoisie to simultaneously exercise power or divide it? 

With such a conception, thoughts and slogans such as "fight until
liberation, fight until the establishment of people's power" have no
more meaning. 

  HOW THOSE WHO DO NOT SEE POWER AS AN AIM VIEW EVENTS

Those who do not strive to win power define concepts like friend and
foe accordingly. On the other hand, those who fight or want to fight
naturally seek out their friends among the friends of the people, that
is, among those who fight. But when one is not aspiring to win power
and in the struggle develops despair, exhaustion and a loss of
self-confidence, then dialogue with the state begins to replace the
goals that were hitherto envisaged and and appropriate friends and
alliances are sought. The monopolies which are responsible for the
massacres in Kurdistan, are today publishing reports about the Kurdish
problem. For the problem is staring them in the face. Not just in
Kurdistan but in the whole of Turkey, the struggle is growing. The
events in Gazi, the May 1 demonstrations, people's justice, all these
are staring them in the face. So we must seek reasons why those who
for years shouted that "the only solution is to destroy them" are now
talking of granting some insignificant cultural rights and are
proceeding in a smooth and cunning manner.

Although these facts are known, the PKK like all other nationalists
have allotted certain roles to the monopolist bourgeoisie and view
them as virtual alliance partners. The PKK leader even went so far as
to say that the parasitic bourgeois Cem Boyner had taken on the
Kurdish problem more strongly than the revolutionary movement had and
was working to solve problems. There has been no word from Boyner for
some time: he is working to help Beymen increase its capital
share. But the left in Turkey, the DHKP-C is there where it
belongs. What has become of all these analyses? Their world view has
got to such a stage that that after the DHKC punished the Sabanci
family concern - one of those most responsible for the policy of
brutal repression and bloody tyranny against the peoples of Turkey,
the Kurdish people among them, they (the PKK), out of fear that their
policy of "cease-fires" and "peace" would be endangered, were among
those who invented theories about a provocation. 

The reports published by the imperialist lackey Sabanci, the head of
monopoly capital, virtually made them hail him as the saviour of the
Kurdish people, but they were not written to save the Kurdish people
but rather the system. But blind nationalism failed to see this. They
stuck to the Sabancis like glue simply because in a period in which
the system was in danger they spoke of granting a fraction of the
rights nations should enjoy, and said "we have delayed too long in
concerning ourselves with this problem." 

The declarations by the official spokesmen of the oligarchy, the prime
minister, the head of the armed forces interest the PKK far more than
anything else, such as the condition of the people or the politics,
criticisms and proposals of revolutionaries. We have got quite used to
this: after every change of government they are certain to express
their expectations of the new government and its prime minister. As a
rule, the PKK immediately sends the new prime minister a letter to say
"how obliging they are" and then they wait for an answer. There is
only one expectation: "peace" and a "political solution" to the
Kurdish problem. Everything is viewed through these spectacles. What
is interesting is that governments fall, new ones are founded, the
puppet prime ministers change but the expectations of the PKK never
do.  

Turkey is on the threshold of revolution. The oligarchy cannot
govern. Governments fall and new ones are founded. It is obvious that
all governments are war governments but nonetheless hopes in them are
not given up. The Kurdish people and guerillas are showered with
expectations. Every year there is a declaration that this year will be
the "year of victory", another year will be the "year of
decision". And this vicious circle goes on. Instead of fighting, hopes
are pinned on peace... Instead of expanding the war, they wait... They
look for friends in the wrong areas... They seek solutions to the
Kurdish problem from the USA, from Germany... They count on the
support of the Özals, Boyners, Sabancis and so on... All these are
stones littering the path leading towards an existence inside the
present system. Revolutionaries for their part prefer revolution.

"PEACE" AND "FIGHTING IN THE WHOLE OF TURKEY"

"To be quite honest with you, if the hostile forces were to cease the
operations aimed at annihilating us and said: here there is a problem,
we must clear up the reasons for it, it must be discussed and the
conditions for this created, we will also try to dispense with
activities connected with the armed struggle." (Abdullah Öcalan,
Demokrasi newspaper, 8.7. 1996)

While the oligarchy uses the most inconceivable methods against the
opposition aimed at "annihilating and exterminating" it, tolerates no
kind of opposition and uses massacres, disappearances and executions
as a means of intimidating the masses, for them to expect the
oligarchy to "create the conditions for it" and offer "peace" means
that this subject is simply not understood. The entire politics and
tactics which are built around the will for peace lead social
development in a false direction, that is, to a deformation of
development. At the same time this means that the entire energy
displayed by the people and the guerrillas up to now is being
wasted. A basis is also being created for the oligarchy to have
influence over the masses and direct them in such a way that obstacles
are placed in the path of the struggle. 

