Investigating Suspicions: Was My Friend A Spycop?

[Tony Gosling]

Celebrating resistance
https://uk.lush.com/article/exposing-spy-who-loved-me
While she claims that undercover spying is still 
happening, the last thing Carolyn wants is for 
people to be put off campaigning. Instead, she 
encourages anyone with suspicions about potential 
spies to look up the Undercover Research Group’s 
guide, 
<http://undercoverresearch.net/2017/07/06/friend-spycop-publication-now/>Was 
My Friend A Spycop?, which gives information 
about investigating that concern and about 
emotional support should that turn out to be true.
There is also something to celebrate. In spite of 
50 years of police infiltration, activists have 
stayed strong, and continued to take a stand. For 
this reason, COPS is organising a 
<http://campaignopposingpolicesurveillance.com/2018/02/13/50-years-resistance-celebration/>50 
Years of Resistance celebration on the weekend of 
7th and 8th July 2018 in London, and all are welcome.
For the women (and potentially men) who have 
suffered these abuses, and who have been deceived 
into becoming props in undercover identities, 
this latest campaign will be a way to demand 
genuine accountability from the State.
The Spy Cops campaign will run from 1st to 18th 
June 2018 in Lush UK stores and online. Join in 
the conversation using #spycops. You can sign the 
petition 
<https://www.change.org/p/sajid-javid-support-victims-of-police-spying-get-access-to-justice>here. 

You don’t have to do very much to end up on a 
police file, and potentially be labelled a 
domestic extremist” - Carolyn, Police Spies Out of Lives campaigner

Image result for WAS MY FRIEND A SPYCOP?


WAS MY FRIEND A SPYCOP?
A GUIDE TO INVESTIGATING SUSPICIONS AND PROVIDING EMOTIONAL SUPPORT
www.undercoverresearch.net

At Undercover Research Group we are regularly 
approached by individuals and groups who suspect 
someone in their group may be an undercover 
police ofcer. Tey usually hope we can confrm 
these suspicions, but unfortunately it is never 
that simple: there is no public database of 
undercover ofcers, and fnding proof is a long 
process of research and elimination­even when the 
evidence against them is substantial. So far, 
almost every successful investigation into an 
undercover ofcer has started with a group of 
people who knew the ofcer. In these cases the 
frst step was for the group to share and discuss 
concerns. Over the years we have seen a variety 
of good and bad practice, but the important thing 
is that group of people has control over the 
process­that it starts and ends with them. Te 
Undercover Research Group can help with the bit 
in the middle, giving advice and doing the more 
specialist research. As we constantly tell 
people, it is not enough to have 
suspicions­suspicions alone never justify 
spreading rumours or making public statements 
about individuals. If you have well-founded 
suspicions then the onus is on you to investigate 
frst and then to provide solid evidence to back 
up your claims. People who make unfounded 
allegations without doing the necessary 
groundwork need to be called out for being 
disruptive and ofensive. Unchecked, this 
behaviour leads to the destruction of groups and 
can cause personal harm. In this pamphlet we 
provide some tips, guidelines and advice on 
potential pitfalls to help get you started on an 
investigation­much is best practice that has 
developed over the last decade. (Note: in places 
it assumes a UK based model of undercover 
policing which may not be applicable in other 
countries). 2 Undercover Research Group GETTING 
STARTED Where do your suspicions come from? Tis 
may seem an unusual point to raise, but asking 
where and when the suspicions started is a good 
starting point. We don’t suspect an individual 
for the sake of it, rather there are reasons why 
there is a niggle, a sense of something odd. As 
activists we don’t just develop our campaigning 
skills, we also develop a sense of the people 
around us. Most suspicions start out this 
way­perhaps it’s a dress sense that is not quite 
right or comes across as contrived, a sense that 
an individual’s politics are weaker than 
expected, a lack of passion that does not match 
actions or simply that they are an odd person who 
doesn’t quite ft. Don’t forget, protest movements 
atract all sorts of personalities and concerns at 
this level will never be enough, and very 
probably be misplaced. But it is useful to 
acknowledge when those concerns began. Another 
form of suspicion comes from hindsight. Perhaps 
things have gone unex pectedly wrong, or there 
have been particular paterns of disruption. Or, 
as is more ofen the case with historical police 
undercovers, a realisation that a former comrade 
fts the now established patern just a bit too 
well­even though that person might have been a 
great activist who you did lots of actions, 
including illegal stuf, and while you knew them 
you would have sworn they weren’t a cop. Whatever 
suspicions you have, they are a valid starting 
point. But the thing to remember is that is 
exactly what they are: a start. How you go from 
here is the important bit. Don’t just assume you 
are right! Be prepared to be proven wrong. If 
questions have been raised about someone’s 
behaviour or background that doesn’t prove 
they’re an undercover ofcer. Tere are many 
legitimate reasons for people to hide their 
background, act strangely or to vanish 
altogether. It is far more important that you 
enter the process with an open mind and are 
prepared to be proven wrong. It is always beter 
to be able to clear someone of suspicion than it 
is to confrm your worst fears. Approach 
investigations with the assumption that it is 
beter to have a positive outcome and be wrong, 
than to immediately assume the worst. To begin 
investigations with the frm belief that someone 
is a cop when they actually aren’t will cause you 
to atempt the impossible: to prove a negative, 
and potentially destroy someone’s reputation in 
the process. Sometimes the reason no evidence can 
be found is that there isn’t any. 
www.undercoverresearch.net 3Be prepared to never 
fnd answers Undercover policing is naturally a 
very secretive world, and great eforts are made 
to keep it that way. Tere’s no magic wand to 
provide straightforward answers­the current 
exposure of the undercover policing scandal is 
the exception rather than the rule. We went for 
many decades without ever having frm evidence or 
clear answers, and in many cases answers have 
never been found (and may never be)­ even afer 
years of campaigning, litigation and ofcial 
apologies. Be a group­listen to each other We 
rarely start investigations on the word of a 
single person. On the other hand, in our 
experience, suspicions are generally worth 
considering when several people have raised 
concerns independently of each other. Tis 
approach also avoids the situation where one 
person manages to persuade others that weak 
suspicions constitute defnitive proof. 
