[Ir-l] [IR-L]: FIPR wants Big Browser scenarios
Caspar Bowden
cb at fipr.org
Sat May 27 08:33:22 BST 2000
FIPR is trying to develop briefing material which elucidates for non-techies
the risks to privacy of the "Big Browser" that RIP will enable (and that
will provide good arguments for using traffic-analysis-defeating methods
involving crypto):
<http://www.fipr.org/rip/FIPR%20Lords%202nd%20reading%20briefing.htm>
[There are important new arguments for requiring prior judicial
authorisation for access to Internet communications data. The explosive
growth of e-commerce, coupled with anticipated high penetration of
interactive digital television and third-generation mobile phones, means
that the Internet is on the verge of becoming a single conduit carrying
comprehensive transaction data tracing virtually every facet of private
life, which previously was scattered on separate utility, bank, credit-card,
library, and telecommunications billing computers, if indeed they were
recorded at all. The Home Office has made clear that it classes Internet
audit trails, including lists of e-mail correspondents and web sites
browsed, as communications data (rather than content). If, as seems likely,
the Internet in time subsumes both television and written information
sources, under the RIP Bill it will be lawful for any public authority to
obtain comprehensive details of what any person has read, watched, and who
they have corresponded with, without a ministerial or judicial warrant.
It is relevant that a current de facto safeguard, that such data can only be
obtained by police request on presenting a data controller with satisfactory
evidence that a Data Protection Act (s.29) exemption applies, is abolished.
If the power of interception were implemented as envisaged by the Smith
Report, it would be both lawful and feasible for such communications data to
be obtained instantaneously, remotely, and secretly by the same apparatus:
the "black-boxes" installed at ISPs, linked to the GTAC monitoring centre.
Moreover, rapid advances in computing power now permit warehousing and
"traffic-analysis" of unlimited quantities of communications data by
automated tools[7] that derive "friendship trees" and can detect patterns of
association between individuals and groups using sophisticated artificial
intelligence programming. This method can be considered as a
"suspicion-engine" which can identify new targets of investigation with
complete generality without any access to the content of communications
but which could subsequently serve as the basis for an interception warrant.
In summary, the combination of:
.) an interception infrastructure linking all data carriers (for feasible
cost) to a central monitoring facility capable of remotely selecting traffic
and content
.) traffic-analysis tools which make intelligent inferences from patterns of
association matched to arbitrary criteria
.) a legal power of self-authorisation, without prior judicial approval
can justifiably be regarded as the emergence of a powerful new form of
mass-surveillance.
It should be emphasised that whilst GCHQ performs broad-spectrum processing
of both the content and traffic patterns of external communications,
mass-surveillance of domestic communications is legally unprecedented in
peacetime.
We wish to emphasise that it is not our view that RIP was drafted with this
intention however it is sobering to realise that proposals modestly billed
as "updating and modernising existing powers", would in fact legitimise what
an extreme government might seek to achieve.]
. - . - . - .
I'd be very interested in hearing from anyone (or getting a thread going if
not too off-topic) who would like to work on developing near-future
scenarios on how government departments are likely to want progressively
more data, which could lead ineluctably to GTAC mission-creep involving
direct siphoning of traffic data from the ISP.
For an example see "A Perfect Match"
<http://www.audit-commission.gov.uk/ac2/NR/LocalA/prdatamf.htm>
including the rather bald statement buried in the Appendix
"Information was required by the auditor for the NFI 1998 under Section 6 of
the Audit Commission Act 1998 (Ref. 3). Disclosure of the data to the Audit
Commission was exempt from the non-disclosure provisions of the Data
Protection Acts 1984 (Ref. 4) and 1998 (Ref. 5) BECAUSE THE DISCLOSURE WAS
REQUIRED BY STATUTE (Section 34(5) of the Data Protection Act 1984)."
(I think this is now in the new Act S.35. - (1) Personal data are exempt
from the non-disclosure provisions where the disclosure is required by or
under any enactment, by any rule of law or by the order of a court.)
--
Caspar Bowden Tel: +44(0)20 7354 2333
Director, Foundation for Information Policy Research
RIP Information Centre at: www.fipr.org/rip#media
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