The PKK leadership which waits for the "Susurluk state" to create
conditions and in this regard awakes expectations among the Kurdish
people with their politics and propaganda, will also be disappointed
this time, like in the past. Moreover, just what kind of conditions
are these? In this context, what is it that the PKK is expecting?
These questions have not been answered. Have they grown so tired of
the armed struggle that they "are ready to dispense with the
activities of the armed struggle"? Has the armed struggle not
fulfilled expectations? 

If the PKK were to look at its own history, it would see that the
armed struggle took it from being a "small group" to the force it is
today. Back then when it started, there were Kurdish nationalist
groups with much bigger organisations. Today hardly any of these
groups exist. They do not exist because they were opposed to the armed
struggle, so they did not take part in the struggle and could not
become a force. 

It may be that the word "peace" which is so often uttered is pleasing
to some. It is even possible that the circles who have no class
consciousness and want to play politics with the oligarchy's
generosity, applaud this word and support it. Moreover there are some
who see it as implementing a "great form of politics". That is,
however, only a visible part of a rather bigger iceberg. There is
another side to it. 

If we only look at the word "peace", it is an abstract concept. It is
only clarified if we answer the question "peace with whom and for
what?" If we also ask the question: "If we fight, against whom and for
what are we fighting?" the subject becomes much clearer. The other
side also can be seen. 

Don't the state's characteristics, its existence and the war it has
waged for years against the people suffice to make it clear that for
the people there is no alternative but to struggle? While the state
attacks and mobilises all its forces against the people, does not
wanting peace and awakening hopes among the people that "peace is
imminent" mean tying the people's hands in the face of state attacks? 

Just how appropriate is it to expect a "solution" from the present
system, from the forces which derive advantage from the continuation
of this system and which have maintained total war against the people?
Why should they want to end the war? For these forces, isn't peace the
denial of their own class position and class interests? 

What is meant by the state, fascism and class interests? Can "good
intentions" and "humanity" be expected from this system? If so, how do
we explain the three thousand burned and depopulated villages and the
driving of three million people from their homes?

But if some claim that a solution can be achieved from this system,
then we have only one question to ask: which state are we talking
about? Whose state is it? Who are the people and what are their
interests? And, most importantly, why has there been fighting for
years, and for what?

All those who persist in wanting peace and defending it must answer
all these questions.  "Yesterday there were all the preconditions for
war, now they exist for peace," is said by some, but it does not
explain the past and the years of war, in which thousands have fallen
and a high price has been demanded. What has changed? What is the
difference between yesterday and today, what is different? Has the
oligarchy distanced itself from attacks and massacres? Has it reined
in its limitless exploitation? Is it no longer ruled by TÜSIAD (the
monopolists' association) and the MGK (National Security Council)? Are
they saying, "Here, take power and govern"?

THE STRUGGLE IS OBSTRUCTED BY THE SEARCH FOR ACCEPTANCE

The effect this kind of politics has at various levels and on various
occurrences is already obvious. This viewpoint turns friends and foes
and even the revolutionary mentality of waging a struggle upside down.

 
A quite typical example of this was what happened after the punishment
action of the people's enemy Sabanci. The break-in into the Sabanci
Centre and the punishment of Özdemir Sabanci frightened the oligarchy
and pleased the people. As a result of the blow against the head of
monopoly capital, the oligarchy, to dissolve the sympathy this action
caused and conceal the major effect of the action, used all kinds of
methods to confuse the issue.

It is comprehensible when the oligarchy does this. While they said "it
was not the DHKC", they tried to conceal the class nature of the
action, spread unbelievable stories about it and tried to confuse
people.