Investigations also tend to work much beter when 
people are able to consider their suspicions 
collectively. In a group, natural checks and 
balances are in place: an action or event that 
may seem suspicious to one person may have a 
natural explanation when accounted for by another 
with more complete knowledge of the event or 
person. Once a group starts investigating it is 
important that there is an agreed set of 
guidelines right from the start: who else can be 
told? how are you going to keep material 
confdential? what you are going to do if proven 
wrong / right? etc. Being in a group can also 
help people to deal with the emotional difculties 
of working through this kind of 
investigation­afer all, digging into the life of 
someone you considered a good friend is never 
going to be easy. Because of this aspect it may 
be useful to bring into the process someone who 
is trusted but who did not know the individual in 
question and who can act as a sounding board. Tey 
can have several roles such as keeping the 
process on track and allowing people to work 
through emotions by lifing some of the 
responsibilities, or even helping call an end to 
the investigation if it is not working out. An 
equally important task is that of challenging 
assumptions and considering evidence critically, 
e.g. by helping the group to avoid assuming it 
has more proof than it actually has and of 
jumping to wrong conclusions. It is possible to 
work through the process on your own­this has 
been done. But in cases where individuals have 
done the work, many have told us they’d have much 
preferred to have had a group around them. 4 
Undercover Research Group Be alert to burn-out 
Burn-out is, sadly, quite common in these 
situations. Tis is neither widely recognised or 
properly addressed. Burn-out is ofen associated 
with a sense of having lost control. Tis in turn 
leads to a loss of perspective and seeing threats 
all around. As a result, paranoia is a common 
manifestation, leading to witch-hunts against 
anyone who ever said something out of place, or 
acted a bit diferently. It can be a fne line 
between acting on gut-feelings and reacting to 
ungrounded paranoia. Tis is yet another reason 
why a group process is generally preferable since 
the symptoms of burn-out can be recognised and 
support provided. www.undercoverresearch.net 
5INVESTIGATING SUSPICIONS 1. Write down your 
suspicions Tis is a short step, but one that 
shouldn’t be underestimated. If you suspect some 
one, take the time to write down the reasons for 
your suspicions. Tis helps to focus and clarify 
what is bothering you. It also helps you evaluate 
the substance of your fears and to present your 
concerns to others. 2. Evaluating initial 
suspicions: Te 15 Qestions Te Special 
Demonstration Squad and the National Public Order 
Intelligence Unit were active for forty years, 
and during this time they were remarkably 
consistent in the techniques used while 
undercover in political and campaign groups. By 
pro fling known undercovers from these 
departments we have been able to reconstruct a 
large part of the manual the police used, which 
gives us some idea of what to look for: the 
‘tells’ that have given away undercovers. Te 
understanding we have gained of their tradecraf 
has been distilled into 15 basic questions (See 
15 Qestions We Work With in the appendix). You 
can apply these questions to the person you 
suspect, or even use them as a starting point. If 
the person matches two-thirds or more of the 
questions, then your suspicions are probably well 
grounded­but further, more in-depth research will 
be required to turn these suspicions into 
something more concrete. NB because of changes to 
training and deployment of undercover policing 
and intelligence gathering the 15 Qestions are 
less likely to be useful for undercovers deployed 
afer January 2011. 3. Organising your material 
Once you have a working group, repeat point 1 but 
this time together with the other people in your 
group. Pool knowledge, compare notes. Again, it 
may be help ful to log, in writing, everything 
you know about the person in question, particul 
arly what gave rise to the suspicions in the frst 
place. Te aim is to see the bigger picture and to 
add clarity to your suspicions. As the 
investigation develops you will gather a lot of 
information and you will need to fnd ways to 
manage this. • Organise information clearly, by 
topic for instance. Spend some time fnding out 
and documenting what you heard and from whom, 
even if people do not want to be publicly named 
as a source. In one case, several rumours about a 
person were traced back to another individual­who 
turned out to be an undercover. • Evaluate the 
credibility of sources. Newspaper articles ofen 
get details wrong, and people may have personal 
grudges which colour their memories. 6 Undercover 
Research Group • Draw up timelines, maps, lists 
of contacts, events and places the person may 
have been. Look for gaps in the chronology of 
events and make a list of those who may be able 
to help fll the gaps. Knowing clearly what you 
have and what you still need to investigate, 
especially when working in a group, is essential. 
Remember: keep your material secure­consider the 
appalling impact this material could have if it 
were disclosed and the person you are 
investigating is actually innocent! 4. Next 
stages If you’ve covered the points above then 
you’ll be in a position to start confrming or 
disproving your suspicions. Tis stage is forensic 
in nature, investigating every aspect of the 
person’s own account of themselves, looking for 
clues and inconsistencies. You want to establish 
whether the identity they presented you with is 
real­are you are dealing with an undercover 
police ofcer using a fake identity? You may fnd 
it useful to go through the profles of previous 
undercovers to give yourselves an idea of what 
sort of details you’re looking for. But remember, 
every case is diferent and some aspects carry 
more weight than others. In pre-2000 cases, you 
may be looking for the death certifcate of a 
child who shares the same name and birthday as 
your suspect (as this may point to a stolen 
identity). Other research may include working out 
how much the persona actually exists outside the 
group they are active in and whether their back 
story is genuine. You could try to confrm their 
existence in birth records, that they went to the 
schools they said they did, and so on. Birthdays 
are always important for this, and to a lesser 
degree, accounts of their childhood and family. 
