[Ir-l] Fwd: Dangers Of New Wiretapping/Internet Laws

Chris Bailey chrisbailey at gn.apc.org
Thu Sep 27 21:54:27 BST 2001


>Date: Wed, 26 Sep 2001 22:20:59 -0700
>From: steve zeltzer <lvpsf at igc.org>
>Subject: Dangers Of New Wiretapping/Internet Laws
>To: LABORTECH <lvpsf at igc.org>, UPPNET <lvpsf at igc.org>
>User-Agent: Microsoft Outlook Express Macintosh Edition - 5.01 (1630)
>
>  September 21, 2001
>            CYBER LAW JOURNAL
>            Concern Over Proposed Changes in Internet Surveillance
>            By CARL S. KAPLAN
>
>            Significant and perhaps worrisome changes in the
>government's Internet surveillance authority have been proposed by
>legislators in the wake of the attacks on the World Trade Center and
>the Pentagon. Indeed, so much is happening so quickly it's hard to
>keep track of the legislative process, let alone follow the ongoing
>debate between fast-moving law enforcement experts and more cautious
>civil libertarians.
>
>           To illuminate the huge changes afoot, it might be useful to
>spotlight one little corner of some proposed legislation. After all,
>as lawyers love to say, the devil is in the details.
>            The proposed law that is furthest along in the pipeline is
>the Combating Terrorism Act of 2001, an amendment to an appropriations
>bill that was passed by the Senate on September 13th without hearings
>and with little floor debate. That legislation, which may ultimately
>become part of an integrated package of laws put forward this week by
>the Attorney General, has several provisions. Perhaps the most
>controversial is section 832, which seeks to enhance the government's
>ability to capture information related to a suspect's activities in
>cyberspace.
>            Some background information is in order. With telephone
>conversations, a law enforcement official can tap a suspect's
>conversations only if there is probable cause to believe the suspect
>is doing something illegal and if a magistrate agrees to issue an
>order. The Fourth Amendment's ban on unreasonable searches have
>heightened the legal requirements needed for a government wiretap.
>
>            But suppose an F.B.I. agent doesn't want to listen to the
>content of a telephone conversation. Suppose she just wants to get a
>list of the telephone numbers that a suspect dials, and the telephone
>numbers of people that call the suspect? This information, the Supreme
>Court has held, is not that private. Under federal law, all the
>government has to do in order to plant gizmos that record a suspect's
>outgoing and incoming telephone numbers -- so called pen registers and
>trap and trace devices -- is to tell a magistrate that the information
>is relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation. There is no probable
>cause requirement and no hearing. The pen/trap and trace information
>is extremely easy to get.
>
>            For the past few years, the government has interpreted the
>existing pen register and trap and trace laws, which were designed
>with telephones in mind, to allow them to swiftly garner certain
>information from ISP's about a suspect's e-mails -- for example, the
>to/from header information.
>
>            In one sense, section 832 of the Senate amendment codifies
>the government's pro-law enforcement interpretation. Among other
>things, the amendment explicitly expands the pen/trap and trace law to
>include Internet communications. Specifically, the proposed law allows
>the government, under the low-standard pen/trap and trace authority,
>to record not just telephone numbers dialed but "routing, addressing,
>or signaling information" .
>
>            According to experts on both sides of the legislative
>debate, the exact meaning of routing, addressing and signaling data
>is ambiguous. But chances are it includes not just to/from e-mail
>header information but a record of the URLs -- Web site addresses --
>that a person visits.
>
>            The legislation's language is "not very narrow," said
>Stewart Baker, head of the technology practice at Steptoe & Johnson, a
>Washington, D.C. law firm, and former general counsel of the National
>Security Agency. Conceivably, he said, federal agents under the
>proposed law could very easily -- and without making a showing of
>probable cause -- get a list of "everyone you send e-mail to, when you
>sent it, who replied to you, how long the messages were, whether they
>had attachments, as well as where you went online."
> >
>            "That's quite a bit of information," added Baker, who this
>week participated in a written dialog on national security in wartime
>on the online magazine Slate. Moreover, it's more information-rich
>material than a log of telephone numbers. "I think if you asked anyone
>on the street: 'Which would you rather reveal, the telephone numbers
>you dialed or a list of all the people you sent e-mail to and the Web
>sites you visited?' I think they'd say, "Go with the phone numbers,'"
>he said.
>
>            Under the proposed amendment, the government's authority
>to easily monitor a person's clickstream is particularly troublesome
>and an unwarranted enlargement of pen/trap and trace law, say some
>critics. After all, they point out, on the Internet the boundary
>between a mere address and the content of a communication is fuzzy.
>For example, by examining a URL, an agent may gain knowledge of a book
>that a person sought to purchase on Amazon.com, or perhaps learn about
>a person's query on a search engine. Indeed, a URL for a target's use
>of Google may reveal travel plans:
>
>http://www.google.com/search?q=Do+You+Know+the+Way+to+San+Jose&btnG=Google+Searchr
>
>
>            "When you look at URLs, you're getting a map of how
>someone surfs the Net," said Daniel Solove, a law professor at Seton
>Hall University and an expert on privacy. "That's much more telling
>about an individual" than a list of telephone numbers, he said. He
>said that he wished Congress would take its time and examine any new
>Internet surveillance legislation with great care.
>
>            That view is echoed by Eugene Volokh, a law professor at
>UCLA and the other half of the ongoing national security dialog on
>Slate. "Keep in mind that these laws are things we will live with for
>a long time," he said in an interview. "These laws can be used by the
>government in other sorts of investigations" besides terrorism, he
>added.
>
>            For his part, Baker of Steptoe & Johnson is willing to
>stomach section 832, should it become law. "Obviously, we're in a
>crisis," he said.
>
>            Marc Zwillinger, a former Internet crime prosecutor for
>the Department of Justice who is currently a partner at the
>Washington, D.C. office of Kirkland & Ellis, a large law firm, goes a
>bit further. He said that bringing the pen/trap and trace law into the
>Internet Age is not that big a deal.
>
>            "Knowing that you visited a Web site at a certain time --
>how is that different from knowing that you dialed a certain telephone
>number at a particular time of the day?" he asked. It's the same
>thing, he asserted. The only difference is that because people use the
>Web more than telephones, authorities can learn more. "I'm not
>troubled by it," he said.
>
>            Zwillinger noted that when he worked for the government,
>he obtained pen/trap and trace information about suspects' Internet
>use "hundreds of times." He said that under the Justice Department's
>interpretation of the current federal law, as well as under the
>proposed law, the government can lawfully record, for example, which
>computer terminals downloaded a particular file from a server; which
>computers logged into a Hotmail account to retrieve mail; which URLs a
>computer user visited. Often, an ISP can capture this information, he
>said, or the F.B.I. can deploy over-the-counter software tools or use
>sniffer programs such as Carnivore to obtain needed results.
>  E-mail
>                        Carl S. Kaplan at kaplanc at nytimes.com welcomes
>your comments and suggestions.




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