Nevertheless, all this is quite understandable and clear. The big
monopolies, like the Kocs and Sabancis, these parasites who are the
true owners of the state, have for years been a natural target of the
people and the revolutionaries. So they were punished by the
revolutionaries of the Front and a statement was issued to the public
in which the Front claimed reponsibility for the action. On December
23, on MED TV Abdullah Öcalan made the following assessment of the
Sabanci action:

"(...) Now in connection with the murder of Sabanci, Hüseyin Kocadag's
connection with the Alevis becomes clearer. (Kocadag was a former
deputy police chief of Istanbul who died in the Susurluk crash.) For
example, he had a meeting with three police commissioners and two
reports about it were published. I think a clarification of it is
needed... It is actually a form of intimidation. Kocadag's name is
mentioned, I think there is something to it; for example when fascist
circles kill Kurdish entrepreneurs, there are many Turkish
entrepreneurs who appear left-wing, these other commissioners. They
see themselves as a rather different kind of band. Kocadag was into
something a bit similar. He is Alevi. It may be that he had some
connections to some formerly left-wing groups... For example they had
some of them in their organisation. And these are exactly the ones who
say they are striking a blow against capital, which does not seem much
like reality to me."

This assessment, and others like it in various media are the official
assessments of the PKK leadership of the Sabanci action. This
assessment cannot be accepted as criticism, for it is a distorted and
quite conspiratorially motivated assessment which seeks to sully the
action and confuse people. 

We have already written a lot on this theme. We do not want to repeat
it all here. In connection with the content of this text we want only
to say the following: 

Whom were these statements made to and what was the intention? 

Firstly, the PKK does not want actions and deeds other than the ones
it carries out, especially not those that can "sabotage the peace
policy". They have tried to create a connection between the action and
their cease-fire. They are addicted to compulsory assessments and
conspiratorial statements. They claimed the action was a provocation
aimed at wrecking the cease-fire. What is worse is that the Sabancis
who for years had organised the assault on the Kurdish people and
financed it, were now, because of a statement they had made calling
for the granting of some minor cultural rights, praised as the friends
of the people. The action was seen as a "suitable occasion" to declare
that the PKK was not against the monopolies but against the punishment
action. This is a concrete example of how the significance of friend
and enemy has changed and how creating misgivings about revolutionary
actions plays a role. So a lot of revolutionary actions and
revolutionary processes are given this kind of treatment. The basic
message the PKK wanted to send to the oligarchy through the Sabanci
action was the following: we can do business with you, we are not
against you, we are against the DHKP-C. This message is not new at
all. Let us remember the following statement, made six or seven years
ago: 

"(...) The Turkish left is very backward.  You say Dev-Sol. They blaze
away here and there, I don't know if we should call them
terrorists. They are too primitive. Should it be understood as the
typical terrorist mentality? Our situation is different. For us
violence is merely an instrument of politics." (December 7, 1991,
Cumhuriyet, Abdullah Öcalan interviewed by Semih Idiz.)

The definitions in this quote supplement what has been portrayed
above. Devrimci Sol is called a "terrorist" organisation. We are
familiar with such designations. We are not accustomed to hearing them
from patriots, above all from a movement waging an armed
struggle. What is the PKK's reason for using the oligarchy's
designation in reference to us?

This question is also answered by another quote from the same period:
"How does Turkey want to bring such people to see reason, I don't
know? Perhaps we could get along with them. But they just shoot
wildly. Making just one of them see reason is difficult. I don't know
if we can call them terrorists, they are too primitive." December 1,
1991, Sabah, Abdullah Öcalan interviewed by Nezih Tavla)

 The message he wanted to send the oligarchy needs no further
explanation: "You can do business with us but not with Devrimci Sol."
"You cannot make them see reason." Of course, those whose minds are
set on reconciliation with the oligarchy are not able to accept
Devrimci Sol on the same level. To confirm this, they call Devrimci
Sol "terrorist". 

Öcalan told the bourgeois media his view that "We can see reason but
you'll never talk them around." We would never want the PKK to be made
to see "reason". We say the PKK should, in choosing between two roads,
not choose "being reasonable", but rather the revolutionary line, to
be able to strike blows at the enemy and distinguish friend from
foe. They should not even think about making  Devrimci Sol
"reasonable". 

The oligarchy has hit its head against a wall a few times trying to
"bring Devrimci Sol to see reason". Öcalan should not bother
trying. And since it is known that Devrimci Sol will not be
"reasonable" it should also be realised that there is no need for it
to be anyway. What the PKK really wants to say is that it itself is
prepared to be "reasonable", that is, prepared for a consensus. This
is no other policy than to deliver itself up to the oligarchy. It was
making such statements in 1991 and is still trying to show the
oligarchy that it can be relied on.