It is not unusual for undercovers to incorporate 
bits from their ‘real’ life to fesh out their 
story, though the degree to which these real life 
snippets are helpful varies a lot; in previous 
cases the real life details have provided 
invaluable clues, while at other times they where 
of litle assistance. It’s hard to tell in advance 
what may help, so it’s best to make a record of 
absolutely everything. Ofen it is a slow process 
of eliminating possibilities. In several cases, 
to prove that someone was not who they said they 
were we went through the exercise of identifying 
everyone with the same name and in the right 
birth range (although this is much harder to do 
if the suspect has a common name) in order to 
show that our suspect didn’t exist. In the jargon 
you are trying to determine if they are a 
‘ghost’­someone with all the appearances of 
existing, but who vanishes when you try to touch 
their past. Much of this can be facilitated by 
access to specialist knowledge and resources; 
this is the point where the Undercover Research 
Group is most likely to be of help (see 
www.UndercoverResearch.net/1082-2). 
www.undercoverresearch.net 75. Bring others into 
the group Once you have reached a point where you 
believe your suspicions need further action, the 
chances are you are going to have to talk to 
others who knew the person. Tis stage can require 
great care, the people being approached need to 
be made aware of any group agreement, and the 
delicacy of the investigations. Be prepared for 
new people to be angry, shocked or in denial; 
prepare the meeting well to avoid your concerns 
being dismissed out of hand, or, conversely, to 
avoid atempts to expose the suspect without 
further investigation. Make sure new people are 
given space and support to process the news. At 
this stage you need to make it clear that this is 
still an investigation that has not come to any 
specifc conclusions, and they should abide by any 
confdentiality agreement. Just because there is 
smoke, it doesn’t mean there is fre. Sensitivity 
is needed when telling people who had close 
friendships or relationships with the individual 
being investigated­everyone reacts diferently and 
you cannot always predict which way it will go. 
However, one of the things that should set us 
apart from the police and state is that we have a 
sense of our duty of care to our comrades, even 
when there are political diferences. Something 
you should consider at this point is preparing 
the support that may be needed both for 
yourselves and for others. (See Support Each 
Other below.) Discuss your individual needs in 
your group, and keep everyone up to date with who 
is doing what. Get a sense of how much people 
want to contribute. Some will want to be involved 
in every aspect, others may be concerned that the 
investigation does not distract too much from 
current political activities, but still share an 
interest in what is decided. Also, be actively 
aware of issues in the group such as balancing 
competing needs for privacy and taking action, 
and the risk of burn-out. 8 Undercover Research 
Group RESULTS OF THE INVESTIGATION It is probable 
that you won’t get any defnitive results to your 
investigation. Absolute certainty about 
undercover ofcers has only been found when 
activists fond out their real name, mostly 
because of mistakes made by the spycops. Mark 
Kennedy returned as a corporate spy afer he lef 
the police and used a passport in his real name 
when going abroad. Carlo Neri registered under 
his real name at one of the addresses he used. In 
other cases, undercovers let slip details that 
gave away their real name. More ofen than not, it 
has come down to luck and sloppiness on behalf of 
the undercover ofcers on the one hand, and 
persistence in following up every possible lead 
on the other­a process that can take years. Below 
we’ve listed the several possible outcomes of 
investigations: Being proven wrong If you are 
lucky you’ll be able to remove suspicion from the 
individual in question. But it’s not enough to 
reach this conclusion then call it a day. For 
starters you’ll need to pass on your conclusions 
to any others you have spoken to­it is wrong to 
destroy a person’s reputation by insinuation or 
by allowing rumours to persist. You’ll also need 
to decide whether to tell the person or not. For 
some people, this degree of openness is 
important, but the individual concerned may 
naturally take it very badly. Other groups have 
decided to simply not mention the investigation, 
which can have the downside that the story may 
linger on­depending on how many people knew of 
the suspicions the subject may crop up again. 
Remember, material you have assembled may, if it 
falls into the wrong hands, be used against the 
individual in question­so destroy it, 
particularly if you are are tending towards 
believing your suspicions were probably 
groundless. Really not sure Te world of 
undercover policing, informers and corporate 
spies is by its very nature murky. It is 
populated by professionals who go to great 
lengths to hide their activities, and to build 
cover. Add to this the fact that many of us have 
legitimate reasons to not always be completely 
open about our backgrounds and personal 
histories, and that our movements have a culture 
of respect for each other’s privacy and you have 
a situation where it’s hard to recognise an 
undercover. If you have suspicions about a person 
who is or was in your group then you should 
recognise that the chances are you’ll never know 
whether or not those suspicions are groundless. 
It may be that you are looking in the wrong 
direction entirely: someone else in the group may 
be the issue (perhaps spreading rumours to secure 
their cover), perhaps group members are being 
careless about security, or your group may be 
subject to a high level of surveillance 
technology. www.undercoverresearch.net 9If you’re 
in this situation then it’s ofen best to park 
your suspicions for the time being, or even to 
completely let go of them. Instead you could 
approach the issue from diferent directions: 
consider what it is that your group does and what 
are the risks to taking such action? Are leaks 
actually preventing your group from continuing to 
seek political change by your chosen methods? 
We’d suggest that a good approach is to be aware 
of your security needs and to tighten things up 
on that front. Have an open and honest debate 
about what the likely threats to your work may 
be, and what measures you can take to counter 
them. Good processes can actually go a long way 
to preventing any infltrator from doing much 
damage, for example smaller afnity groups may use 
positive veting of members to reduce the risk of 
infltration, while other groups choose to focus 
on openness as a tactic in itself, making the 
potential presence of an infltrator irrelevant. 
