Venezuelas Quiet Housing Revolution: Urban Land Reform
marksimonbrown
mark at tlio.org.uk
Wed Sep 21 16:32:34 BST 2005
Venezuela's Quiet Housing Revolution: Urban Land Reform
Monday, Sep 12, 2005
Ref: www.venezuelanalysis.com/articles.php?artno=1551
"Uh-Ah-Chavez no se va!" chanted the red-dressed crowd to the catchy
beat of the band "Madera." It was just like August 2004 all over
again. Was this perhaps an event to celebrate the one-year anniversary
of the defeat of the presidential recall referendum that was held
almost exactly one year ago? No, this was something far more
important. It was the celebration of the handing out of over 10,000
land titles to families living in Venezuela's poorest urban
neighborhoods, in the barrios.
Flying below the radar of most Venezuela observers, both pro- and
anti-Chavez, Venezuela is undergoing a quiet revolution, in which
urban land reform promises to dramatically improve the lives of
millions of Venezuela's poor. The urban land reform is functioning as
a catalyst for the mobilization of Venezuela's barrios, following the
fizzling out of the Bolivarian Circles and the Electoral Battle Units
(UBEs). It is a mobilization that is independent of the government,
but was jump-started by the government's decision to issue land
titles. It has led to the mobilization of over 5,000 land committees,
representing a total population of more than 5 million Venezuelans, or
20% of the population. This makes the urban land committees
Venezuela's largest organized social movement.
The event, which was held last August 30th in one of Caracas' main
arenas, resembled a rally in the closing phase of the August 2004
recall referendum campaign. Participants had come from 22 out of
Venezuela's 23 states, representing 4,298 land committees, and were
obviously fired up to see Chavez symbolically turn over grants for 14
land committee projects. Altogether, the land committees have
submitted 1,200 grant applications for about $50 million of funds.
"This event is very important," said President Chavez to the roaring
crowd. "Here is evidence for something that is fundamental for any
revolution and in this case for our Bolivarian Revolution: grassroots
organization, grassroots participation," he added.
Urban Land Reform and the Housing Crisis
The Urban Land Committees (CTU - Comités de Tierras Urbanas) were
called into life with presidential decree 1,666 on February 4, 2002.
That is not to say that the President created the committees by
decree, but rather that the decree established the legal parameters
for the creation of such committees. The decree specified that
Venezuelans who live in self-built homes on occupied land, which is
the case for nearly all of Venezuela's poor, can appeal to the
government for title to the land. It is estimated that up to 60% of
Venezuela's population of 26 million live in such communities or
barrios as they are known in Venezuela.
The main mechanism for acquiring title to the land, which some have
occupied for decades, are the land committees, where 100 to 200
families that live in a contiguous area elect about seven individuals
to represent their community (the average size is 147 families). The
committees then register with the National Technical Office for the
Regularization of Urban Land Tenancy. The technical office then
provides the committees with training and help to measure out the
families' plots of land and to initiate the process of acquiring title
to the land. In some cases, land committees have requested collective
land titles.
The land committees, however, have evolved to do much more than just
measure land and process title claims. The technical office encourages
them to write a "barrio charter," which lays out the history of that
particular barrio and the community's rules and principles. In
addition, land committees have begun to form sub-committees that deal
with public utility companies, such as water and electricity supply,
sewage and garbage disposal, the organization of cultural events, the
management of security concerns, the initiation of neighborhood
improvement projects, and other issues. Most importantly, though, the
CTUs empower communities in an unprecedented way, giving them a real
sense of ownership over their habitat.
As of mid 2005, the National Technical Office has issued over 84,000
titles to 126,000 families, benefiting about 630,000 barrio
inhabitants. With a total estimated barrio population of around 10
million, the project still has a ways to go. Once most barrio
inhabitants (not all can receive titles because many homes are on
unstable ground or have competing ownership claims) have received
titles, though, this will be one of the government's greatest impact
programs, aside from public health and public education. This would be
a far greater impact than the public housing project could ever hope
to have.
As a matter of fact, barrio inhabitants, who generally build their own
homes on occupied land, have built more homes than all government have
built in Venezuela's post-1958 era. Land committee organizers thus
feel that it is high time that this labor and this contribution to
Venezuelan society is recognized and legalized. For them, the land
titles are the recognition of a social debt that society owes barrio
inhabitants.
The project, according to one of its brochures, hopes to, "develop,
with the participation and activity of the Urban Land Committees, a
process of complete barrio transformation and the democratization of
the city." The project's legitimacy comes from the constitution, which
states that all Venezuelans have a right to a home that is, "adequate,
safe, comfortable, hygienic, and supplied with basic essential
services
" (Article 82). Since the government cannot guarantee this
right on its own, via its public housing projects, it is up to
Venezuelans themselves to claim this right.
The urgency for the land committees to act is particularly great in
light of the Chavez government's general failure to construct public
housing. According to the human rights group PROVEA, the annual
average number of homes constructed during the first four years of the
Chavez presidency (1999-2003) was 34,228, compared to 37,018 for the
second Perez government (1989-1993) and 33,754 during the second
Caldera government (1994-1998). The figures for 2004 were no better
and for 2005 look like they will be only slightly higher.
Considering that housing experts estimate that Venezuela needs a
minimum of 135,000 new homes per year and that there is an accumulated
deficit of nearly one million homes, and that the private home
building sector constructed even less than the public sector,
Venezuela is facing a severe housing crisis. It thus appears that the
only way out of this housing crisis is to help Venezuelans to help
themselves as far as their housing is concerned.