"EVERYBODY HAS MADE AGREEMENTS WITH THEIR TERRORISTS"! BUT WHAT KIND
OF AGREEMENTS?

Consequently the PKK never tires of expecting things from all kinds of
parties and writes obstinate letters to the USA and the governments of
the Republic of Turkey. 

"I sent a letter to Mesut Yilmaz. In it I offered him fraternity,
peace and an end to the war. In reply I was sent a bomb." (He means
the assassination attempt against him.) I say it openly, we are not
thirsting for war. We want to conclude peace as soon as possible. The
cease-fire remains in force nevertheless. Despite the attack we still
want to resolve the problem at the negotiating table. Everywhere in
the world similar problems are being resolved through dialogue."
(Abdullah Öcalan, May 14, 1994, Demokrasi newspaper)

It is true that everywhere in the world "dialogue" has "resolved" a
great many problems, but a price is paid for this dialogue. The price
is dispensing with the armed struggle and "national liberation". So
dialogue has begun in many countries. However the ruling classes and
imperialists set the precondition that an act of submission should be
made to them, the armed struggle should be given up and they should
surrender. Those who fulfil these preconditions can then be admitted
to dialogue. Look at Guatemala, Palestine, El Salvador and now the
IRA... 

The oligarchy has not replied to any of the peace declarations and
cease-fire announcements of the PKK, on the contrary, it has stepped
up its attacks on the people. Today it is not ready for such a
dialogue. It does not mean it will not be ready later. The oligarchy
wants the PKK, which is ready to hand itself over, to be pushed so far
into a corner that it will do whatever is demanded of it. That is
their standard approach. Nevertheless the oligarchy, in its current
difficult situation, does not want to dispense with its classic
methods of achieving a result. Instead of talking of negotiations, it
talks of "annihilation" and "obliteration". In short, for liberation
movements there is no alternative to fighting unless they want to give
up all hope of liberation. If the PKK surrenders it will of course say
that it is because it wants peace. But on top of it all, today it says
it wants to spread the war to "the whole of Turkey", to the Black Sea
Region and the Taurus mountains. It goes further and does not limit
things to Kurdistan but in this context it talks of  a revolution in
Turkey besides the revolution in Kurdistan and of its own leading role
in this. But all this does not stop the PKK from dreaming of the
"negotiating table". If conditions are ripe, the PKK will naturally go
for what it calls a "political solution". At present it has not
distanced itself from a political solution and sitting at the
negotiating table to achieve it.

So the current claim of "spreading the war to Turkey" is only an
effort to get to the negotiating table to achieve the "political
solution". But if the war spreads there will not be a negotiating
table, and inversely, if there is a negotiating table there can be no
talk of war.That means the PKK must either spread the war or insist on
peace. At this point the PKK is insisting on peace, on the other hand
it is also talking of spreading the war. Both existing together points
to a contradiction. But when it is remembered that with spreading the
war, even "spreading to the whole of Turkey", they intend to achieve
peace, we see that there is in fact no contradiction.

IS THE POLITICAL SOLUTION A "SOLUTION"?

Nowadays everyone, from the reformists to TÜSIAD, everybody talks
about a "solution to the Kurdish problem". All have one thing in
common, that is, they are part of the system. Admittedly, what do we
understand by the political solution that is being defended? And whose
solution is it? Let us look at the facts:

"Now, America sees the armed struggle as terrorism. The USA wants this
problem resolved through political means. What do you think of this
viewpoint of the USA? 

Öcalan: If America truly wants to resolve the Kurdish problem by
political means, we would not fight a day longer. If they do not
attack us, we will not attack them. Even without making conditions,
only that Turkey must stop and not send its units to attack us. 

- So you are saying that the condition for dispensing with the armed
struggle is that the USA and the European countries offer us a plan
for a political solution of the Kurdish problem to bring about peace,
which is accepted.

Öcalan: Of course, if they have such plans then they should be
implemented, we are ready for it. We would sign this plan without
preconditions, we are ready to fulfil whatever is demanded of us."
(Özgür Halk, February 15, 1996, p.19)

>From this interview with Abdullah Öcalan we learn yet again from whom
things are expected. It is also clearly expressed what these
expectations are. In many similar interviews and declarations,
imperialism is not condemned, and the legitimacy of the armed struggle
is not consistently defended. 