Almost but not quite In most situations, you will 
never be 100% certain that someone was an 
undercover. Atempts to seek answers from the 
police, outside of actually taking them to court 
(and even then there’s no guarantee), are likely 
to fail, or to be met with ‘Neither Confrm Nor 
Deny’ statements. Which leaves you with the 
unpleasant choice of what to do next. In the 
context of the Public Inquiry into Undercover 
Policing, the Undercover Research Group and 
others have released information on undercovers 
for whom, although there was no defnitive proof, 
there was sufcient circumstantial evidence to 
confrm their status. In these cases we 
acknowledged the residual doubt by limiting the 
information we released­depending on the evidence 
available, we took decisions not to publish 
photos, full cover names, etc. If you are right 
 
historic undercovers If you have found defnitive 
evidence­the ‘smoking gun’­or circumstantial 
evidence that is too signifcant to ignore then 
you will need to consider the next stages with 
care. Tere is almost always a case to made for 
going public as most undercover ofcers were 
active in more groups and movements than we 
initially realise­disparate groups may be afected 
and should know about the case. Going public with 
your information requires sensitivity. Tere are a 
number of steps you should take: a) Forewarn 
those you know who had connections with the 
undercover. Tis might not always be possible, but 
it’s only fair to make an efort. It is horrible 
to discover a former lover or friend was an 
undercover by suddenly seeing their picture on 
the web or in newspapers. b) Consider whose 
anonymity needs to be protected and ensure that 
all who knew the undercover are informed of the 
need to not betray certain personal details, such 
10 Undercover Research Group as the real names of 
people involved, without permission­something 
particularly true for those who had been lovers 
of undercovers. In the current context of the 
Public Inquiry, you may need to give time for 
those who had relationships to get anonymity 
orders, especially where there is likely to be 
strong media interest. c) Prepare a profle of the 
undercover, clearly seting out the evidence. It 
is bad practice to make allegations without 
publicising the reason why you are doing so, as 
this leads to doubt and confusion, not to mention 
mistrust and paranoia. It is also good practice 
to detail the activities the undercover was 
involved in so others can place them in 
context­memories of names and faces can fade, so 
help people to work out who you are talking 
about. d) Consider how you are going to publish 
the profle, and how much material you are going 
to release to back up your story. Qestions and 
controversy will quickly emerge if you say an 
activist was a police ofcer without presenting 
any evidence to support the claim. Depending on 
the nature of the story, you may want to consider 
approaching the mainstream media. If you do, make 
sure they are aware of which aspects of the case 
they need to be discreet about, particularly in 
protecting the identities of people who were 
targeted. Mainstream media has its own 
issues­they can be very conservative when it 
comes to standards of proof, and you need to make 
sure you work with journalists who understand 
your needs and the emotional efect this sort of 
thing can have on people, especially where there 
were close relationships with the undercover. Te 
media must be prepared to respect people’s 
privacy­if in any doubt, contact us for advice. 
e) Don’t use people’s real names without their 
permission, and it is best practice, even when 
using aliases, to get people to sign of on how 
they were quoted. f) It is very important you 
handle this well in your own group, and have 
support in place for those who are going to be 
the most afected by the fall-out. If you are 
working in the UK, please get in touch as we may 
be able to direct you to helpful resources g) 
Likewise, discourage macho responses, or those of 
the ‘I knew all along’ kind­ these are never 
helpful, especially for those most afected. 
Simply dissing the undercover can also have its 
negative efects on those trying to get their head 
round how a long term lover betrayed them so 
completely­remember, they may be already 
struggling with a lot of self-doubt because of 
what they’ve just found out, this kind of thing 
can take years to resolve. For more on 
understanding the impact of exposing undercovers 
and cushioning the impact, please see the Police 
Spies Out Of Lives website: 
www.policespiesoutofives.org.uk 
www.undercoverresearch.net 11If you are right 
 
in the here and now What should you do if you 
discover an undercover or other kind of 
infltrator in your midst in the here and now? In 
acute cases you should prioritise the 
investigation­you need to act fast to prevent 
more damage being done. You will need to be 
discreet, as in these circum stances there is not 
just the danger of spreading paranoia, but also 
the risk of the person in question learning about 
the suspicions. If this happens, it will in all 
likelihood lead to them covering their tracks, 
and they may well disappear before you can 
confront them. Be alive to the fact that any 
investigation, regardless of the outcome, can 
damage the networks of trust within a group. Tis 
will be an issue, particularly post exposure, if 
some people feel excluded from the process and 
angry that they didn’t have the chance to have an 
input on decisions. Once the investigation is 
fnished­and again, having 100% defnitive proof is 
rare­ your group may have to work hard in order 
to re-establish trust between members. Experience 
has shown that a good way to approach a situation 
where you have proof that you are dealing with a 
live undercover is to organise a meeting between 
them and the investigating group. Take care to 
avoid leting them know the purpose of the meeting 
beforehand since the aim is to challenge the 
undercover directly and give them a chance to 
respond. Tis way you can gauge their reaction to 
the challenge, which can be a way of testing your 
hypothesis that they are an 
undercover­particularly useful if you are still 
looking for conclusive proof. If you go down this 
route, it is important that you are ready to tell 
others about the situation­have the dossier ready 
for distribution immediately afer the meeting. A 
freshly exposed undercover can do serious 
personal damage on their way out. Te shock of 
discovery can split a group if evidence is not 
readily available to demonstrate why an 
investigation was carried out. Similarly the 
undercover may seek to turn the wider group or 
movement against the investigating team, or use 
their departure as a way to cause friction and 
infghting. Undercover Cop or something else? 
Undercover ofcers are­still­relatively rare. 
However, too ofen people are sloppy in their 
language, and consider informers, corporate 
spies, secret service agents and even undercover 
journalists as the same thing. While their aims 
may be similar, their modus operandi are 
considerably diferent. For instance, police 
generally never use their real surname and have a 
limited time undercover (the longest known is 6 
years). So someone who is involved longer than 
that, or can be shown to be known by that surname 
for a longer time, has a much lower likelihood of 
being an undercover police ofcer 12 Undercover 
Research Group An informer or grass is someone 
who is already active in activist circles and who 
has agreed to pass on information to the police. 
Sometimes this is because they have found 
themselves in a position that the police have 
been able to exploit (blackmail), and once you 
have been trapped into talking the police won’t 
let go. In other cases it may be because some 
part of an individual’s personality likes to be 
able to play all sides­we know of some informers 
who have made the initial approach to the police. 
Te difculty with an informer is that as someone 
who is already part of the scene they are much 
more in tune with it and are less likely to make 
the same cultural mistakes that police 
undercovers do. Corporate spies are specifcally 
hired by intelligence corporations to infltrate 
groups on behalf of clients. Tese spies ofen have 
a strong police or military connection. Corporate 
spies do not usually have the daily handling and 
in-depth preparation which can dramatically 
improve the chances of successful infltration. 