Urban Land Committees Lobby to go Beyond Land Title Regularization
In late November 2004, 820 delegates of the CTUs, in the presence of
government representatives agreed on a proposal to the Housing
Ministry, according to which CTUs would be more actively involved in
solving Venezuela's housing crisis. According to the proposal, CTUs
would form a new organizational neighborhood entity known as CPTH,
which stands for Participation Centers for the Transformation of
Habitat. CPTHs would consist of 5-10 adjacent CTUs (1,000 to 2,000
families or 5,000 to 10,000 individuals), as well as neighborhood
associations, health committees (which work with Mission Barrio
Adentro), and Technical Water Committees (which work with the water
company), among others.
The CPTHs' main objective is to function as a partner for the
government in the improvement of neighborhoods. That is, they are
supposed to "promote, develop, and strengthen in a sustainable way the
active participation of all members of the community in the processes
of co-responsible self-management and management with the state for
the complete and permanent transformation of habitat, as well as in
the creation of new settlements." (Brochure on Democratización de la
Ciudad y Transformación Urbana)
In effect, the CPTHs would be the new primary organizational unit for
the diagnosis of what communities need, to plan projects, to implement
training programs on community participation, to develop and
strengthen the community's capacity for holding local government
accountable, among many other things.
The Housing Ministry and the various governmental bodies for funding
projects thus have a primary partner for disbursing funds, which is
exactly where the funds during the August 30th event were given.
More important, though, for solving Venezuela's housing crisis, is a
new proposal that has yet to be approved, which is to create new
settlements. That is, the CPTHs are proposing to the government to aid
in controlled land invasions. When a community realizes that it is
running out of space in its neighborhood, it would have the local CPTH
ask the Housing Ministry for land that families could settle in an
organized manner, to build their own homes on this new land, with
government support. Such new settlements would be called "pioneer
camps." According to the Director of the National Technical Office,
Ivan Martinez, the goal is to have communities build 20,000 homes in
the second half of 2005 - a figure that would easily rival that of
recent governmentally constructed homes.
Significance of the Urban Land Reform
The urban land reform process is perhaps the single most important
manifestation of participatory democracy in Venezuela today. There are
other manifestations, such as the Local Public Planning Councils
(CLPPs). However, while these appeared to be a very important
manifestation of participatory democracy in Venezuela's constitution,
they seem to have fallen by the wayside due to an inadequate law and
the sabotage by low-level elected representatives who try to protect
their turf.
Another manifestation is the possibility for holding referenda, which
citizens can organize and which saw its most important enactment
during the presidential recall referendum. While many other types of
referenda are possible, no other use of this mechanism has been made
since the constitution was first passed in December 1999.
Next, there are the possibilities for social comptrol (contraloria
social) or citizen oversight over all levels of government. This tool
has proven to be quite valuable in many cases, especially for making
local government more transparent and accountable. However, since the
CLPPs are not functioning properly, there are few community
organizations that have the capacity to take advantage of the
opportunities for citizen oversight.
Finally, as mentioned earlier, the organizations that Chavez called
into being, the Bolivarian Circles and the Electoral Battle Units
(UBEs) also appear to have failed in the longer term. That is, the
Bolivarian Circles served a purpose when they were first formed, in
mobilizing Chavistas for demonstrations and in creating a visible
pro-Chavez presence in communities during the height of the
confrontation from shortly before the coup until shortly after the oil
industry shutdown. Similarly, the UBEs served a purpose in mobilizing
and organizing people in support of Chavez against the recall
referendum and for the October 2004 regional elections. When Chavez
transformed their mission into community self-improvement groups,
though, they faltered and disappeared, just as the Bolivarian Circles.
In all likelihood, a large part of the reason for why the Bolivarian
Circles and the UBEs dissolved is that both had contradictory
purposes. That is, on the one hand they were partisan pro-Chavez
groups, mobilizing the population in support of Chavez. On the other
hand, they were also supposed to be (in the case of the circles) or to
become (in the case of the UBEs) community self-improvement groups
working in everyone's interest, whether pro-Chavez or anti-Chavez.
However, the groups' two missions contradict each other: they cannot
be both non-partisan community self-improvement groups and partisan
mobilization groups. Also, their community self-improvement aspect
lacked a clear focus for maintaining people's interest.
Into this organizational void (not really a void, as the CTU began
around the same time as the Bolivarian Circles) stepped the Urban Land
Committees. Other task-specific groups emerged as well, such as the
Technical Water Committees, which work on improving water supply,
health committees, which work on supporting the community health
mission Barrio Adentro, and other mission-specific community groups,
such as those that support the high school completion mission Ribas
and the free food allocation centers (Casas de Alimentación).
The participants in these groups were to a large extent recruited from
Bolivarian Circles and UBEs. Key to their long-term success, though,
is that these groups are non-partisan and pluralistic, so that
anti-Chavistas and Chavistas can work side-by-side, getting their
immediate tasks done, relatively free of the political polarization
that has gripped Venezuela in the past few years.
In effect, these task-specific committees, with the CTUs leading the
way, have come to occupy a space between non-governmental
organizations and governmental organizations, between partisan
politics and non-partisan project work. As such, the CTUs and the
mission-related committees have become the most important example of
participatory democracy in Venezuela today. The government did not
create them, but it enabled their creation by opening the government
up to their emergence and their input. Perhaps this can be a model for
reforming the Venezuelan state as a whole and other states as well.
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