While the PKK moves into this cul de sac, the aim of independence
becomes an unattainable "dream" in the memory:

"Even England did not practice a policy of  'blood and iron' with
regard to the IRA. Although the relationship of forces is quite
unequal, they meet to resolve problems at a political level. The same
can be seen in the ties between Israel and Palestine. Also in Bosnia,
there is a political solution. Moreover in Chechnya it is the Russian
government which calls for peace every day. For Kurdistan we do not
want any status other than the one in Chechnya. Why don't they see
that correctly or portray it correctly?" (Berxwedan, February 15,
1995, No 180, Abdullah Öcalan)

The PKK, which earlier took Vietnam as a model, now mentions examples
like Ireland, Palestine, Bosnia, Chechnya and so on, in which national
liberation could not be achieved. This is an important point because
it shows the PKK's situation. 

The demand the PKK makes for a "political solution" is no more than
the "national-cultural autonomy" it once rejected. These kinds of
proposals, which were in the beginning made to "not be dogmatic" and
as a "tactic" have now become the actual line of the PKK with the
passage of time. 

First of all the aim of independence was revised to a "federation" or
"autonomy", and later quite clear statements were made that these too
can be completely dispensed with:

"In short, in the coming period ways for a political solution will
arise. The next parliament will treat this as an important
problem... We do not want to separate forcibly... All that is needed
is to have the self-confidence to enter into negotiations... We are
not making any conditions." (2000'e Dogru, September 1991, interview
with Abdullah Öcalan)

"...The future of Turkey will inevitably offer the Kurds unlimited
democratic possibilities for interpretation, they will found their own
parties, even regional parliaments; let us not call them a federation,
but regional parliaments, regional parliaments are indispensible."
(Özgür Halk, May 1997, Number 76, Ali Firat)

"This will happen, today or tomorrow. Whether it will be like the
Basque model or the Palestinian one, if we strengthen resistance a
little more I think the Turkish state will accept a solution." (Özgür
Halk, January 1996 Number 62)

Finally they have got into a situation where they want only as much
freedom as is offered to the "German Bundesländer". 

And in the current political situation they are expecting a "political
solution" from the USA. How can this imperialist power which is the
chief enemy of the peoples, which exploits our peoples and makes them
hungry, how can it be seen as a liberating force capable of offering a
solution?

But that is how they see it. If we read the following statements about
the situation in northern Iraq, it is clear that this mentality does
not even come as a great surprise. 

"The Kurds want to tie themselves more and more to American and
English soldiers. They are not happy with the Turkish soldiers. They
are not happy with the Turks." (Rafet Belli, Kürt Dosyasi (Kurdish
Dossier), meeting with Öcalan, p 245)

"...In reality forming a connection to the USA is a progressive step,
as is one with the English... A connection to Turkey or Iran is a step
backwards. So is a connection to Iraq. It is to some extent a
progressive thing to be tied to the UN or the USA. (...) It is not our
choice, but other strivings will develop. The urge to gain freedom
will develop. Dependence will weaken the quest for freedom and
independence will grow stronger." (Belli, interview with Öcalan, p
246)

So, after forgetting what a state is they are also forgetting what
imperialism is.           

Imperialists always make the laying down of arms a condition of a
peace settlement. And the PKK says this is fine by them. Good, so what
kind of peace is it? Does it put a stop to class oppression and the
national oppression of the Kurdish people? Can the Kurdish people
determine their own fate freely? None of the points listed is being
fulfilled. But if the PKK keeps going down its current trajectory it
will water down its own conditions more and more and end up by being
ready to end the armed struggle. It is clear that those who expect a
solution from imperialism will end up doing this. 
        
"...Their defence is of a non-socialist system, which in practice is a
consequence of nationalism and which to a certain extent they would be
able to rule themselves. With what methods, with whose contribution
and support this system they defend will arise, the borders are
already drawn and they only want cultural rights in the bourgeois
sense. While the Kurdish nationalists are of the opinion that a
consensus can be reached with the imperialists and the oligarchy and
pursue a classic policy arising from despair and exhaustion after a
decade of war, they have the boldness to defend open cooperation with
imperialism, and the PKK has been in this phase for some time. Because
of the brevity of the war the PKK is not yet bold enough to defend
open cooperation." (Resolutions of the Founding Congress of the DHKP,
Resolution 18, The Situation of the Kurdish National Movement and our
Attitude Towards It)

----------------------------

The Gulf Crisis, the elections in 1991, the Newroz festivals of 1991
and 1992, the armistices are important milestones in the PKK policy of
seeking peace and consensus. The entire policy that PKK pragmatism has
pursued in this phase, the "tactics", and the results they have led to
are a millstone around the neck of the PKK: the political impasse it
is in is, in part, a consequence of this millstone. Because of it, the
PKK is, in the political sense, no longer standing up to imperialism
and the oligarchy in the revolutionary sense of the word, and every
day its politics become more backward and the demands it makes become
more modest.      