However, we know of other, long-term corporate 
spies who were successful in infltrating various 
groups for many years, some on behalf of the 
police. Tough many of the techniques for an 
investigation overlap, there are many diferences 
in approach which we have not covered in this 
publication, but will address elsewhere. Tus, 
during an investigation you need to be alert to 
these diferent possibilities, as diferent kinds 
of evidence will be needed depending on what 
manner of beast you are dealing with. Tere are 
far more informers and corporate spies around 
than there ever were undercover police ofcers. 
Being alert to this, and being prepared to change 
tack is a sign of a healthy process. 
www.undercoverresearch.net 13SUPPORT EACH OTHER 
Please do not underestimate the importance of 
supporting each other! Support will be needed 
throughout the process­investigating and 
uncovering a spycop is not without deep emotional 
cost. Te state, the abusers in all this, provide 
psychological support for undercovers, and we 
should be at least as aware of the issues. Make 
sure, at all stages of the process, that you are 
considering the emotional needs of those afected, 
including those in the investigating group. Where 
investigations haven’t worked so well it is ofen 
because they have fallen down on precisely this 
issue, adding further damage to that done by the 
police. Dos and don’ts of providing emotional 
support In the unpleasant world of investigating 
undercovers, trust, both in oneself and in how 
you view others, is one of the frst things to be 
lost. So, at the heart of any emotional support, 
trust will be central, followed by access to 
people who can give understanding, both 
politically and emotionally. One of the strongest 
things we have is group unity. It creates space 
for people to come together and be mutually 
supported by those who share the same politics 
and experiences of campaigning. Everyone reacts 
in diferent ways, even if the case being 
investigated happened a long time ago. Reaction 
can depend on where an individual is now in their 
lives as well as what happened when the 
undercover was in their lives. A very common 
reaction is a sense of loss of control, and of 
doubting one’s own judgement. Afer all, if you 
can let someone deceive you so much, who and what 
else were you wrong about? Tus, it is very 
important that those needing emotional support 
have a sense they are in control of decisions 
which afect them. Having facts ready and 
accessible can make a big diference to how people 
process the information you’ve uncovered. People 
will want to know that the reasons for the outing 
is based on substance and not just 
speculation­having access to facts is a factor in 
helping people process what has happened since it 
addresses doubt early on, rather than allowing it 
to fester. Set out your processes carefully and 
make space for people to ask questions. Te 
following points do not just apply to those who 
had intimate relationships with undercovers; 
trust and friendship are equally powerful forces 
and we should not forget how others can be 
damaged by the discovery that a trusted friend 
was a spycop. • Be aware that people who were 
very close to the ofcer may fnd it hard to accept 
the deception, and can take a long time to feel 
any anger towards the person they were deceived 
by. Te manipulation of their emotions has been 
very complex. It may be hard for them to hear 
negative talk about the undercover ofcer. 14 
Undercover Research Group • Acknowledge that 
undercovers (and their support team) are experts 
at deception who deliberately prey on activists’ 
emotions. Saying it was obvious at the time 
undermines those who were deceived by making them 
feel stupid. • Gather together the people who 
were close to an ofcer to digest and debrief the 
evidence­this can be a very helpful way for 
people to process the news. • Be aware that not 
all intimate relationships are public knowledge, 
even within the group. • Avoid dismissing 
someone’s experience­a one-night stand can have 
as much impact as a year long relationship­it all 
depends on the context for that person. Tere is 
no hierarchy of abuse. Don’t divide up how people 
respond along gender lines. • If people have had 
intimate relationships with undercover ofcers, 
they will probably need ongoing support to come 
to terms with this. People who knew them and the 
ofcer are best placed to provide support, but 
making contact with other people in a similar 
situation can also be cathartic. Support groups 
like Police Spies Out of Lives can help. • Just 
because someone is not saying much, it does not 
mean they are not afected. Give space to 
everyone, not just the loudest. • When bringing 
others into the group, remember that everyone 
will have changed to diferent degrees since the 
time in question. Tis will bring extra histories 
that may need to be considered, especially where 
emotional trauma is an issue, and extra layers of 
safety may need to be considered. For example, 
where members of the group have had to deal with 
domestic violence situations. Tis can also be a 
very empowering experience for people, to rebuild 
old friendships and to fnd strength in a 
collective, inclusive process. • Depending on the 
situation, it may be best to pass on any 
information in person. Someone who is in an 
isolated situation away from like-minded people 
is not likely to react well to a phone-call out 
of the blue and then being lef to deal with the 
situation alone. Do not let people who were close 
to the ofcer fnd out on the grapevine or in the 
press. • Give people space to vent and be angry, 
though be aware that it is not always appropriate 
to sound of: angry damning of the undercover may 
have a negative efect on people already feeling 
shaky or struggling to process the revelation. 
Likewise, avoid macho and aggressive responses. 
It’s all about fnding the right balance and the 
right space: it can be a good idea to set up a 
diferent space aferwards (e.g. afer a 
facilitated, formal meeting, there could be a 
trip to the pub for a more informal, looser set 
of reactions). • Accept people may initially 
shoot the messenger. Some people will need space 
to grieve and rebuild important memories that are 
now tainted. www.undercoverresearch.net 15• Be 
ready for people to be upset if they were not 
invited to be part of the investigating group, 
and to have answers why they weren’t. Tis may 
become a signifcant focal point in the afermath 
if not handled well. • Try to put aside old 
political and personal disagreements; they can 
exacerbate the situation and distract from the 
real problem in this case. • Don’t railroad 
decisions: people will need to feel their needs 
are being heard, and they should be given space 
to input into discussions. Te story and efect of 
an infltrator is rarely, if ever, owned 
exclusively by one group of people. • Be prepared 
for how the investigation may afect how you view 
and react to people. Ofen people underestimate 
the personal impact of conducting an 
investigation. • Respect people’s wishes and 
privacy. People handle these situations 
diferently: for example, some people may not want 
to know, or they may have too much going on in 
their lives to be able to deal with all the fall 
out. • Finally, taking legal action against those 
running the undercover is an important option for 
some. Work out whether and how much support you 
want to give to such a process. Supporting 
someone who had a relationship with an undercover 
If you are supporting someone lef in a vulnerable 
situation afer discovering they were in a 
relationship with an undercover ofcer there are a 
number of practical steps you can take: a) Form a 
group of supportive people around the person. 
Check in on them regularly, and be in it for the 
long-haul. b) Approach the situation knowing that 
they will need to feel in control of their 
choices. Avoid removing their sense of agency. c) 
Listen. Sometimes they will need to tell their 
story again and again in order to process it. 
Make a list with them of people they can contact 
if they need to talk or have a wobble. d) Help 
them identify appropriate counselling or therapy 
(see Resources below). e) Help them take 
action­fnd a solicitor if necessary, become a 
Core Participant in the Public Inquiry into 
Undercover Policing, etc. f) Help them document 
what happened to them in their own voice. Further 
tips and resources: 
www.policespiesoutofives.org.uk/are-you-afected 
16 Undercover Research Group Paranoia Finally, we 
have mentioned paranoia a couple of times­it is 
important to watch-out for this. At the 
Undercover Research Group we have observed common 
symptoms such as seeing ‘spooks’ at every turn or 
pointing a fnger at everyone who has ever done 
anything vaguely out of place, without any sense 
of analysis and refusing to conduct a proper 
investigation. Te last example, of a group not 
prepared to engage in a well thought-out invest 
igation, is the one that more ofen than not 
distinguishes between those with genuine 
suspicions and those who have let paranoia enter 
their life. Paranoia is not helpful to any 
group–it simply disrupts any real sense of 
security or process. On the other hand, paranoia 
may point to underlying issues that need to be 
dealt with, such as a reaction to a sense of loss 
of control or burn-out. Tis can be a difcult to 
deal with, and ultimately it comes down to the 
person themself as to how much help they will let 
you give them. As a general piece of advice, it 
is best to not be short or rough with a person 
you believe is experiencing paranoia­this won’t 
‘snap them out of it’. Similarly, it’s unhelpful 
to simply state you believe them. Gently question 
the person as to what they believe or fear, but 
do not let them draw you into ‘their’ world of 
paranoia. Listen honestly but cautiously and make 
it clear that what is being said is something 
that you are not in a position to fully commit 
to. Challenge any discrepancies respectfully and 
be open to the fact that you may not be dealing 
with paranoia but serious concerns. Another 
aspect of paranoia is when it masquerades as 
security awareness. Security is about reducing 
risk to an acceptable level so you can get on and 
do things; paranoia is when that goes too far and 
stops things from happening at all, ofen due to a 
general fear of the state’s apparently 
all-encompassing power. As activist groups have 
demonstrated time and time again, even with 
several undercover police in your midst, you can 
achieve a lot. www.undercoverresearch.net 17FINAL 
NOTES Ironically, an investigation with a good 
process can be inspiring and empowering, despite 
the fact that uncovering a spycop is (at the very 
least) unpleasant. Te material for this article 
has been drawn from a number of such processes 
and includes feedback from those involved. In 
many cases, the groups were actually 
strengthened, though the path they travelled was 
ofen rocky. In writing this pamphlet, our aim has 
not been to encourage paranoia, but to reduce it. 
Too ofen allegations based on rumour and 
speculation are thrown around, and the only 
people that helps are our enemies. We have 
atempted to give you some tools and techniques to 
enable you to carry out substantive 
investigations to put an end to rumours and bad 
practice, and to strengthen us all in the 
process. Despite all that the police have thrown 
at us and the deep damage they have caused, they 
have still not destroyed us. Special Branch used 
to boast that once they infltrated a group it was 
dead. We know this to be untrue. Tere are far 
more of us than there ever were of them, and we 
are still around, still active, in many diferent 
ways and in many diferent movements. Campaigns 
have been lost over the years, and others have 
been won­and inspiringly so. Giving in to a 
fatalism that there is nothing we can do just 
lets the state and the police win. Tere is much 
we can do. Tere are many issues still to be won, 
campaigns to be fought. Tactics will change, 
adapt and accommodate to the reality on the 
ground as we fnd work-arounds, but what maters is 
why we all started out as political activists in 
the frst place. Ironically, we now learn that 
spycops have had unexpected side-efects, such as 
court cases being dropped or campaigns actually 
being helped. We know of numerous cases where a 
spycop’s presence has led to activists being 
protected, as the ofcer couldn’t act on 
intelligence for fear of blowing their cover. 
Finally, one common question we are asked is how 
to bring new people into our groups. How can we 
combine openness with security? Tere is no single 
answer. Each group will have its own needs and 
priorities. What maters is that you create, from 
the very start, a culture that fts your group’s 
ambitions, and that you stick to it. Don’t be 
afraid to ask people questions, but do be open 
about why you are doing so. If you feel you need 
a higher level of security or secrecy, work out 
what specifc threats you face and plan how to 
address them in order to minimize risk. Tere is 
no such thing as 100% security, but there are 
always ways of working around things. 
Corporations and the state may heavily invest in 
an atempt to stop us, yet so many actions have 
taken place over the years, so many diferent 
groups are taking sensible precautions and 
succeeding in their actions­this is clear 
evidence that we can still outsmart them all when 
we put our minds to it. 18 Undercover Research 
Group APPENDIX 15 Qestions We Work With Tis is a 
list of the 15 Qestions. Tese questions can also 
be found at: www.UndercoverResearch.net/1260-2/ 
1. Is their background missing? Generally, the 
undercover has very litle in the way of 
background story. Tey will ofen have a 
‘legend’­where they are from, why they lef. 
Details will generally be quite sparse, and there 
is very litle overlap between their previous 
world and their activist one. It is rare to meet 
friends (or see their photos) from their 
‘previous’ life, even though they may be 
discussed or the suspect claims he goes to see 
them. Undercovers will also have a lack of 
presence in the public record, though this is not 
always obvious until one starts investigating 
them seriously. Caveat: it is known that several 
undercovers did bring other people through­ 
generally these are considered ‘background 
artistes’ used to help bolster an undercover’s 
story. For example, Lynn Watson introduced 
several boyfriends to activist friends. Generally 
these other people have only appeared once or 
twice, and at times have been noted for their 
unusual or provocative behaviour. 2. Are their 
politics missing, under-developed or stereotyped? 