Since 1990-91 it has peristed in a policy which it calls peace, a
cease-fire, dialogue and a political solution. At this point we have
to ask an important question: has this developed the war or not? It is
clear that in the military sense there have been setbacks. It is clear
that the oligarchy cannot wipe out the guerrillas as long  as they do
not give up the struggle, but it is also discernable that they have
lost ground. From the political viewpoint they have made some
"progress", and have won broad acceptance on the international scene,
that is, they have forged a wide range of contacts. They call this a
diplomatic victory. But if we remember that most of this is based on
pragmatism and that these international ties and alliances only have
very limited revolutionary significance, it is clear that on the
political scene there is not a real progressive dynamic based on
events in the country itself. In the actual war zone the mass movement
has declined and there has been no progress in achieving cooperation
and fraternity among the peoples in Turkey, or in winning their
support. That shows us that the negative side of the balance sheet
outweighs the positive. 

It is understandable that stringing together all the words that would
enumerate what has been said on the matter of the peace policy would
go far beyond the limits of the space available in this series. But
the few examples we have published are enough to cause
astonishment. One may well ask how such statements could ever be made
in the name of revolutionary politics. 

Despite all declarations about "progress" and the "year of victory",
this is a period of regression. 

The situation is clearly recognisable: the phase in which armed
struggle was insisted upon was a phase in which progress was made,
while the phase in which stress was placed on the peace policy has
seen the struggle go into reverse. 

Scrutinising this policy closely is sufficient to condemn it on the
basis of the results it has produced.

Yesterday - today
OCTOBER 1990

"Even if the SHP uses social democracy as a means of deception and even if in the last couple of years it has tried to show some that it is a development capable of changing the system it is clear that this party is certainly social fascist. It is to be recognised that it is not a party cooperating with the imperialists. For cooperating parties can develop in new ways, on the other hand the SHP is a social fascist structure and nothing else." (Serxwebun, Abdullah Öcalan, October 1990, number 106) 

OCTOBER 1991
"Of course we say that the SHP-HEP coalition must be supported. We
want to say that the efforts must be strengthened to prevent a
right-wing government, a period of reaction and attempts to renew the
special war regime, and  conflicts among these forces should be
aggravated, the balance among them destroyed so that the people can
take advantage of it. We believe that strengthening this coalition is
the best option to achieve such a result. For if this coaliton comes
to power or forms a government together with others, it will cause
significant disharmony among the institutions engaging in special
warfare and the government. This situation will create special
conditions which will limit the policy of special warfare and the
position of whoever is installed as president and has broad powers
will be unstable, and the possibility of some democratic developments
will arise." (Özgür Halk, October 1991, Abdullah Öcalan, On the
Question of Alliances and Coalitions, Number 12)


MARCH 1992
"Everything for a total people's war, that is our motto. Prepare
yourselves thoroughly. Understand your tasks well and fulfil them
absolutely. (...) Arm yourselves! Every village must be a centre of
rebellion, every house a strongpoint, and every family must be turned
into a guerrilla unit. They should support the guerrilla actions
expanding in the mountains by carrying out uprisings in the villages
and spreading them into the cities. (...)

Dig secret depots in the ground and store provisions there so the
enemy can no longer threaten us with hunger in the future. Each
village, each house must have depots.  Build underground bunkers and
tunnels against air attacks. Everyone who has a gun should join the
nearest guerrilla unit. (ARGK Central Military Committee, Serxwebun,
March 1992, Number 123)

MARCH 1993
March 17, 1993: The PKK announces a unilateral cease-fire and makes an appeal for a "peaceful Newroz" in 1993.

"The hand of the Kurdish people, extended under the leadership of the
PKK, should be grasped..." (ERNK Europe Organisation, March 28, 1993)
                        

-- 
Press Agency Ozgurluk
For justice, democracy and human rights in Turkey and Kurdistan!
Website: http://www.ozgurluk.org                          
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