Related to the frst question, in most cases 
undercovers have had very litle to say in 
relation to the politics of the movement they are 
infltrating. Although they are indeed interested 
in listening to others (though some eschewed any 
interest in the name of cynicism), they 
contribute litle on that score and generally 
avoid or head of such discussions. Where they 
demonstrate interest, it is ofen superfcial and 
the books and background material they have are 
standard, popular stuf showing litle depth or 
breadth. Caveat: clearly this can be applied to a 
lot of campaigners, but in some groups it is a 
reason for standing out. 3. Has anyone ever met 
their family? Some undercovers never talk about 
their family, while others talk about them a lot. 
However opportunities to meet them never quite 
come of­there are always excuses. Undercovers can 
produce photos and other material indicating the 
existence of supposed family members, and talk 
about having close relationships with them. 
Others have spun stories about abusive 
relationships (and used these stories to build 
trust), but inconsistently talk about how they 
are going to see them. Sometimes family crises, 
such as a seriously ill father, are used as an 
excuse to go away for extended periods of time. 
www.undercoverresearch.net 194. Does their job 
take them away for periods at a time? It appears 
that many undercovers have jobs that require them 
to be away for extended periods, up to several 
weeks at a time. Tese jobs would also supply them 
with money, vehicles and excuses to put receipts 
‘through the books’. Depending on the nature of 
the job, most are reluctant to bring activists 
into contact with their employers. E.g. Lynn 
Watson was a care-worker, but when friends asked 
about working with her agency, she kept them at 
bay. 5. Does their home look un-lived in? A 
common theme is how un-homely or not lived-in 
their houses were, though­ again­not in every 
case. Tere would be materials around that 
indicated ‘political activist’, but they are the 
exception rather than the norm, looking more 
staged than anything. Tere would also be a lack 
of personal touch and possessions. Te most noted 
case was Lynn Watson’s house which had overdone 
Class War posters and litle in the way of 
personal touch. 6. Do they have a vehicle? Most 
exposed undercovers had vehicles and were very 
willing to use them for the purposes of 
campaigning, including doing reconnaissances and 
actions. Te vehicles would vary in type and 
model, and include vans. Sometimes the 
undercovers claimed the car came through their 
work. 7. Do they have above-average driving 
skills? Something commented on a lot of 
undercovers is their above average driving 
skills, which is not unsurprising given a Special 
Branch or other police background. 8. Would you 
consider them to be someone who goes out of their 
way to be helpful? Te charm, friendliness and 
general kindness of the undercovers is regularly 
noted upon. Tey come across as ready to go out of 
their way to help. In particular, they are happy 
to give lifs to and from campaigner’s homes. 9. 
Do they have ready access to money and are they 
generous with it? Tey are ofen ready to help 
people out with money, such as waive petrol costs 
or buy rounds of food or drink. Sometimes they 
will claim that expenses are already covered in 
some way­through their work for instance. Tey are 
not necessarily fash, but seem to have ready 
access to cash. 10. Do they focus relationships 
on key people? It is not uncommon for them­afer 
geting involved in a group­to ‘make a beeline’ 
for key people and become very close to them 
personally and in campaigning. Tis ofen leads to 
them being been seen as ‘second in command’, etc. 
20 Undercover Research Group 11. Do they ever 
exhibit noticeable out-of-character behaviour? A 
number of undercovers have been known to do 
something quite out of character that either 
disrupted an action and alerted police, or was 
distinctly far from the norm of the group. 
Examples are: inexplicable carelessness (Jim 
Boyling sabotaged a blockade during a Reclaim the 
Streets action by ‘forgeting’ to keep a window 
closed, so that the car was easy to remove by the 
police), or doing things beyond the group’s 
normal mode of behaviour (encouraging activities 
that put other members at risk, or taking them 
into unplanned confrontations). Related to this 
is spreading stories about more serious 
involvement in radical action elsewhere to give 
the impression they are ‘up for it’, though this 
would difer from how they normally present and 
actually behave in given situations. 12. Have you 
spotted oddities? A number of distinguishing 
features we have encountered in our research that 
are worth noting if you come across them: • 
Documents are held in names other than that they 
are known by (these can sometimes be explained 
away; not all discrepancies are without good 
reason). • Organisational skills at odds with 
their persona. • Not having the skills they 
claim, especially where it is within their 
alleged job (Mark Jenner, for instance claimed to 
be a professional joiner but was unable to ft a 
kitchen). Related to this is not knowing enough 
about something they claim to be into, 
particularly a football team. • A focus on 
cleanliness and order that puts them at the far 
end of the activist spectrum, or at odds with it 
(e.g. Mark Kennedy geting his hair regularly 
styled at professional hairdressers). • 
Characteristics that indicate some formal 
training (e.g. how they do their boots). • 
Reacting to surprise situations in ways that 
indicate training (e.g. Jenner reacting to a 
noise outside by dropping in the correct moves to 
react to a bomb explosion). • Owning a very 
expensive bit of equipment that is somewhat out 
of characteristic for them or their milieu (top 
of the range phone, watch). • Doing something 
that seems to be signalling to someone else. 13. 
Have there been weird things around court cases 
or lack of police interest? Sometimes undercover 
ofcers have inexplicably been dropped from a 
court case, or they choose to have a diferent 
solicitor from everyone else. Or you may have 
experienced a noticeable lack of police interest 
during the period the undercover was part of your 
group, or people would not be arrested when it 
would be otherwise be expected. It is now known 
that the undercovers’ handlers were 
www.undercoverresearch.net 21turning a blind eye 
to illegal activities on occasions, and would go 
out of their way to keep the undercover from 
going to court. Caveat: Te opposite might be true 
too: there are several strong examples of 
undercovers turning up in court using their false 
names to give evidence for instance­these have 
led to overturned convictions eventually. 14. Did 
they suddenly disappear and cut of all contact? 
Tis question is a section in itself as the ‘exit 
strategy’ is one of the most important aspects of 
the tradecraf for those investigating a potential 
undercover. In every case we are aware of 
undercovers have served a term of four to fve 
years, then lef relatively abruptly. It is quite 
telling how time and again two strategies are 
used, sometimes in combination: a) they go 
abroad, or b) act out some kind of mental 
breakdown, including actual tears. More 
importantly, they disappear completely, totally 
cuting themselves of from their activist social 
life. In several cases, not atending funerals or 
coming to other events related to people they 
were once very close to has given rise to 
suspicions. Sometimes, the situation has been 
more complicated, because the undercover 
continued to tangle up their personal life and 
their professional undercover one, which is 
called ‘going native’. Mike Chity, for instance, 
returned afer supposedly having lef for Canada to 
socialise with activist friends, while he 
continued his job in the protective service­a 
diferent section of Special Branch. Kennedy came 
back afer he had lef the police, and tried to use 
his activist contacts to set up shop as a 
corporate spy selling the information he 
gathered. 15. Can you help us kill these myths? 
We are aware that some people believe or have 
believed undercovers had a code of conduct, that 
there were things they would not do. We fag these 
rumours up here to help put an end to them. Some 
people say undercovers should never: • commit 
illegal activities; • have sexual relationships 
with people they were targeting; • deny they are 
police when asked directly (some would even joke 
about it). We know that all of these things have 
been done regularly by undercover ofcers. 22 
Undercover Research Group Important caveats to 
the 15 Qestions If you fnd someone whose story 
ticks a number of these boxes, it does not 
necessarily mean you are dealing with an 
undercover ofcer. It merely means that your 
suspicions warrant further digging and 
investigations. Tese questions are a starting 
point, not a way to prove a case. We strongly 
discourage people from spreading rumours based on 
suspicions alone, and we recommend following up 
suspicions with serious research as quickly as 
possible. Gossiping without confrmation does much 
harm and can destroy groups from within, 
regardless of whether or not there is any actual 
infltration. It is important to remember that 
while there might be commonalities among the way 
undercovers operate, there are also as many 
diferences, particularly around what they seek to 
achieve: some directly facilitate a group, while 
others seek to destroy it, for instance. We also 
note that there are many good reasons for people 
to fall into the same categories without being an 
undercover, our framework is not fail-safe. For 
example, there are prety valid reasons for not 
having contact with your family, or for people to 
disappear. Sufering from burn-out is also a 
common a reason for activists to withdraw (if you 
or someone you know is afected by burn-out 
contact Counselling for Social Change for 
support­see below). Furthermore, not all 
undercover stories are exactly the same, there 
will be variations: so not fting the patern does 
not necessarily put someone in the clear either. 
Apart from that, other forms of infltration (by 
security services or corporations, or through 
informers) will show very diferent paterns. If 
you have any questions or concerns or want to run 
unusual situations by us, do get in contact. N.B. 
If you post these questions anywhere, please make 
sure to leave the caveats in place. 
www.undercoverresearch.net 23RESOURCES 
Organisations Undercover Research 
Group­UndercoverResearch.net with full profles on 
undercover ofcers at Powerbase.info Spycop.Info 
(also a facebook group) Police Spies Out Of 
Lives­PoliceSpiesOutOfLives.org.uk ARSpyCatcher 
(blog)­network23.org/arspycatcher/ Campaign 
Opposing Police 
Surveillance­CampaignOpposingPoliceSurveillance.com 
Public Inquiry into Undercover 
Policing­UCPI.org.uk Te Monitoring Group has also 
put on several conferences on the issue of 
undercover policing. You can fnd videos of talks 
from them at www.tmg 
uk.org/watch-the-videos-from-our-conference-subversion-sabotage-and-spying 
political-policing-and-racism-in-the-uk/ On 
twitter, follow the hashtag #spycops Counselling 
resources Counselling for Social 
Change­CounsellingForSocialChange.org.uk British 
Association for Counselling BACP.co.uk Books Rob 
Evans & Paul Lewis, Undercover: Te True Story of 
Britain’s Secret Police Eveline Lubbers, Secret 
Manoeuvres in the Dark: Corporate Spying on 
Activists Dave Smith & Phil Chamberlain, 
Blacklisted: Te Secret War between Big Business and Union Activists  
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'From South America, where payment must be made with subtlety, the 
Bormann organization has made a substantial contribution. It has 
drawn many of the brightest Jewish businessmen into a participatory 
role in the development of many of its corporations, and many of 
these Jews share their prosperity most generously with Israel. If 
their proposals are sound, they are even provided with a specially 
dispensed venture capital fund. I spoke with one Jewish businessmen 
in Hartford, Connecticut. He had arrived there quite unknown several 
years before our conversation, but with Bormann money as his 
leverage. Today he is more than a millionaire, a quiet leader in the 
community with a certain share of his profits earmarked as always for 
his venture capital benefactors. This has taken place in many other 
instances across America and demonstrates how Bormann's people 
operate in the contemporary commercial world, in contrast to the 
fanciful nonsense with which Nazis are described in so much "literature."

So much emphasis is placed on select Jewish participation in Bormann 
companies that when Adolf Eichmann was seized and taken to Tel Aviv 
to stand trial, it produced a shock wave in the Jewish and German 
communities of Buenos Aires. Jewish leaders informed the Israeli 
authorities in no uncertain terms that this must never happen again 
because a repetition would permanently rupture relations with the 
Germans of Latin America, as well as with the Bormann organization, 
and cut off the flow of Jewish money to Israel. It never happened 
again, and the pursuit of Bormann quieted down at the request of 
these Jewish leaders. He is residing in an Argentinian safe haven, 
protected by the most efficient German infrastructure in history as 
well as by all those whose prosperity depends on his well-being.'
<http://l.facebook.com/l.php?u=http%3A%2F%2Fspitfirelist.com%2Fbooks%2Fmartin-bormann-nazi-in-exile%2F&h=eAQErj17O>http<http://l.facebook.com/l.php?u=http%3A%2F%2Fspitfirelist.com%2Fbooks%2Fmartin-bormann-nazi-in-exile%2F&h=eAQErj17O>://spitfirelist.com/books/martin-bormann-nazi-in-exile/ 


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